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International commercial arbitration is a very attractive field right now, with
significant numbers of practitioners and aspiring arbitrators making their first
forays into what was once seen as a specialized niche practice. In many ways, this
increased interest in international commercial arbitration is a direct result of mar-
ket forces, as globalization requires and inspires an ever-larger number of com-
mercial actors, many of whom are not located in well-established centers of inter-
national trade such as New York or Washington, D.C., to take part in cross-border
transactions.
However, the mere fact that the number of international commercial arbitra-
tions taking place around the world is on the rise cannot explain the number of
practitioners and arbitrators who are handling these sorts of cases for the first (and
perhaps only) time. Indeed, as recently as fifteen years ago international commer-
cial arbitration was commonly viewed as so unique and demanding that only a
handful of lawyers in a small number of boutique firms were considered capable
of representing clients in such matters.
Since then, things have changed, both in terms of the practice and the busi-
ness of law.' Rather than shying away from international commercial arbitration,
* D.Phil., University of Oxford (U.K.); Ph.D., University of Cambridge (U.K.); J D., Duke Uni-
versity; M.P.W., University of Southern California; B.A., University of California, Davis. The author,
who is admitted to practice as an attorney in New York and Illinois and as a solicitor in England and
Wales, is Senior Fellow at the Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution and Associate Professor of
Law at the University of Missouri. This Article is based substantially on a judge's guide written by the
author for the Federal Judicial Center (FJC). That monograph, which is entitled INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A GUIDE FOR U.S. FEDERAL JUDGES (2012), is part of a series of publi-
cations commissioned by the FJC to assist U.S. federal judges in addressing various types of interna-
tional disputes. These publications are available to the public free of charge from the FJC website
(http://www.fjc.gov/). The author would like to thank the FJC for authorizing the use of some of the
materials from that text in this Article. Furthermore, the author would like to thank Gary B. Born,
Christopher R. Drahozal, Emmanuel Gaillard, Margaret Moses, William W. Park and Lucy Reed for
comments on an early draft of the judge's guide, since many of their excellent suggestions are incorpo-
rated into this Article. All errors of course remain the author's own.
1. These changes include a higher degree of mobility among practitioners, a decrease in mentorship
of young attorneys and the expansion of electronic research methods have allows increased access (or
the perception of increased access) to specialized international source materials that were once solely
in the hands of arbitral specialists. See S.I. Strong, Research in International Commercial Arbitration:
Special Skills, Special Sources, 20 AM. REV. INT'L. ARB. 119, 127-29 (2009) [hereinafter Strong,
Research].
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many practitioners and arbitrators now see this field as a lucrative, somewhat
glamorous sub-specialty that can be added onto an existing dispute resolution
practice with relative ease. The idea is that international commercial arbitration
cannot be all that different from domestic arbitration or litigation.2 Unfortunately,
this assumption is dangerously misguided.
As one expert in international commercial arbitration recently wrote, "the es-
sential difference" between international and other types of arbitration "is so great
that their similarities are largely illusory." However, many newcomers to the
field are entirely unaware of the extent to which the policies and procedures that
apply to international arbitration vary from those in domestic litigation and arbi-
tration. This is deeply troubling, since the biggest danger in law is when "you
don't know what you don't know." Indeed, many of those who participate only
infrequently in international commercial arbitration do not even know of their
own blind spots.
This lack of awareness can have serious repercussions. For example, practi-
tioners who do not understand the nuances of international practice and procedure
suffer a competitive disadvantage against more experienced counsel, leading ei-
ther to the loss of the dispute or to a much higher bill at the end of the process
because the lawyer has to get up to speed on issues that a specialist would already
know. (Both outcomes obviously tend to make clients unhappy.) Arbitrators who
are unfamiliar with international norms also experience difficulties, since errors
made during the process can lead to either an unenforceable award or damage the
arbitrator's own professional reputation as a competent, knowledgeable decision-
maker.
Aspiring arbitrators and practitioners, therefore, cannot simply step into the
international realm without some subject-specific preparation, no matter how ex-
perienced they may be in other types of commercial law and practice. Fortunate-
ly, there are a number of methods by which newcomers to and infrequent partici-
pants in international commercial arbitration can obtain the skills necessary to
work in this area of law.
The best alternative, of course, would be to acquire hands-on training from
one of the increasing numbers of continuing legal education providers and univer-
sities that offer specialized courses in international commercial arbitration.5 Many
2. The legal literature is unfortunately littered with so-called experts who mistakenly claim that
"[c]ffective arbitration advocacy is remarkably similar to model advocacy in court." Kevin R. Casey &
Marissa Parker, Strategies for Achieving an Arbitration Advantage Require Early Analysis, Pre-
Hearing Strategies, and Awards Scrutiny, 26 ALT. HIGH COST LITIG. 167 (Oct. 2008); see also Anana
R. Levinson, Lawyering Skills, Principles and Methods Offer Insight as to Best Practices for Arbitra-
tion, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. I (2008). However, "[t]he voices of the true experts in international commer-
cial arbitration can be lost, sometimes - ironically - because their views are published in sources of
which novices are unaware." Strong, Research, supra note 1, at 124.
3. See PHILIP D. O'NEILL JR., BEST PRACTICES FOR INTERNATIONAL ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: LEADING LAWYERS ON UNDERSTANDING ADR LAWS AND POLICIES, OVERCOMING
CHALLENGES, AND SUCCEEDING IN A GLOBAL SETTING 105, 119 (Aspatore 2007) (noting that clients
mistakenly believe their usual litigation counsel can handle international commercial arbitrations).
4. Jan Paulsson, International Arbitration Is Not Arbitration, 2008 STOCKHOLM INT'L ARB. REV. 1,
I.
5. Some of the arbitral institutions that offer continuing education courses include the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) and the Intema-
tional Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), which is the international arm of the American Arbitra-
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of these programs are excellent and well worth the investment. However, not
every practicing lawyer or arbitrator can travel to these types of in-person train-
ings, which often take place in well-established arbitral centers such as New York,
Miami, or Washington, D.C. In those cases, some recourse may be had to the
increasing number of written materials that are now available in this area of law.
For example, various books and articles have been published regarding the "un-
written" aspects of practice in international commercial arbitration.6 Efforts have
also been made to describe the unique types of legal authorities utilized in this
field of law and where they may be found, since it is impossible to construct a
convincing legal argument without the proper source material.
One thing that is missing, however, is a concise yet detailed guide to the in-
tersection between U.S. federal courts and international commercial arbitration.8
This is a very complicated subject, and one that infrequent participants in interna-
tional arbitration find particularly perplexing. Furthermore, given the scope of
materials relevant to this area of law,9 newcomers often find it difficult to find
materials that quickly describe how individual issues and procedures fit into the
overall scheme of things. This can be problematic, since legal disputes frequently
must be handled on an expedited basis and are, therefore, not amenable to exten-
sive and time-consuming research.
Thus, this Article aims to provide newcomers to and infrequent users of inter-
national commercial arbitration with a brief introduction to the relationship be-
tion Association (AAA). The Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (ClArb), which has branches in North
America and other regions, offers a multi-tiered pathway to competence, providing varying degrees of
certification to those who have completed their courses. Furthermore, some institutions have begun to
provide specialized certificates or degrees in international or transnational law. See Doug Jones, Acqui-
sition ofSkills and Accreditation in International Arbitration, 22 ARB. INT'L 275, 275 (2006). Among
the universities that offer certificate programs and/or intensive summer courses in international com-
mercial arbitration are American University Washington College of Law in the United States; the
School of International Arbitration at Queen Mary University of London in the United Kingdom; the
International Centre for Arbitration, Mediation and Negotiation of the Institute for European Studies of
the CEU San Pablo University in Spain; and the University of Hong Kong in Hong Kong. The Intema-
tional Bar Association also offers an LL.M. in international law in association with the Law College of
England and Wales.
6. See STEVEN FINIZIO & DUNCAN SPELLER, A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2010); H. RODERIC HEARD ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION ADVOCACY: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE FOR AMERICAN LAWYERS (2011); LAWRENCE
W. NEWMAN & RICHARD D. HILL, LEADING ARBITRATORS' GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
(2008); PRACTITIONER'S HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION (Richard
Chernick et al., eds., 2012); FRANK-BERND WEIGAND, PRACTITIONER'S HANDBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2010); Loukas Mistelis, Workshop on Research, Teach-
ing and Training in International Arbitration - An Introduction, 22 ARB. INT'L 243, 244 (2006);
O'NEILL, supra note 3.
7. See S.I. STRONG, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
SOURCES AND STRATEGIES (2009); Strong, Research, supra note 1, at 119; see also JULIAN D.M. LEW
ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 2-44 (2003). Some information
on this topic is provided in this Article. See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
8. Although some assistance is forthcoming in the form of the highly anticipated Restatement on
the U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration, that project will not be completed for a number
of years. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PUBLICATIONS CATALOG, RESTATEMENT ON THE U.S. LAW
OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, available at
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.ppage&nodc id=130.
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tween international arbitral proceedings and U.S. federal courts.' 0 Limitations of
space mean that a great deal has necessarily been left out of this discussion. For
example, this Article does not describe processes internal to the arbitration, in-
stead focusing solely on the interaction between tribunal, parties and court. Fur-
thermore, the text often skips over basic propositions of U.S. law that are well-
established in the domestic realm so as to concentrate more heavily on elements
that are unique to international disputes."
Although this Article focuses on the intersection between U.S. litigation and
international commercial arbitration, there will be times when the discussion in-
troduces the law and practice of other nations. This type of limited comparative
analysis is important because there are times when the U.S. approach to interna-
tional commercial arbitration varies from that taken by other nations. In some
cases, this divergence is problematic as a matter of international law and practice,
while in other cases it is not.12 However, this Article does not aim to critique or
defend any individual policy or procedure. Instead, the goal is simply to introduce
the various issues that may arise as a tactical matter so that practitioners and arbi-
trators can understand how actions taken in U.S. courts may affect procedures in
the arbitration or in other national courts. One of the reasons why experienced
counsel and arbitrators are so highly valued in international commercial arbitra-
tion is because of their ability to see the big picture, and newcomers need to learn
to develop this kind of skill if they want to be successful in this field.
Finally, the purpose of this Article is not to provide answers to particular
questions, since far too much depends on the individual facts and circumstances of
a particular dispute to allow for abstract generalizations. Instead, the goal is to
identify a useful framework for analysis of matters relating to international com-
mercial arbitration so that newcomers and infrequent participants in this area of
law can approach their specific concerns with a higher degree of understanding
and sophistication.
10. This guide may also be of use to students, both in the U.S. and abroad, who need to understand
the interplay between judicial and arbitral proceedings. One of the best ways for law students to learn
about international commercial arbitration is to participate in one of the growing number of interna-
tional arbitration moots that take place around the world. See, e.g., Eric E. Bergsten, The William C.
Vis International Commercial Arbitration Moot and the Teaching of International Commercial Arbi-
tration, 22 ARB. INT'L 309 (2006); Jack M. Graves & Stephanie A. Vaughan, The Willem C. Vis Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration Moot: Making the Most of an Extraordinary Educational Opportuni-
ty, 10 VINDOBONA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 173 (2006); THE VIs BOOK - A PARTICIPANT'S GUIDE TO THE
WILLEM C. Vis INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION MOOT (Janet Walker ed., 2008). Experts
agree that international moot competitions can be extraordinarily helpful in developing internationally-
minded advocates. See Mark C. Rahdert, Comparative Constitutional Advocacy, 56 AM. U. L. REV.
553, 663-64 (2007). Some DVDs of experienced advocates and arbitrators role-playing in mock arbi-
trations are also now available. See Jack J. Coc, Jr., Some Thoughts on Teaching International ADR
and the Case for Reality-Based Simulations, 22 ARB. INT'L 249, 256-57 (2006). Those interested in
improving their understanding of the international arbitral process can also view videos of oral argu-
ment and obtain copies of the written submissions in an inter-state arbitration held at the Permanent
Court of Arbitration at The Hague in April 2009. See The Government of Sudan v. The Sudan People's
Liberation Movement/Army (Abyci Arbitration), available at http://www.pea-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pagid=l 306.
I1. Basic information on domestic U.S. arbitration law and procedure is available elsewhere. See
LARRY E. EDMONSON, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2011).
12. Uniformity of practice is often a goal of the international arbitral community, although there are
also times when national divergence is both contemplated and welcomed. See BORN, supra note 9, at
210; LEW ET AL., supra note 7, 1 2-20.
122 [Vol. 2012
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The structure of the Article is as follows. First, part II sets the discussion in
context by describing the differences between international commercial arbitration
and other dispute resolution mechanisms, including domestic arbitration.
Next, part III describes a number of fundamental concepts that lay the
groundwork for further analysis. For example, part III provides an overview of
the arbitral process and considers the various sources of authority relied upon in
international commercial arbitration. This part also gives a basic outline of the
U.S. statutory approach to international commercial arbitration and introduces
certain basic jurisdictional concerns that will be referred to throughout the text.
The next section, part IV, is in many ways the core of the Article, since this
portion of the text addresses the various procedural motions that are associated
with international commercial arbitration. The discussion is arranged chronologi-
cally so as to give the maximum practical benefit, beginning with issues that arise
in court prior to or at the initiation of the arbitration before moving on to issues
that arise during and after the arbitration.
Although part IV covers the range of motions that may be brought in U.S.
federal court in cases involving international commercial arbitration, there are
some matters that do not fall neatly into one of these categories. These issues
relate to who may be a proper party in an international commercial arbitration and
include questions involving non-signatories, multiparty proceedings and state
parties. Because these matters can arise at any time, they are addressed separately
in part V. Part VI then concludes the Article with some closing observations.
Before beginning, it is useful to provide a cautionary word to those who may
be tempted to turn straight to the part that addresses the immediate issue that they
are researching. International commercial arbitration is a complex subject, requir-
ing a sophisticated understanding of the interplay between substantive and proce-
dural law at both the national and international levels. Readers are therefore urged
to review parts II and III in their entirety before moving on to one of the subparts
contained in part IV. While the text does contain a significant amount of internal
cross-referencing to help provide context for the various discussions, it is im-
portant to have an overview of the field as a whole before addressing one of the
constituent elements. Part V contains a number of useful points, although readers
may wish to refer to this part only when one of the relevant issues arises.
The substantive discussion now begins with an overview of the differences
between international commercial arbitration and various forms of arbitration
commonly seen in domestic disputes.
II. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION AND OTHER FORMS OF ARBITRATION
The term "arbitration" encompasses a wide variety of dispute resolution
mechanisms. However, arbitration is not a one-size-fits-all proposition. Distinct
variations arise across different types of disputes, both with respect to the applica-
ble policies and procedures. It is therefore necessary to differentiate between the
various types of proceedings so as to avoid any misconceptions about the nature
of international commercial arbitration.
123No. 1]1
5
Strong: Strong: Navigating the Borders
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. Distinguishing International Commercial Arbitration From
International Investment Arbitration
The first task is to distinguish international commercial arbitration from in-
ternational investment (alternatively called "investor-state" or "treaty") arbitra-
tion. Although both processes are international, they derive their authority from
two fundamentally different sources and therefore reflect a number of basic dis-
similarities.
For example, international commercial arbitration is a private dispute resolu-
tion mechanism that relies heavily on the agreement of the parties, both as a
means of demonstrating consent to arbitration and as a way of describing the
shape of the proceedings. The types of procedures that can be used in internation-
al commercial arbitration are as diverse as the disputes themselves, and arbitral
tribunals are encouraged to tailor the procedures to meet the needs of the individ-
ual parties and the dispute at hand.
International investment arbitration, on the other hand, is a treaty-based pro-
cedure that is rooted in public international law.'3 Consent to international in-
vestment arbitration exists at the state-to-state level and must be found in each
particular proceeding through reliance on one of the hundreds of bilateral invest-
ment treaties (BITs), multilateral investment treaties (MITs) or investment protec-
tion agreements (IPAs) that are currently in place worldwide. 14 The most well-
known instrument on international investment arbitration is the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States,
more commonly known as the ICSID Convention or the Washington Conven-
tion. Procedures in each individual dispute are dictated by the terms of the gov-
erning investment treaty, with little opportunity for deviation from the internation-
ally agreed terms.16
Because treaty-based arbitration is a public law mechanism, it gives rise to a
number of practical and jurisprudential issues that do not exist in international
commercial arbitration, which constitutes a matter of private international law.' 7
While some investment arbitrations resemble commercial arbitrations in some
regards, the two procedures reflect a sufficient number of differences to make it
impossible to address both in this Article.' 8 Therefore, the following discussion
should be taken to refer only to international commercial arbitration, not invest-
ment arbitration under the ICSID Convention or any applicable BIT, MIT or
IPA.' 9
13 See CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:
SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES (2008); CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A
COMMENTARY (2001).
14. See SCHREUER, supra note 13.
15. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1720, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
16. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 13.
17. See LEW ET AL., supra note 7,I 28-1 to 28-119 (2003).
18. Id. 28-1 to 28-119; MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 13.
19. See ICSI D Convention, supra note 15.
124 [Vol. 2012
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B. Comparing International Commercial Arbitration to
Other Forms ofDispute Resolution
The next task is to compare international commercial arbitration to domestic
arbitration and litigation. Although there are some similarities between the vari-
ous dispute resolution mechanisms, key differences arise as a matter of both poli-
cy and procedure.
First, certain distinctions can be made between international and domestic ar-
bitration. For example, most parties are well aware of the robust pro-arbitration
policy currently in place in the United States.20 However, relatively few people
know that the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that international commercial
arbitration is to be treated even more favorably than domestic arbitration. Thus,
the:
concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and
transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international
commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require
that we enforce the parties' agreement, even assuming that a contrary re-
sult would be forthcoming in a domestic context.2 1
Policy is not the only area where international and domestic arbitration differ.
Distinctions also exist at the procedural level. For example, international com-
mercial arbitration typically involves:
* Sophisticated, specialized counsel for both parties (as opposed to
consumer, employment and securities arbitration, which may proceed
without counsel for one or both of the parties);
* Highly qualified arbitrators with years of experience in international
law and practice (as opposed to securities arbitration, which uses "pub-
lic" arbitrators who lack any insider knowledge of the securities industry,
or other forms of arbitration, which may not routinely use lawyers as ar-
bitrators);
* Strict policies requiring arbitrators to disclose conflicts of interest, in-
cluding previous contacts with the parties or with counsel (as opposed to
labor and employment arbitration, which can experience difficulties aris-
ing from perceptions regarding arbitrator bias concerning "repeat play-
ers");
* Arbitration agreements negotiated by sophisticated players at arm's
length (as opposed to consumer or employment arbitration, which can
involve contracts of adhesion signed by lay persons with no real under-
standing of arbitration or its alternatives);
20 See BORN, supra note 9, at 48-49, 132-44.
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* Highly formal procedures, often dictated by detailed institutional
rules of procedure and requiring extensive pre- and post-hearing written
submissions, and involving days, if not weeks, of hearings (as opposed to
consumer, labor, and employment arbitration, which use very little in the
way of written submissions and evidence, and which emphasize short
and informal hearings);
* Complex legal claims involving large sums of money, often ranging
in the millions or billions of dollars (as opposed to consumer, labor, and
employment arbitration, which often involve simple legal issues and
small amounts in dispute); and
* Extensive reliance on statutes, judicial precedents, international trea-
ties and other legal authorities (as opposed to consumer, labor, and em-
ployment arbitration, which often involve less complex questions of sub-
stantive and procedural law).
Although these comparisons are obviously very general, they nevertheless demon-
strate certain fundamental differences between international commercial arbitra-
tion and various forms of domestic arbitration.
Second, international commercial arbitration reflects certain distinct qualities
when compared to international litigation. For example, international commercial
arbitration provides:
* An effective and reliable means of enforcing foreign arbitral awards
through use of various international treaties (as opposed to international
litigation, which requires U.S. parties to rely primarily on unpredictable
principles of international comity, since the U.S. is not a party to any
multilateral agreements on the enforcement of civil judgments);
* A faster route to the final determination of the matter, due to limited
judicial review (as opposed to international litigation, which can involve
multiple appeals and the possible need for enforcement in various juris-
dictions through the comity-based procedure noted above);
* A single forum in which to resolve disputes (as opposed to interna-
tional litigation, which can involve multiple proceedings in different ju-
risdictions, particularly in cases where there is no enforceable choice of
forum clause);
* Neutral decision-makers free from national or political prejudices (as
opposed to international litigation, which can subject parties to bias (or
perceived bias) from national courts that favor their own citizens);
* Adjudication by persons with extensive experience in international
law and commerce (as opposed to international litigation, which may not
involve decision-makers who are expert in complex commercial matters
or international trade); and
[Vol. 2012126
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* A purposeful and time-tested blend of common law and civil law pro-
cedures (as opposed to international litigation, which typically gives one
party a home-court advantage in terms of procedure).
Interestingly, many multinational actors find international litigation in nation-
al courts so problematic that arbitration is no longer considered an alternative
means of resolving disputes in the international commercial realm. Instead, many
parties consider arbitration to be the only realistic method of resolving disputes
arising out of cross-border transactions.
The cornerstone of the international arbitral regime is the 1958 United Na-
tions Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, more commonly known as the New York Convention.22 With 146 state
parties as of January 2012, the New York Convention is perhaps the most success-
ful commercial treaty in the world.23 This multilateral agreement revolutionized
global commerce by creating a neutral, reputable, and effective means of resolv-
ing international legal disputes.24 Although several other international treaties on
arbitration exist, the only one that parties to U.S. proceedings will regularly have
to address is the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitra-
tion of 1975, more commonly known as the Panama Convention.25
Both the New York and Panama Conventions have been incorporated into
domestic U.S. law through the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).26 The two treaties,
which are similar in many ways, are to be applied uniformly as per Congressional
mandate. 27 For this reason, much of the discussion in this guide refers only to the
New York Convention, although the principles apply equally to the Panama Con-
vention.28
Given its vast geographic scope, the New York Convention arises more fre-
quently in U.S. practice than the Panama Convention. 29 However, in cases where
22. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention].
23. See New York Convention, Status, available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitraul
en/uncitral texts/arbitration/NYConvention status.html [hereinafter New York Convention Status].
24. See BORN, supra note 9, at 91-101; LEW ET AL., supra note 7, 1f 1-21 to 1-22.
25. See Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1975, Pub. L. No.
101-369, 104 Stat. 448 (1990) [hereinafter Panama Convention]; see also European Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration, Apr 21, 1964, 484 U.N.T.S. 364; Organization of American
States, Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral
Awards (Montevideo Convention), May 14, 1979, 1439 U.N.T.S. 87.
26. See New York Convention, supra note 22; Panama Convention, supra note 25; 9 U.S.C. §201
(2011) (regarding the New York Convention); id §301 (regarding the Panama Convention).
27. See House Report No. 501, 101' Cong., 2d Scss. 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 675,
678; DRC, Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, 774 F. Supp. 2d 66, 71 (D.D.C. 2011); BORN, supra note 9,
at 104 n. 615.
28. See New York Convention, supra note 22; Panama Convention, supra note 25; see also John P.
Bowman, The Panama Convention and its Implementation Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 11 AM.
REV. INT'L ARB. 1 (2000); Helena Tavares Erickson et al., Looking Back, and Ahead: The Panama
Convention After 30 Years, 23 ALT. HIGH COST LIT. 184 (2004).
29. See New York Convention, supra note 22; Panama Convention, supra note 25; New York Con-
vention Status, supra note 23. The seventeen states that have ratified the Panama Convention include
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. See Panama Conven-
tion, supra note 25; see also Organization of American States, Foreign Trade Information System,
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/comarb/iacac/iacac2c.asp [hereinafter SICE]. The two
No. 1] 127
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both treaties apply, the Panama Convention takes precedence if a majority of the
parties to the arbitration agreement are from countries that have ratified or acced-
ed to the Panama Convention and also are members of the Organization of Ameri-
can States.30  Therefore, lawyers involved in disputes involving Latin America
should familiarize themselves with the differences between the New York and
Panama Conventions.31
III. FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
Because this Article focuses on matters that come before U.S. federal courts,
it might not seem necessary to discuss issues involving internal arbitral procedure.
To a large extent, that is true, since a quick review of some of the leading institu-
tional rules provides a rough outline of the process and demonstrates that interna-
tional arbitration follows well-established procedures that give the parties clear
guidance about written submissions, the taking and presentation of evidence,
powers of the tribunal, and so on.32
Nevertheless, some general background information about arbitral procedurds
is necessary to demonstrate how and why certain disputes end up in court. Fur-
thermore, providing some context regarding internal arbitral procedures can help
explain why national courts are required to adopt certain standards or procedures
as a matter of international law. This section, therefore, provides a brief introduc-
tion to various fundamental concepts in international commercial arbitration so as
to lay the groundwork for later discussions.
A. Institutional Arbitration versus Ad-hoc Procedures
To begin with, a distinction must be made between institutional and ad hoc
proceedings.3 3 Although there is no requirement that an international commercial
arbitration be administered by an arbitral institution, parties often find it useful to
seek the assistance of one of the many organizations specializing in the resolution
of international disputes. These organizations, which may be based in the United
States or elsewhere, typically provide two different services.
countnes that have signed the Convention but not yet ratified it are the Dominican Republic and Nica-
ragua. See id.
30. See 9 U.S.C. §307 (2011).
3 1. See New York Convention, supra note 22; Panama Convention, supra note 25. One of the major
differences is discussed below. See infra notes 67-78 and accompanying text. Further reading on this
topic is available. See Bowman, supra note 28; Erickson ct al., supra note 28.
32. See International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Rules of Arbitration, effective January 1, 2012,
2011, available at http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/id4l99/index.htm [hereinafter ICC Arbi-
tration Rules]; International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR) International Arbitration Rules,
effective June 1, 1999, available at http://www.adr.orgliedr [hereinafter ICDR Arbitration Rules];
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) Arbitration Rules, effective Jan. 1, 1998, available
at http://www.Icia.org/Disputc Resolution Services/LCIA ArbitrationRulcs.aspx [hereinafter LCIA
Arbitration Rules].
33. The differences between these two proceedings are discussed in detail elsewhere. See LEw ET
AL., supra note 7, IM 3-1 to 3-59.
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First, arbitral institutions administer arbitrations, providing a variety of types
of practical assistance to the parties.34 For example, an arbitral institution can help
with the selection of the arbitral tribunal, consider challenges to individual arbitra-
tors and facilitate communications between the parties and the tribunal, among
other things.
Second, arbitral institutions publish procedural rules for use in individual ar-
bitrations.35 These rules offer a number of benefits, including neutrality, con-
sistency and predictability. Published rules typically allow for a great deal of
flexibility and discretion on the part of the arbitral tribunal while also providing
time-tested solutions to issues that routinely arise in international disputes.
Arbitrations that are not administered by an institutional body proceed "ad
hoc." Some ad hoc arbitrations are truly independent of institutional influence,
with all procedures determined by the parties and/or arbitrators themselves. How-
ever, international arbitration is a complex undertaking, and it can be both risky
and time-consuming for parties to design a complete set of individualized proce-
dures for each dispute or transaction.36  Therefore, parties can decide to adopt
procedural rules published by an arbitral institution, even if the process is not
administered by that organization. These arbitrations are still referred to as ad hoc
proceedings, even though they are governed by published procedural rules. How-
ever, most published rule sets require any parties using those rules to have their
arbitration administered by the organization that promulgated the rules.37
Ad hoc arbitrations are often chosen by parties because such proceedings are
seen as less expensive. However, the absence of an administering institution can
create difficulties, as in situations where the parties need assistance appointing an
arbitrator or organizing a challenge to a sitting panelist. It has, therefore, become
increasingly common for parties to ad hoc proceedings to agree to allow an arbi-
tral institution to assist with certain tasks (such as those involving appointments of
or challenges to an arbitrator) that are normally associated with an administered
arbitration. Although this procedure does not transform an ad hoc arbitration into
an administered one, it does provide parties with one of the major benefits of ad-
ministered arbitration, namely the ability to avoid going to court to resolve these
types of procedural disputes.
Parties in international commercial arbitration are free to adopt virtually any
type of rule set that they like. Procedural rules need not be specifically designed
for use in an international dispute, nor must the institution in question be based in
a country that has a connection to the parties, the arbitration or the dispute.
As international commercial arbitration has grown in popularity, so, too, has
the number of procedural rules available to parties. While some of these rules are
of recent origin, others have been in place for decades. Some of the more well-
established and well-respected arbitral rule sets include those published by:
34. For a list of well-known international arbitral institutions, see infra notes 38-43 and accompany-
ing text.
35. See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
36. Indeed, most experts suggest that parties use a well-known model clause and tailor it to their
own particular needs. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION
AGREEMENTS: DRAFTING AND ENFORCING 37 (2010) [hereinafter BORN, DRAFTING].
37. See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
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* The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC);3 8
* The London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA);3 9
* The Swiss Chambers of Commerce; 40 and
* The Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC). 41
More recent arrivals on the international scene include rules published by:
* The China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Center
(CIETAC); 42 and
* The International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), which is as-
sociated with the American Arbitration Association (AAA).43
Not every set of arbitral rules is associated with an arbitral institution. For
example, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) promulgated its own set of arbitral rules in 1976 (amended in 2010)
(UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules)." However, UNCITRAL does not act as an
administering institution, which means that proceedings under the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules cannot be considered institutional.
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are very popular with parties who want
some structure to their proceedings but who do not want an administered arbitra-
tion.45 The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were also instrumental in helping
standardize international arbitral procedures worldwide, although they have also
introduced a number of innovations, particularly with respect to provisions regard-
ing situations where the parties are having difficulties in selecting or challenging
an arbitrator.46 According to both the new and amended Rules, the Secretary
38. See International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), International Court of Arbitration, available at
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/id4398/ndex.htmi.
39. See London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), available at http://www.lcia.org/.
40. See Swiss Chambers' Court of Arbitration and Mediation, available at
https://www.secam.org/sa/cn/.
41. See Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, available at
http://www.sceinstitute.com/.
42. See China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Center (CIETAC), available at
http://www.cietac.org/index.cms.
43. See International Centre for Dispute Resolution, available at http://www.adr.org/icdr.
44. See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, UNCITRAL, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17 at
34, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (Apr. 28, 1976), available at http://www.uncitral.org/
pdf/cnglish/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 1976];
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 65/22, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/22 (Jan. 10, 2011), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-201 0-c.pdf
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010].
45 See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010, supra note 44; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 1976,
supra note 44; see LEW ET AL., supra note 7, 1 3-11 (noting the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are
sometimes also used in arbitrations administered by other organizations).
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General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague may designate an
appointing authority to assist with the selection or challenge of arbitrators in cases
where the parties cannot agree on an appropriate procedure themselves. 47 This
approach - which led various private institutions to provide similar services to
parties to ad hoc arbitrations - eliminates the need for judicial assistance in the
area of arbitrator challenges and selection.
B. Sources ofLegal Authority
Although some people may believe that arbitrators are not strictly bound by
legal principles, that is very much not the case with international commercial arbi-
tration, which involves an incredibly broad and diverse mix of legal authorities.
In that sense, international commercial arbitration can be referred to as a highly
legalistic procedure. However, some newcomers to the field may be surprised by
what constitutes a reputable legal authority in international commercial arbitra-
tion.
Some of the relevant sources are "public," in that they have been promulgated
by various state entities, while other materials are "private," in that they derive
their persuasive power from the agreement of the parties.48 Both forms of authori-
ty are central to the arbitration process and must be taken into consideration by
both judges and arbitrators. However, not every type of authority is relevant to
every issue, which can make analysis difficult for those who are entering the field.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that international commercial
arbitration involves a number of legal authorities that are not used in litigation.49
Furthermore, some materials that may seem familiar may be used slightly differ-
ently in proceedings related to international arbitration than in litigation.so This
unique approach to legal authorities arises not only because of the high degree of
party autonomy that is reflected in arbitration, but also because of the specific way
in which international commercial arbitration melds practices and procedures
found in both the common law and civil law traditions.
Navigating this complex web of materials can be difficult. Nevertheless, it is
vitally important that those working in this area of law understand the role that
each of the various authorities plays in court and in arbitration, lest a critical prin-
ciple of controlling law or procedure be overlooked or given diminished weight.
Practitioners who do not understand how to find or how to use these specialized
materials suffer a competitive disadvantage in front of judges and arbitrators.
The following subparts therefore provide a brief summary of the legal materi-
als used in international commercial arbitration and introduces the various ways in
which these resources are used. In so doing, the discussion also provides insights
into some of the fundamental principles of international commercial arbitration.
47. See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010, supra note 44; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 1976,
supra note 44.
48. See STRONG, supra note 7; Strong, Research, supra note 1, at 130-31.
49. For example, arbitral awards are typically not used as authority in court (though they are brought
in as evidence in motions to enforce or vacate an award).
50. For example, scholarly works and case law are used somewhat differently in international com-
mercial arbitration and U.S. litigation.
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Restrictions of space allow for only a cursory analysis of these topics, although
further reading on research techniques and source material is available.ft
1. Substantive Law: Issues Regarding Scope
The first issue to address - substantive law - is perhaps the easiest to consid-
er, since arbitration and litigation address substantive disputes in very similar
ways. For example, arbitral tribunals use the law or legal principle that is chosen
by the parties or, in the absence of party agreement, the law or legal principle that
that the tribunal determines to be appropriate, typically through the application of
standard choice of law (i.e., conflict of law) analyses. 52 In this, tribunals behave
in ways that are very similar to courts. 53
However, there are some ways in which international commercial arbitration
differs from other forms of adjudication vis-a-vis the application of substantive
law. For example, in international commercial arbitration, the parties or the arbi-
trators may decide that the substance of the dispute is not to be decided by refer-
ence to the law of a particular country but instead by reference to general princi-
ples of law, such as those found in the lex mercatoria54 or encompassed in the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) Principles
of International Commercial Contracts.
Substantive disputes may also be governed by the United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (sometimes known as the Vienna
Convention for the International Sale of Goods but more commonly referred to as
the CISG), which is a self-executing treaty under U.S. law that applies automati-
cally to transactions involving the international sale of goods between parties
resident in contracting states. Although parties can opt out of the CISG," not
everyone knows to do so. This can lead to surprises, since Article 2 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code (UCC), which applies to domestic sales of goods, is dif-
ferent than the CISG in several key regards.
Because parties often want their disputes to be determined in accordance with
international commercial practices and principles, it is not uncommon for one of
51. See STRONG, supra note 7; Strong, Research, supra note 1.
52. See LEW ET AL., supra note 7, 1 17-1 to 17-78.
53. See Gibson Guitar Corp. v. MEC Imp. Handelsgesellschaft GmbH, 198 F.3d 245 (table), No. 98-
6046, 1999 WL 1073651, at *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 17, 1999) (noting that the arbitration agreement gave the
arbitrator the power to make choice of law determinations).
54. "Lex mercatoria" refers to the customary law merchant, which has been revitalized for current
use. See LEW ET AL., supra note 7, 1} 17-18, 17-73 (noting use of lex mercatoria in an ICC arbitral
award); Klaus Peter Berger, Lex Mercatoria Online- the CENTRAL Transnational Law Database at
www.tida.de, 18 ARB. INT'L 83, 83-94 (2002); L. Yves Fortier, The New, New Lex Mercatoria, or,
Back to the Future, 17 ARB. INT'L 121, 121 (2001).
55. See UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, art. 1.6(2), UNIDROIT
Principles 2004, available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/
integralversionprinciples2004-c.pdf; BORN, supra note 9, at 2143; Fortier, supra note 54, at 124-25.
56. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-9 (1984), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/salegoods/I 980CISG.html [hereinafter CISG];
Christopher C. Kokoruda, The U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods - It's
Not Your Father's Uniform Commercial Code, 85 FLA. BAR. . 103, 103 (June 2011).
57. See CISG, supra note 56, art. 6.
58. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, art. 2; Kokoruda, supra note 56, at 103.
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these internationally oriented legal regimes to apply. In such cases, courts have
very limited ability to review the arbitrators' determinations regarding the choice
of substantive law, since matters involving choice of law are very much for the
arbitral tribunal to decide.59
Application of general or transnational principles of law should not be con-
fused with deciding a matter ex aequo et bono or as an amiable compositeur.6
These two interpretive techniques were at one time regularly relied upon in inter-
national commercial arbitration and allow arbitral tribunals to decide disputes by
reference to certain equitable principles.6' Notably, most arbitral rules and stat-
utes now forbid arbitrators from deciding a dispute ex aequo et bono or as amiable
compositeurs except with the express permission of the parties. 62 Absent this
express authority, arbitral tribunals follow the governing legal principles, although
those principles may, of course, involve equitable considerations.
Finally, newcomers to this area of practice need to understand that different
substantive laws may apply to different aspects of an arbitral proceeding. For
example, the law that governs the issue of the validity of an arbitration agreement
might be different than the law that governs the merits of the dispute.63 It is there-
fore important to distinguish between the different legal issues under discussion
and apply the law that is appropriate to each of those issues.
2. Procedural Law: Issues Involving Choice ofLaw and Persuasive Law
The identification and application of the appropriate substantive law in inter-
national commercial arbitration can be complicated at times, but it is not a concep-
tually difficult task, since it involves analyses that are similar to those used in
litigation. However, identifying and applying the appropriate procedural law in an
international commercial arbitration can be a different endeavor. Arbitration of-
fers a much wider variety of legal authorities from which to choose than litigation
does, and it can be difficult for newcomers to the field to determine which authori-
ty governs which procedural issue." This means that parties must learn how to
choose the appropriate governing law for a particular issue and to introduce per-
suasive authority as necessary. Notably, these sorts of "choice of law" issues do
not necessarily relate to debates about the applicability of different national laws
59. See Zurich Ins. Co. v. Ennia Gen. Ins. Co., 882 F.Supp. 1438, 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
60. See LEW ET AL., supra note 7, 17-18, 18-5. The phrase "ex aequo et bono" describes a process
whereby an arbitrator is permitted to rely primarily on equitable principles to decide an issue or dispute
in justice, fairness and equity. The term "amiable compositeur" refers to an arbitrator who is permitted
to disregard or alter legal rules when the strict application of those rules would violate equity.
61. See id. 17-18, 18-5.
62. See, e.g., ICC Arbitration Rules, supra note 32, art. 21(3); ICDR Rules, supra note 32, art. 28(3);
LCIA Rules, supra note 32, R. 22.4.
63. See Gerard Meijer & Josefina Guzman, The International Recognition ofan Arbitration Clause
in the Articles ofAssociation ofa Company, in ONDERNEMING EN ADR 117, 125 (C.J.M. Klaassen et
al., eds., 2011) (noting formal validity of an arbitration agreement should be considered under the law
of the place of arbitration, while substantive validity should be considered under the law of the place of
enforcement, absent any choice of law between the parties concerning the law applicable to the arbitra-
tion agreement; also noting that these laws may be different than that applicable to the substance of the
dispute).
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(although they may). Instead, the question relates to the different types of authori-
ties that a party may introduce.
The process is further complicated by the fact that there are some procedures
that are entirely internal to the arbitration itself and some procedures that involve
interactions between the arbitral tribunal and the court.6 5 There is no single law
that governs all of these issues, nor is there a single interpretive rule that can be
followed in all instances. Instead, it is often necessary to consider procedural
disputes on a motion-by-motion basis, as is done in this Article.6 6 However, it is
impossible to conduct a proper legal analysis if one does not know which sources
of authority are relevant to which issues or what the relative weight is of those
authorities. Therefore, the following discussion describes each of the types of
authorities available in international commercial arbitration and the uses to which
they are put.
Experienced arbitral counsel, along with courts and arbitrators, rely on seven
different types of authority to determine procedural issues in international com-
mercial arbitration, including:
* international conventions and treaties;
* national statutes on arbitration;
* case law;
* arbitral rules;
* agreements between the parties;
* arbitral awards; and
* scholarly works (treatises, monographs and articles).
Each is discussed in turn below.
a. International Conventions and Treaties
The United States has ratified two treaties concerning international commer-
cial arbitration: the New York Convention and the Panama Convention. 67 Both
instruments address the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards,
which means that these treaties are cited regularly in international enforcement
proceedings in U.S. courts. As shall be seen, the two conventions apply not only
65. For example, questions regarding the introduction of evidence are entirely internal to the arbitra-
tion. Questions regarding the appointment of or challenge to an arbitrator in a situation where there is
no appointing entity (such as an arbitral institution) involve interactions between the arbitral tribunal
and the court.
66. See infra notes 256-645 and accompanying text.
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to arbitrations seated outside of the United States but also to certain arbitrations
seated within the United States.68
Although the primary purpose of the New York and Panama Conventions is
to outline the means of enforcing certain types of arbitral awards, these treaties
apply in other proceedings as well. 69 For example, parties seeking to compel arbi-
tration often rely on language found in Article 11(1) of the New York Convention
indicating that a court "shall" refer a dispute to arbitration if the dispute falls with-
in the scope of the convention. 70
The New York and Panama Conventions have been incorporated into domes-
tic U.S. law through Chapters 2 and 3 of the FAA, respectively.7' As such, the
two conventions not only constitute binding federal law, but also reflect the Unit-
ed States's international treaty obligations.72 This dual role is important to re-
member, for there is a "very specific interest of the federal government in ensur-
ing that its treaty obligation to enforce arbitration agreements covered by the Con-
vention finds reliable, consistent interpretation in our nation's courts."73
When construing the New York and Panama Conventions, U.S. courts must
look beyond domestic policies and practices, and take international norms into
consideration. 74 This is because the primary purpose of the two conventions is to
"encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements
in international contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to arbi-
trate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries."75
There is one other way in which the Panama Convention, but not the New
York Convention, might be used in a U.S. court.76 Article 3 of the Panama Con-
vention states that the arbitrators shall adopt the procedural rules of the Inter-
American Commercial Arbitration Commission in any case where the parties have
not made an express agreement regarding the governing procedural rules.7 7
Therefore, a U.S. court could be required to consult the Panama Convention and
the procedural rules of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission
when determining or confirming what the proper arbitral procedure should be.
68. See infra notes 143-201 and accompanying text.
69. See New York Convention, supra note 22; Panama Convention, supra note 25.
70. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. 11(1).
71. See 9 U.S.C. §§201, 301 (2011).
72. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504-06 (2008); BORN, supra note 9.
73. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 500 F.3d 571, 579 (7th Cir. 2007).
74. See New York Convention, supra note 22; Panama Convention, supra note 25.
75. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n. 15 (1974) (discussing New York Conven-
tion); see also House Report, supra note 27 (requiring New York and Panama Conventions to be
construed in a similar manner).
76. See New York Convention, supra note 22; Panama Convention, supra note 25.
77. See Panama Convention, supra note 25, art. 3; Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commis-
sion Rules of Procedure, as amended Apr. 1, 2002, 22 C.F.R. Pt. 194, App. A.
78. See Panama Convention, supra note 25; Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission
Rules of Procedure, supra note 77; Bowman, supra note 28, at I1; Erickson et al., supra note 28; S.I.
Strong, International Arbitration and the Republic of Colombia: Commercial, Comparative and Con-
stitutional Concerns From a U.S. Perspective, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 47, 57-60 (2011) (discuss-
ing application of article 3 of the Panama Convention) [hereinafter Strong, Colombia].
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b. National Statutes on Arbitration
As important as international treaties on arbitration are, they concern a very
limited number of issues. However, more extensive guidance can be found in
national statutes on arbitration.
National laws on arbitration address a broader range of subjects than interna-
tional treaties do, but most arbitration statutes are nevertheless limited in scope,
focusing primarily on the relationship between the court and the arbitration, rather
than on the procedures to be used during the arbitration itself.7 9 Therefore, arbi-
tration statutes cannot be considered analogous to codes of evidence or civil pro-
cedure, since laws on arbitration typically do not address many of the procedures
internal to arbitral proceedings. However, these statutes do constitute the primary
source of authority for questions regarding whether and to what extent a court is
competent to undertake certain actions relating to an international commercial
arbitration.
Sometimes the national arbitration law resolves an issue independently, with-
out requiring the court to have recourse to any other source of law. Other times,
national arbitration provisions may need to be construed in tandem with another
legal authority. For example, motions to enforce an arbitral award typically fall
under one of the international treaties on arbitration, but treaty provisions may be
supplemented by the national statute on arbitration in some jurisdictions.
The national arbitration statute most relevant to U.S. judges is the FAA.s0
However, parties may occasionally need to consider the national arbitration laws
of other nations as well.8 ' Questions regarding the circumstances in which these
other national statutes apply are best handled on a motion-by-motion basis and
are, therefore, discussed in that manner in this Article. 82
Parties and counsel sometimes also have to consider whether and to what ex-
tent an issue is governed by the arbitration statute of an individual U.S. state. This
analysis may give rise to questions about whether the FAA has preempted that
particular state provision.8 3
U.S. courts regularly rely on the FAA to identify the permissible powers of
the court concerning a variety of matters, including the court's ability to compel or
aid arbitration; stay litigation; set aside, confirm, or enforce arbitral awards; ap-
point arbitrators; remove a dispute from state court; and appeal certain orders
relating to arbitration.84 The FAA also establishes federal jurisdiction in matters
79. For example, the New York Convention explicitly deals only with the enforcement and recogni-
tion of foreign arbitral awards, although it also addresses matters concerning the enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements by implication. See New York Convention, supra note 22, arts. 11, V. The FAA, on
the other hand, deals not only with motions to compel arbitration (i.e., enforce an arbitration agree-
ment) and motions to enforce an arbitral award, but also with appointment of arbitrators, compelling
attendance of witnesses, and staying proceedings. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 7, 12, 206, 208 (2011).
80. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307.
81. See Mediterranean Shipping Co. S.A. Geneva v. POL-Atlantic, 229 F.3d 397, 406 (2d Cir. 2000)
(considering scope of arbitral powers under the English Arbitration Act).
82. See infra notes 256-645 and accompanying text.
83. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307; Volt Info. Sciences v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 477-78 (1989); BORN, supra note 9, at 140-44; Chnstopher R. Drahozal, The New York
Convention and the American Federal System, 2012 J. DisP. RESOL. 99 (2012).
84. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-5, 16, 205.
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involving international arbitration arising under the New York and Panama Con-
ventions and gives domestic effect to the two treaties.85
Although the FAA itself is outlined in more detail below, it is beyond the
scope of this Article to consider the content of any national arbitration statute
other than the FAA in detail.86 However, brief reference should be made to the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (commonly
referred to as the Model Arbitration Law or MAL).
The Model Arbitration Law, which was drafted in 1985 and amended in
2006, was intended to act as a template for nations wishing to reform their statuto-
ry approach to international commercial arbitration.88 The Model Arbitration Law
has been adopted in whole or in part in sixty-six countries and seven U.S. states,
and has been instrumental in helping to harmonize the law relating to international
arbitration. 89
The Model Arbitration Law contains a number of distinctive elements that are
discussed at various points in this Article.90 However, one item bears mention
now. It was stated previously in this subsection that most national statutes on
arbitration do not include provisions regarding arbitral procedure. While that
remains largely true, some jurisdictions are modifying their approach as a result of
the Model Arbitration Law, which supplements the usual statutory provisions
concerning the relationship between the court and the arbitral tribunal with certain
default rules addressing arbitral procedure.91 These rules are found in chapter V
of the Model Arbitration Law and can be overcome by the parties' implicit or
explicit agreement to use other procedures. 92
Although the United States has not adopted the Model Arbitration Law at the
federal level, parties may need to raise certain issues governed by national legisla-
tion based on the Model Arbitration Law from time to time.93 Parties who find
themselves in these circumstances should be prepared to conduct and possibly
present a significant amount of comparative legal research to show how a particu-
lar provision of the Model Arbitration Law has been interpreted in several differ-
ent jurisdictions, including but not limited to the nation whose law governs the
issue.94 This type of research is not only permissible but recommended, given that
UNCITRAL has specifically stated that the Model Arbitration Law was intended
85. See id §§ 201, 203, 301-02.
86. See id §§ 1-307; see also infra notes 143-201 and accompanying text.
87. See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, UNCITRAL, 18th Scss.,
Annex 1, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (June 21, 1985) [hereinafter Model Arbitration Law 1985], revised by
Revised Articles of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,
UNCITRAL, 39th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/61/17 (July 7, 2006), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitration/1985Model-arbitration.html [hereinafter
Model Arbitration Law 2006].
88. See Model Arbitration Law 2006, supra note 87; Model Arbitration Law 1985, supra note 87.
89. See id; see also UNCITRAL, Model Arbitration Law Status, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/cn/uncitral-texts/arbitration/I 985Model arbitration status.htmi.
90. See Model Arbitration Law 2006, supra note 87; Model Arbitration Law 1985, supra note 87.
91. See Model Arbitration Law 2006, supra note 87, arts. 18-27; Model Arbitration Law 1985, supra
note 87, arts. 18-27.
92. See id.
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to be applied consistently across national borders.95 This means parties may ap-
propriately refer to international consensus on matters relating to the interpretation
and application of the various provisions of the Model Arbitration Law.96
c. Case Law
Case law plays a central role in U.S. litigation, so little needs to be said about
the use of judicial opinions in the determination of domestic principles of law.
However, international commercial arbitration often involves issues that are not
governed by U.S. law. These matters may not be determined or determinable by
case law in the same way that domestic issues are.
To understand how case law is treated in international commercial arbitration,
it is necessary to understand how judicial opinions are used in both the common
law and civil law traditions. As is well known, common law lawyers tend to rely
heavily on judicial opinions as a primary source of authority.97 Although statutes
are of course important, subsequent judicial interpretations of statutory provisions
are often equally, if not more, persuasive to common law decision-makers.
Scholarly commentary is relied on rarely, typically only in cases involving a novel
point of law.
The situation is somewhat different in civil law countries. There, the statu-
tory text is the primary source of authority, and the first task of a judge is to iden-
tify which of several competing statutory provisions governs the issue in ques-
tion.99 Once that task is complete, the judge must apply the law to the facts of the
dispute.'00
However, it is something of a misperception to say that the civil law does not
follow precedent, for civil law courts do aim to provide consistent judgments over
time, although the extent to which civil law judges rely on precedent may vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and issue to issue. 0 1 Nevertheless, civil law
codes can be relatively abstract and difficult to apply. Therefore, civil law judges
typically consider how other authoritative sources have handled issues similar to
the one at bar.102 It is at this point that the common law and civil law diverge, for
although judges in both traditions look to previously published judicial opinions,
civil law judges are at least equally likely to turn to scholarly treatises to deter-
mine how the matter ought to be decided.103
95. See G.A. Res. 61/33, U.N. Doc. AIRES/61/33 (Dec. 18, 2006).
96. See Model Arbitration Law 2006, supra note 87; Model Arbitration Law 1985, supra note 87.
97. See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 259-62
(Tony Wcir trans., 3d cd. 1998).
98. See id. at 262-65.
99. See id.
100. See id
101. See BORN, supra note 9, at 2957-59.
102. See ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 97, at 262-65.
103. For a good example of a civil law judgment in English, see Empresa Colombiana de Vias Fdrre-
as (Ferrovias) v. Drummond Ltd., 24 Oct. 2003 - Conscjo de Estado, Sala de lo Contencioso Adminis-
trativo, Seccion Tercera [Council of State, Administrative Chamber, Third Section], No. 25.25, 18,
affd 22 Apr. 2004, No. 24.261, 25, in XXIX Y.B. COMM. ARB. 643 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed.,
2004) (demonstrating Colombian court's reliance on both judicial precedent and scholarly authorities).
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Furthermore, even those civil law judges that do rely on precedent do not do
so in quite the same way or to quite the same purposes as common law judges.
This interpretive distinction is rooted in the way judicial opinions are reasoned
and written in the two legal traditions.
Judicial opinions written by civil law judges are much shorter and more con-
clusory than those written by common law judges.'1 Because there is so little in
the way of judicial reasoning reflected in a civil law opinion, case law provides
future courts with little guidance on how to address similar disputes in the future.
Although the courts will understand the outcome of the earlier dispute, a judge
will not necessarily be able to glean the reasoning behind the decision.
Scholarly works fill this gap by providing in-depth analysis of the various
statutory texts. This is particularly useful because of the way in which civil law
lawyers approach questions of law. Civil law jurisprudence strives to set forth
general principles of law in the abstract rather than respond to individual facts on
a case-by-case basis.1 0 5 As a result, the civil law has more use for scholarly works
that elucidate general principles of law than the common law does. Furthermore,
the civil law tradition has a great respect for materials that are written by objective
experts who can look at the issues holistically, rather than on a limited case-by-
case basis.o6 The fact that scholars lack any personal or financial interest in the
outcome of their legal analyses also increases the persuasive power of academic
works in the civil law tradition. Together, these factors lead civil law judges to
give significant weight to scholarly commentary as a supplement to judicial prec-
edent.
This distinction is important to understand for two reasons. First, parties may
need to ask a U.S. court to decide a point governed by foreign law. To decide that
issue, the judge must determine what was required under that foreign law and,
therefore, must understand the relative importance of the various types of authori-
ty in that jurisdiction, including both case law and scholarly works. Parties must
provide the court with the tools necessary to make this determination.
Second, parties may need to ask a U.S. court to review certain issues decided
by the arbitral tribunal, which could raise questions about the legal authorities
relied upon by the arbitrators. While it is generally inappropriate for courts to
review arbitrators' decisions as to the weight of various authorities, 0 7 judges who
understand how legal resources are used in different legal systems are less likely
to question arbitrators' reasoning simply as a result of a common-law based con-
ception about what constitutes a "proper" form of legal authority.
d. Arbitral Rules
As indicated previously,10 8 parties to an international commercial arbitration
often agree to adopt any one of a wide variety of procedural rules, regardless of
whether the arbitration is administered or ad hoc. There are very few restrictions
104. See ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 97, at 262-65.
105. See id. at 91, 262-65.
106. See id at 270.
107. See Zurich Ins. Co. v. Ennia Gen. Ins. Co., 882 F.Supp. 1438, 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
108. See infra notes 33-47 and accompanying text.
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on the type of rules that can be used in an international arbitral proceeding.1 09
Furthermore, even those parties who choose to proceed under institutional rules
still have a significant amount of autonomy and can, if necessary, tailor the pub-
lished procedures to suit the needs of the dispute, since most arbitral rules indicate
that their provisions apply unless the parties agree otherwise. 110 However, the
parties' power is not limitless, since some rule sets include provisions from which
the parties cannot derogate. For example, parties to an ICC arbitration may not
contract around provisions regarding the scrutiny of the draft award by the Inter-
national Court of Arbitration of the ICC."' Parties also may not derogate from
certain mandatory rules of law, such as those ensuring due process.112
Arbitral rules focus primarily on matters of internal procedure and are there-
fore most relevant to processes undertaken in front of the arbitral tribunal rather
than the court. However, many rule sets also include some provisions outlining
the relationship between the tribunal and the court and, therefore, may be relevant
to certain jurisdictional questions.' 1 3
As a general rule, judges defer to arbitral tribunals on matters of procedure,
since most arbitration agreements, national statutes on arbitration, and procedural
rules give the arbitrators a great deal of discretion in such matters. 114 However,
arbitral discretion is not unbounded; indeed, the use of published procedural rules
is one of the key methods by which the parties agree to limit and define the power
of the arbitral tribunal. 15
Therefore, courts occasionally need to determine whether the procedure used
by the tribunal was consistent with the parties' agreement and fundamental no-
tions of due process.1 6 When construing the terms of the parties' agreement -
including with respect to the interpretation of any relevant rules - courts must
consider what legal authorities are relevant to the determination of the issue at bar.
Critically, arbitral rules are not U.S. laws.1 17 Instead, these rules of procedure
have been promulgated by specialized arbitral bodies such as the ICC, the ICDR,
the LCIA or UNCITRAL, and adopted by the agreement of the parties."' At the
time the rules were adopted by the parties - which was in all likelihood the time
the underlying transaction was concluded, typically years before the dispute in
question arose - there may not have been any indication that some aspect of arbi-
tral procedure would be heard in a U.S. court.
109. See LEW ET AL., supra notc 7, 11 21-3 to 21-18.
110. See id.
111. See ICC Arbitration Rules, supra note 38, art. 27. The ICC International Court of Arbitration is
distinct from the arbitral tribunal and pnmarily exercises a supervisory role over certain administrative
issues. See W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION
§2.03 (2000).
112. See LEW ET AL., supra note 7,In21-14 to 21-18.
113. See infra notes 331-50 and accompanying text.
114. See Indus. Risk Ins. v. M.A.N. Gutchoffungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434, 1443-44 (11th Cir.
1998); Telenor Mobile Comm. AS v. Storm LLC, 524 F. Supp. 2d 332, 359, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2007),
aff'd 584 F.3d 396 (2d Cir. 2009).
115. See LEW ET AL., supra note 7,121-10.
116. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2011); New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V.
117. Although parties may decide to adopt the rules of civil procedure enacted by a particular coun-
try, they seldom do so and are never considered to have chosen those rules by implication. See LEW ET
AL., supra note 7, 1 21-11.
118. See id. 12 1-10.
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Therefore, it is commonly accepted that parties choose arbitral rules based on
an international, rather than national, understanding of how the rules would be
interpreted and applied rather than on a perspective enunciated by one particular
nation. This international understanding is reflected in a variety of sources, in-
cluding not only U.S. case law but also published arbitral awards construing the
relevant language, scholarly commentary, and judicial opinions from other juris-
dictions. All of these sources contribute to and reflect the international under-
standing of the procedural rules in question and are, therefore, relevant to what
these particular parties intended and expected when they adopted the provisions.
Thus, parties to disputes involving international commercial arbitration will need
to consult a variety of sources when construing matters involving arbitral rules,
even if the dispute is being heard in a U.S. federal court.
Most arbitral rules address a relatively standard set of issues that are suffi-
cient for most purposes. However, there are a few potentially contentious matters
that are not included within the normal procedural rules. These issues are covered
in supplemental provisions that can be adopted as necessary by arbitrators and
parties. The two most important rule sets were promulgated by the International
Bar Association (IBA) and consist of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in
International Arbitration, which were originally published in 1999 and amended in
2010,19 and the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitra-
tion, which were published in 2004.120
The importance of these supplemental rules has been growing steadily over
the years, and a significant number of arbitrators and courts find the two docu-
ments to be highly persuasive indications of international procedural norms con-
cerning the taking and presentation of evidence and the grounds for challenges to
arbitrators. 12 1
e. Agreements between the Parties
International commercial arbitration is based on the concept of party autono-
my, which means that the intent of the parties controls the question of whether the
dispute is to be arbitrated as well as what procedure is to be used to resolving that
dispute.122 Parties are allowed to adopt a wide variety of procedures in interna-
tional arbitration, even those (such as documents-only or fast-track proceedings)
that are not available in litigation.123
When it comes to procedural issues, it is the arbitral tribunal, rather than the
court, that is to determine the terms of the parties' agreement.124 Nevertheless,
119. See IBA, Rules on the Taking of Evidence, available at
http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications IBAguides and freematerials.aspx.
120. See IBA, Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, available at
http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_1BAguides and-free materials.aspx.
121. See New Regency Prod. Inc. v. Nippon Herald Films, Inc., 501 F.3d 1101, 1110 (9th Cir. 2007)
(citing IBA Guidelines); In re Application of Caratube Int'l Oil Co., LLP, 730 F. Supp. 2d 101, 107
(D.D.C. 2010) (citing IBA Rules).
122. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83-84 (2002); Volt Info. Sciences v.
Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989).
123. See BORN, supra note 9, at 1232, n. 442.
124. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444,452-53 (2003) (plurality opinion).
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parties may ask a court to resolve certain matters relating to the agreement of the
parties.
For the most part, the types of issues that require reference to the arbitration
agreement are the same in both domestic and international arbitration. Further-
more, because an agreement to arbitrate must be in writing for it to be enforceable
as a matter of both international and domestic law, parties will be parsing through
the same manner of documents in both kinds of cases: contracts containing arbi-
tral clauses, stand-alone arbitration agreements, standard terms and conditions
making reference to arbitration, and so forth. Therefore, the concept and use of an
arbitration agreement as a source of legal authority is consistent in both national
and international disputes.
f ArbitralAwards
Of the various types of legal authority available in international commercial
arbitration, arbitral awards are perhaps the most misunderstood. Even though they
constitute a private (i.e., non-state-generated), rather than public, source of author-
ity, arbitral awards from international proceedings have long been available in
collected series and yearbooks that are similar to case reporters.1 2 5 Many of these
awards are also available on specialized subscription databases such as kluwerar-
bitration.com, with a growing number appearing on Westlaw and LexisNexis as
well. However, parties need to exercise caution when using any electronic data-
base that purports to compile sources relating to international commercial arbitra-
tion, since the library of materials may not be as broad as one might hope or ex-
pect. 126
While publishers remove various pieces of identifying information, such as
the parties' names, so as to respect the strictures of confidentiality, published
awards often contain a considerable amount of information about the arbitrators'
procedural and substantive decisions.1 27 Parties and arbitrators, therefore, can and
125. Arbitral awards are often the hardest type of source material for non-specialists to find. Howev-
Cr, detailed guidance on where to find international arbitral awards is available. See STRONG, supra
note 7; Strong, Research, supra note 1, at 142-45.
126. For example, general legal databases like Westlaw and LexisNexis claim to offer materials in
international commercial arbitration even though they do not have access to very many international
arbitral awards. Specialized subscription databases, such as kluwerarbitration.com and Arbitration Law
Online (arbitrationlaw.com) can fill the gap left by more general legal databases, since the subject-
specific databases include material from at least some of the major arbitral reporters. Nevertheless, no
single electronic database has comprehensive access to all relevant materials. For a list of sources for
international arbitral awards, see STRONG, supra note 7.
127. Most awards arising out of international commercial arbitration are fully reasoned, pursuant to
requirements found in individual arbitration agreements and/or institutional rules. See BORN, supra
note 9, at 2457 (noting "reasoned" or "fully reasoned" awards contain detailed descriptions of the
tribunal's legal and factual analyses). This is in contrast to "unreasoned" or "standard" awards, which
are more common in domestic disputes and which simply indicate who the prevailing party is and what
sort of relief is due. The FAA does not require arbitral awards to be reasoned, and U.S. courts have
generally held that unreasoned awards are valid and enforceable so long as the parties' agreement or
governing rules did not require the arbitral tribunal to provide its reasoning. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 207,
302 (2011); Stark v. Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C., 381 F.3d 793, 803 (8th Cir. 2004);
BORN, supra note 9, at 2456. This is equally true in the international context. See Matter of Arbitration
Between Trans Chem. Ltd. and China Nat'l Mach. Import & Export Corp., 978 F.Supp. 266, 308 (S.D.
Tex. 1997), affd 161 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 1998).
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do review previously rendered awards to determine whether and to what extent
international consensus exists on a particular point of law or procedure. This is
similar to what occurs in other areas of arbitration, including employment, labor,
maritime, and international investment arbitration, where the frequent and con-
sistent use of arbitration and publication of arbitral awards leads to the creation of
something akin to arbitral precedent. 128
This kind of widespread reliance on arbitral awards makes a great deal of
sense, given the high need for consistency and predictability in international
commercial arbitration. Indeed, as one ICC award has noted:
[t]he decisions of these tribunals progressively create caselaw which
should be taken into account, because it draws conclusions from econom-
ic reality and conforms to the needs of international commerce, to which
rules specific to international arbitration, themselves successively formu-
lated should respond.129
Nevertheless, the persuasive value of previously published awards often var-
ies according to the issue in question. Thus, for example, arbitral awards are often
not highly influential on matters of substantive law, since there are other, more
authoritative materials available (i.e., "public" or state-sponsored sources of law).
However, awards carry a great deal of weight in other areas of arbitration law and
practice.iso
Arbitral awards are perhaps most useful with respect to procedural matters
such as the interpretation of arbitral rules or the provision of interim relief. These
are issues that reside firmly within the realm of arbitrator discretion, 3 1 and arbitral
awards are the best source of information about how expert international arbitra-
tors construe these principles in practice. However, parties may need to ask courts
to rule on these sorts of issues as well and, therefore, may need to present a judge
with previously published awards as a form of relevant authority.
Notably, parties may find it even more appropriate to rely on arbitral awards
in the international realm than in the domestic context. This is for two reasons.
First, the kinds of procedural matters discussed in arbitral awards are typically not
issues of national law, so it makes less sense for a party to rely exclusively on
judicial precedent. Second, parties typically expect these matters to be resolved in
accordance with international commercial and legal norms rather than by refer-
ence to a single national perspective. Therefore, reference may properly be had to
authorities describing the relevant international standards.
128 See Fournclle v. N.L.R.B., 670 F.2d 331, 343-44 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Matter of Andros Compania
Maritima, S.A. (Marc Rich & Co., A.G.), 579 F.2d 691, 696 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting review of 1200
published awards of Society of Maritime Arbitrators); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mallela, Civ.
No. CV-004923, 2002 WL 31946762, *12 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2002), question certified by 372 F.3d
500 (2d Cir. 2004), certified question answered by 4 N.Y.3d 313 (N.Y. 2005).
129. Interim Award in ICC Case No. 4131, IX Y.B. COMM. ARB. 131, 135 (1984).
130. See BORN, supra note 9, 2965-70 (listing areas where arbitral awards affect the development of
international commercial arbitration); Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent. Dream, Neces-
sity or Excuse? 23 ARB. INT'L 357, 361-78 (2007) (discussing development of precedent in arbitral
realm).
131. See BORN, supra note 9, 1758-65.
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g. Scholarly Works (Treatises, Monographs and Articles)
Parties in U.S. litigation are used to using scholarly works as persuasive au-
thority. However, these types of authorities play a larger role in international
commercial arbitration than they do in domestic forms of dispute resolution. To
some extent this is because international commercial arbitration reflects an inten-
tional blend of civil and common law traditions, and the civil law has always re-
lied heavily on scholarly work as a source of legal authority.' 32 However, aca-
demic commentary is also given heightened respect in international commercial
arbitration because this is a private form of dispute resolution, with much of what
goes on during the decision-making process being hidden from public view.
Arbitral awards provide some insights into the conduct of an international ar-
bitration, but the issues discussed there are often tailored to the dispute at hand.
Furthermore, arbitral awards only provide a snapshot of certain contested matters
rather than an overview of the entire process. Uncontested issues and routine
practices are not usually discussed in arbitral awards.
This may seem troubling to those who are used to the transparency of litiga-
tion. However, arbitral procedure is not as secretive or as discretionary as it may
initially appear. For years, the international arbitral community has relied on
scholarly commentary, often written by top arbitrators and practitioners with years
of experience in the field, to describe what goes on behind the closed doors of the
hearing room.'3 3 Treatises and other forms of scholarship provide comprehensive
analyses of a wide variety of procedural and practical matters that are ostensibly
subject to arbitral discretion but that are in fact largely guided by international
consensus and customary practice.134 Experienced counsel rely heavily on these
materials at all stages of the arbitral process: when drafting arbitration agree-
ments, selecting arbitral rules, identifying the seat of arbitration, choosing arbitra-
tors, and deciding what tactical steps to take with response to judicial relief. This
shared understanding of arbitration results in a highly predictable dispute resolu-
tion regime, which is precisely what the parties contract for when they sign their
arbitration agreements. 35
Although the universe of scholarly works concerning international commer-
cial arbitration is expanding rapidly, several works stand out as being particularly
authoritative. These include:
* Gary B. Born's International Commercial Arbitration (substantially
revising an earlier edition entitled International Commercial Arbitration
in the United States);3 6
* W. Laurence Craig, William W. Park and Jan Paulsson's Internation-
al Chamber of Commerce Arbitration;13 7
132. See supra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
133. See practitioners' handbooks and guides, supra note 6.
134. See BORN, supra note 9, at 1739-1939; LEW ET AL., supra note 7, 21-1 to 22-106.
135. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985).
136 See BORN, supra note 9.
137. See CRAIG ET AL., supra note 111.
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* Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage's Fouchard Gaillard Goldman
on International Commercial Arbitration;1 3 8
* Julian D.M. Lew, Loukas A. Mistelis and Stefan Krill's Comparative
International Commercial Arbitration;'3 9 and
* Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern and Martin
Hunter's Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (substantially
revising an earlier edition entitled Law and Practice of International
Commercial Arbitration).140
Not only are these authorities regularly relied upon by parties and practitioners,141
they have also been recognized by various federal courts as constituting persua-
sive authority.142
C. U.S. Statutory Regime
Many commercial practitioners are of course already familiar with the FAA
through their work on domestic disputes.143 However, international disputes expe-
rience a number of complications that do not arise in domestic arbitrations. Many
of these difficulties are tied to the structure of the statute. Therefore, it is useful to
provide a brief overview of the FAA as a whole so as to set later, more detailed
discussions into context.'"
Structurally, the FAA appears relatively straightforward, with three separate
chapters dealing with three separate scenarios. Chapters 2 and 3 are known as the
"international" chapters, since they give domestic effect to the New York and
Panama Conventions, respectively.145 However, the FAA does not simply incor-
porate the two conventions into domestic law verbatim and leave it at that, as
some nations do.146 Instead, Chapters 2 and 3 include additional provisions re-
138. See EMMANUEL GAILLARD & JOHN SAVAGE, FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1999) [hereinafter FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN].
139. See LEW ET AL., supra note 7.
140. See NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2009)
[hereinafter REDFERN & HUNTER].
141. Several other titles arc also worth considering. See JACK J. COE, JR., INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: AMERICAN PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT (1997);
MARGARET MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
(2008); MAURO RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE (second
edition forthcoming 2012); STRONG, supra note 7. Numerous helpful articles also exist, although not
all are found in U.S. law reviews. Indeed, several of the most authoritative sources come from outside
the United States. These materials include ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL, ASA BULLETIN, the
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, and the YEARBOOK OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION. See
STRONG, supra note 7; Strong, Research, supra note 1, at 150-56.
142. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler- Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633-34 (1985)
(citing Craig, Park, and Paulsson); Polimaster Ltd. v. RAE Systems, Inc., 623 F.3d 832, 838-39 (9th
Cir. 2010) (citing Born; Gaillard and Savage; and Redfern and Hunter).
143. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2011).
144. See id.
145. See New York Convention, supra note 22; Panama Convention, supra note 25; 9 U.S.C. §§201,
301 (2011).
146. See 9 U.S.C. §§201, 301; see also Drahozal, supra note 83.
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garding the application of the two treaties in U.S. courts.147 As shall be seen
throughout this Article, this approach has created significant difficulties at times.
Chapter I is commonly considered the FAA's "domestic" chapter.148 Never-
theless, it has residual application to international disputes to the extent that it "is
not in conflict with" Chapters 2 or 3.149 This, too, has created trouble for courts,
with numerous debates arising about the applicability of certain aspects of Chapter
I to disputes arising under one or the other of the conventions.15 0
Questions also exist regarding the extent to which the FAA preempts state
law.' 5 ' This issue is still under consideration in both the domestic and interna-
tional realms.152 However, several recent decisions have stated that the New York
Convention preempts any provision of domestic law that limits the enforceability
of arbitration agreements.' 53 Because Congress has indicated that the New York
and Panama Conventions are to be construed harmoniously and consistently, these
holdings apply equally to the Panama Convention.154
Although the basic structure of the FAA can be easily described in the ab-
stract, difficulties arise in the application of its language.'5 5 For example, it is not
always clear whether a dispute falls under Chapter 1 (the "domestic" chapter) or
under Chapters 2 or 3 (the "international" chapters).156 This confusion is largely
due to the interaction between FAA's definitional sections.' 5 7
Chapter 1, which was originally enacted in 1925, indicates that it applies to
both domestic arbitrations and arbitrations involving interstate and foreign com-
merce. 5 8 These arbitrations must arise out of written agreements involving mari-
time or commercial transactions. 159 However, Chapter 2, which was enacted in
1970, limits Chapter 1's broad applicability.16 0 For example, Section 202 states
that "[a]n arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal relation-
ship, whether contractual or not, which is considered as commercial, including a
transaction, contract, or agreement described in section 2 of this title, falls under
the [New York] Convention."' 61 At first, this would appear to bring all disputes
listed in Section 2 under the governance of Chapter 2, leaving nothing to the ex-
147. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-307.
148. See id. §§ 1-16.
149. Id §§ 208, 307.
150. Seeid. §§ 1-307.
151. See id; Drahozal, supra note 83.
152 See AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011); Preston v. Ferrer, 552
U.S. 346, 349-50 (2008).
153. See New York Convention, supra note 22; Safety Nat'l Casualty Corp. v. Certain Underwriters
at Lloyd's, London, 543 F.3d 744, 755 (5th Cir. 2008), reh'g en banc, 587 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2009),
cert. denied sub nom. Louisiana Safety Ass'n of Timbermen - Self Insurers Fund v. Certain Under-
writers at Lloyd's, London, 131 S.Ct. 65 (2010); Rogers v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, 547 F.3d
1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied 129 S.Ct. 2827 (2009).
154. See New York Convention, supra note 22; Panama Convention, supra note 25; House Report,
supra note 27.
155. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307.
156. See id.
157. See id§§ 1-2, 202, 302.
158. See id § 1.
159. See id. §2.
160. See id. §§ 1-208.
161. Id. § 202.
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clusive jurisdiction of Chapter 1.162 However, Section 202 then goes on to limit
the types of disputes to which Chapter 2 applies, stating that:
[a]n agreement or award arising out of such a relationship which is en-
tirely between citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall
under the Convention ... .
This clause returns a subset of disputes to the exclusive jurisdiction of Chapter
1.i6 However, Section 202 includes one more provision that brings some dis-
putes that arise out of a relationship entirely between citizens of the United States
back within the scope of Chapter 2.165 This occurs when:
... that relationship involves property located abroad, envisages perfor-
mance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with
one or more foreign states. For the purpose of this section a corporation
is a citizen of the United States if it is incorporated or has its principal
place of business in the United States. 166
The end result is that Chapter 2 of the FAA applies to:
* agreements or awards arising between a U.S. and foreign party;
* agreements or awards arising entirely between foreign parties; and
* agreements or awards arising entirely between U.S. citizens, but only
if there is some sort of international nexus (i.e., "property located abroad,
... performance or enforcement abroad, or .. . some other reasonable re-
lation with one or more foreign states"). 67
Any agreement or award that falls under Chapter 2 is subject not only to the statu-
tory requirements set forth in that chapter, but also to the requirements of the New
York Convention.' 68  Chapter 1 of the FAA also has residual application to
agreements and awards falling under Chapter 2, to the extent that no inconsisten-
cies between Chapter 1 and either Chapter 2 or the New York Convention arise.' 69
Notably, Chapter 2 of the FAA does not impose any kind of territorial limita-
tions on arbitrations arising under its provisions.' 70 Therefore, Chapter 2 applies
to an arbitration located anywhere in the world, including the United States, so
162. See id §§ 2, 202.
163. Id. § 202.
164. See id. §§ 1-16.
165 See id. § 202.
166. Id.
167. See id.
168. See New York Convention, supra note 22; 9 U.S.C. § 201; see also S.1. Strong, What Constitutes
an "Agreement in Writing" in International Commercial Arbitration? Conflicts Between the New York
Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act, 48 STAN. J. INT'L L. 47 (2012) [hereinafter Strong, Writ-
ing].
169. See New York Convention, supra note 22; 9 U.S.C. § 208.
170. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08.
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long as the definitional test described in section 202 is met, subject to certain re-
strictions on reciprocity and commerciality.' 7i
Chapter 3, which was enacted in 1990, incorporates much of Chapter 2 by
reference, both in terms of its definitions and its procedures. 7 2 Thus, Chapter 3
states that Section 202 "shall apply to this chapter as if specifically set forth here-
in, except that for the purposes of this chapter 'the Convention' shall mean the
Inter-American Convention."173 However, Chapter 3 also indicates that when the
requirements of both the New York and Panama Conventions are met, the Panama
Convention (and thus Chapter 3) shall apply if a majority of the parties are citi-
zens of states that have ratified the Panama Convention and that are members of
the Organization of American States. 174
There are two ways to give domestic effect to an international treaty. One
simply declares that the treaty is directly applicable in national courts while the
other embeds the treaty in domestic legislation indicating how the treaty provi-
sions are to be given effect in the national legal system.' 75 The United States uses
the second approach for matters involving international commercial arbitration.176
Unfortunately, however, the terms used in the FAA do not mirror those used by
the New York Convention, creating significant difficulties for courts attempting to
construe the various provisions.177 Disputes arising under the Panama Convention
experience slightly fewer problems, since the Panama Convention simply refers to
"[a]n agreement in which the parties undertake to submit to arbitral decision any
differences that may arise or have arisen between them with respect to a commer-
cial transaction" rather than adopting the more complex definitional aspects of
Article II of the New York Convention.'78
The New York Convention is often said to govern two types of arbitral
awards - "foreign" and "non-domestic" - rather than "international" awards. 79
This distinction arises out of the language of the Convention itself, which states
that it:
shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in
the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and en-
forcement of such awards are sought [i.e., "foreign" awards], and arising
out of differences between persons, whether physical or legal. It shall al-
so apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State
where their recognition and enforcement are sought [i.e., "non-domestic"
awards].'
171. See infra notes 177-202 and accompanying text.
172. See 9 U.S.C. § 302.
173. Id.; see also Panama Convention, supra note 25.
174. See New York Convention, supra note 22; Panama Convention, supra note 25; 9 U.S.C. § 305.
175. See Robert E. Dalton, United States, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 765, 788-90
(Duncan B. Hollis et al., eds., 2005) (discussing self-executing and non-self-executing treaties).
176. See 9 U.S.C. §§201, 301.
177. See New York Convention, supra note 22; 9 U.S.C. §§2, 202; Strong, Writing, supra note 168.
178. Panama Convention, supra note 25, art. 1; see also New York Convention, supra note 22, art. 11;
Strong, Writing, supra note 168.
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Although this provision refers only to the recognition of awards, the Convention
also applies to motions to compel arbitration by virtue of Article II, which indi-
cates that "[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under
which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration" certain relevant disputes.18'
Therefore, the New York Convention governs arbitration agreements as well as
arbitral awards.182
Problems can arise with respect to both foreign and non-domestic agreements
and awards. Analytically, courts have had the least amount of difficulty with
foreign awards, since those are often perceived as being clearly "international" in
scope. Nevertheless, some problems occasionally arise regarding arbitrations that
are entirely between U.S. citizens and seated outside the U.S., but that do not in-
volve "property located abroad" or "performance or enforcement abroad." 83
Although these are clearly "foreign" arbitrations under the New York Convention,
based on geographic considerations, U.S. courts have occasionally held that Chap-
ter 2 of the FAA does not apply to these types of disputes.18 However, this ques-
tion has seldom been addressed and, therefore, remains relatively open. Thus, it
may be that seating an arbitration outside the United States creates a reasonable
relationship with a foreign state sufficient to bring the arbitration within the scope
of section 202 of the FAA, "at least where this was not an effort to circumvent
local regulatory protections."' 85
The second type of agreements and awards - those considered "non-
domestic" under the Convention - can also cause trouble, perhaps because they
are not always perceived as being "international" to the same extent that foreign
agreements and awards are.'8 Clearly, however, an agreement or award comes
within the scope of the Convention and thus Chapter 2 of the FAA arbitration
even if it is seated within the United States, so long as it involves a foreign party
or has the requisite international nexus.'87 Nevertheless, some controversies still
remain about the applicability of the Convention to U.S.-seated arbitrations in
some situations, most particularly those involving motions to vacate an award.i88
Courts considering the relevance of the New York Convention to a particular
dispute must take two additional factors into account.' 89 According to the terms
of the treaty, contracting states may make two declarations limiting the applicabil-
ity of the Convention.' 90 These declarations allow a state party to apply the New
York Convention only to "differences arising out of legal relationships . . . which
are considered as commercial under the national law of the State making such
declaration" and only "on the basis of reciprocity," meaning that the state making
181. Id. art. 11(1).
182. See id.
183. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (2011).
184. See New York Convention, supra note 22; 9 U.S.C. § 202; Wilson v. Lignotock U.S.A. Inc., 709
F. Supp. 797, 799 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
185. BORN, supra note 9, at 293-94 (citing analogies to section 1-105 of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE); see also 9 U.S.C. § 202.
186. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. 1(1).
187. See id.; 9 U.S.C. §202; Lander Co., Inc. v. MMP Inv., Inc., 107 F.3d 476, 482 (70i Cir. 1997)
(holding that the New York Convention applied to a dispute between two U.S. parties and seated in the
U.S. when performance was to occur abroad).
188. See New York Convention, supra note 22; see also infra notes 470-97 and accompanying text.
189. See New York Convention, supra note 22.
190. See id. art. 1(3).
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the declaration "will apply the Convention to the recognition and enforcement of
awards made only in the territory of another Contracting State."' 9'
The United States has made both declarations, but this has little effect in ac-
tual practice. First, U.S. courts have defined the term "commercial" so broadly
that the first limitation is virtually irrelevant.192 Thus, for example, the New York
Convention applies not only to the prototypical commercial relationship exempli-
fied by the purchase and sale of goods between two corporations, but also to dis-
putes involving employers and employees, consumers, shareholders, foreign state
actors, antitrust issues, foreign regulatory authorities, insurers and reinsurers, and
maritime matters.'9 3 Courts have even concluded that the New York Convention
applies to relationships (such as those involving contracts regarding the employ-
ment of seamen) that are excluded from the scope of Chapter 1 of the FAA.19 4
Thus, it has been said that doubts as to whether a contract involves a commercial
dispute and, thus, falls under the New York Convention should be resolved in
favor of the arbitrability of the dispute under the Convention.195
The U.S. declaration regarding reciprocity also has little effect in practice. In
this case, the reason is that very few countries have not signed the New York
Convention.' 96 That means that a U.S. court will seldom, if ever, be asked to deny
enforcement of an arbitral award based on a lack of reciprocity. Notably, reci-
procity under Article 1(3) relates only to the place where the award was rendered
(i.e., the arbitral seat) and not to the nationalities of the parties.'97
Confusion sometimes arises as a result of a second provision in the New York
Convention that mentions reciprocity.198 This section indicates that "[a] Contract-
ing State shall not be entitled to avail itself of the present Convention against other
Contracting States except to the extent that it is itself bound to apply the Conven-
tion." 99 U.S. courts have addressed this language only rarely, but it would appear
that Article XIV applies only in cases where a country is routinely behaving in an
improperly restrictive manner with respect to its obligations under the Conven-
tion.200 Notably, this is a very high burden to meet.
Finally, foreign awards that are rendered in nations that are not parties to the
New York or Panama Convention are nevertheless enforceable in the United
States.201 However, because the vast majority of proceedings fall under one of the
two conventions, that will be the focus of this Article.
19 1. Id.
192. See BORN, supra note 9, at 258-59, 272.
193. See New York Convention, supra note 22; BORN, supra note 9, at 262.
194. See New York Convention, supra note 22; 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2011); Rogers v. Royal Caribbean
Cruise Line, 547 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir 2008).
195. See New York Convention, supra note 22; Francisco v. Stolt Achievement MT, 293 F.3d 270,
274-75 (5th Cir. 2002).
196. See New York Convention Status, supra note 23.
197. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. 1(3); see also BORN, supra note 9, at 303-05.
198. See New York Convention, supra note 22.
199. See id. art. XIV.
200. See id.; Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Mgmt. Inc., 517 F.Supp. 948, 953 (S.D. Ohio 1981)
(refusing to apply Article XIV).
201. See New York Convention, supra note 22; Panama Convention, supra note 25; Weizmann Inst
of Sci. v. Neschis, 421 F. Supp. 2d 654, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (concerning an award rendered in Liech-
tenstein prior to Liechtenstein's adherence to the New York Convention).
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D. Overview of an International Commercial Arbitration
Having outlined the U.S. statutory regime regarding international commercial
arbitration, it is now useful to give a brief overview of the entire arbitral process to
help put various types of judicial proceedings into context. This subsection intro-
duces topics that will be discussed in more detail below. 202
1. Drafting Stage
Although parties may modify the terms of their arbitration agreement at virtu-
ally any time, the parameters of a particular agreement are relatively set by the
time the dispute arises, since real or perceived tactical concerns often foreclose the
parties' willingness to create or modify an arbitration agreement after a dispute
comes alive.203 Nevertheless, practitioners need to understand how choices made
at the drafting stage influence the shape of the proceedings, particularly since
international transactions give rise to several problems that are not found in purely
domestic matters. Thus, for example, parties to an international arbitration
agreement must consider:
(1) where to seat their arbitration;
This is important in international disputes because:
* the law of the country where the arbitration is seated (i.e., is
legally located) typically governs several important procedural
issues;204 and
* the courts in the country where the arbitration takes place are
considered under U.S. law to have "primary jurisdiction" over
certain types of actions associated with arbitration, most particu-
larly motions to vacate an arbitral award, although a vacated
award may still be enforceable in other countries.205
(2) what procedure is to govern the dispute;
This is important in international disputes because:
* the failure to choose the procedure either explicitly or implicit-
ly (as through the designation of institutional rules) leaves nu-
merous issues to the discretion of the arbitrator, since national
202. See infra notes 256-645 and accompanying text.
203 See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 36, at 37; BORN, supra note 9, at 202. For this reason, parties
to international transactions tend not to use post-dispute agreements (known internationally as submis-
sion agreements or compromis), although this does occasionally happen.
204. See infra notes 248-55 and accompanying text.
205. See infra notes 470-97 and accompanying text.
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rules of civil procedure or evidence do not apply to arbitration
unless clearly and explicitly adopted by the parties; 206 and
* some countries have default rules of procedure embedded
within their arbitration statutes, and the failure to contract spe-
cifically out of these provisions will leave the parties subject to
the statutory text.207
(3) which laws apply to which issues.
This is important in international disputes because:
* three types of law can arise in international commercial arbi-
tration: procedural law (supplemented by any applicable arbi-
tral rules), substantive law, and the law governing the construc-
tion of the arbitration agreement;208 and
* there is no requirement that the same country's law must apply
to each of the issues that arise.209
2. Prior to or at the Initiation of the Arbitration
The time surrounding the initiation of a legal claim is often quite busy. Alt-
hough many disputes proceed straight into arbitration without the need for any
judicial intervention, sometimes parties need assistance with certain preliminary
matters.
For example, the parties may disagree about whether the dispute is to be
heard in court or arbitration. This can lead to motions being brought in any one of
a number of courts around the world regarding the validity of the arbitration
agreement and whether arbitration can properly be compelled.210 Since the parties
may have different views about which court has competence to hear this particular
issue, parallel proceedings are possible, although they are not ordinarily permitted
at this stage as a matter of international law and practice. As a result, anti-suit
injunctions may be sought to protect the jurisdiction of a particular court or tribu-
nal over a matter.211
Furthermore, even parties who agree that their substantive dispute should be
heard in arbitration may need the court's assistance on a particular procedural
matter. For example, a court may be asked to help select the arbitral tribunal or
issue a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo.212
206. See infra notes 566-76 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 79-96 and accompanying text.
208. See infra notes 535-52 and accompanying text.
209. See infra notes 535-52 and accompanying text.
210. See infra notes 256-88 and accompanying text.
211. See infra notes 298-309 and accompanying text.
212. See infra notes 317-30, 331-50 and accompanying text.
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3. During the Arbitration
Once the arbitration has begun, most concerns are referred to the arbitral tri-
bunal. However, courts and tribunals share jurisdictional competency over certain
matters, which can lead to debates not only over the resolution of the dispute it-
self, but also over the question of who should properly hear the matter. Among
the issues that can appear in court while an arbitration is proceeding are disputes
regarding the production of evidence or witnesses,2 13 the availability of injunctive
relief, including anti-suit injunctions,2 14 and challenges to one of the arbitrators.215
Some countries take the view that judges should not be involved in a dispute
between the parties while an arbitration is proceeding and, thus, prohibit all re-
course to the courts until the arbitration has concluded.2 16 While the United States
has not adopted quite that strict an approach, it is generally considered best for
courts to exercise caution and restraint when asked to assist with an ongoing arbi-
tration so as not to upset the parties' contractual expectation that the dispute
would be resolved through arbitral means.217
4. After the Arbitration
Most parties in international commercial arbitration voluntarily comply with
the terms of the arbitral award.218 Nevertheless, there are times when judicial
assistance is needed after the completion of the arbitration. For example, a party
may seek to have an award vacated or confirmed at the place where it was
made. 219 Alternatively, a court may be asked to enforce an award made in another
jurisdiction.220 Although these proceedings are in some ways analogous to what
occurs in domestic disputes, international commercial arbitration is unique in
several ways, not the least of which is the possibility that actions to enforce an
arbitral award may be brought simultaneously in any number of national courts.
Notably, parallel proceedings at this point of the process are not unusual and are
instead considered entirely proper as a matter of international law and practice.221
213 See infra notes 352-421 and accompanying text.
214. See infra notes 452-55 and accompanying text.
215. See infra notes 422-51 and accompanying text.
216. France is well known for taking an extremely hands-off approach to arbitral proceedings. See
LEW ET AL., supra note 7, 14-55 to 14-56 (discussing the concept of negative competence-
competence).
217. See infra notes 331-50 and accompanying text.
218. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 140, 11.02
219. See infra notes 470-97 and 498-509 and accompanying text.
220. See infra notes 510-630 and accompanying text.
221. See BORN, supra note 9, at 2853, 2872-78. The New York Convention permits a court to sus-
pend enforcement proceedings pending the outcome of an annulment procedure in the place where the
arbitration took place, but says nothing about suspending an enforcement proceeding pending the
outcome of another enforcement proceeding. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. VI.
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E. Jurisdictional Competence: Courts versus Arbitral Tribunals and U.S.
Courts versus Foreign Courts
As the preceding discussion shows, there are many different ways in which
U.S. federal courts may become involved in an international commercial arbitra-
tion. Furthermore, it is entirely possible that assistance may be sought simultane-
ously from several different national courts. For example, parties may seek judi-
cial assistance at the seat of the arbitration (i.e., the place where the arbitration is
legally located, which is often but not always named in the arbitration agreement),
the countries where the parties reside, the location where the injury was suffered,
and/or the place where assets are located.
Sometimes - as in the case of enforcement proceedings - it is considered
proper to bring actions in one or all of these venues.22 2 In situations where multi-
ple proceedings are permitted, parties may bring their actions simultaneously or
seriatim.223
However, there are other times when parallel proceedings are neither encour-
aged nor permitted.224 Furthermore, it is possible for a party to seek judicial inter-
vention at a proper time and regarding a proper issue, but from a court that does
not have proper jurisdiction over the dispute. 225 When this happens, the problem
is not one of domestic law, since the judge overseeing the dispute will undoubted-
ly ensure that any necessary tests are met as a matter of national law. Instead, the
jurisdictional objection arises as a matter of international law and practice.
In this, international commercial arbitration is quite different than domestic
arbitration. In domestic proceedings, the prototypical jurisdictional dispute focus-
es on whether the court or the arbitral tribunal should hear a particular issue. In
international proceedings, it is not only necessary to consider whether the dispute
may properly be heard by a court, but if so, which court or courts. To answer this
second question, the U.S. arbitral community has developed the concept of "pri-
mary" and "secondary jurisdiction."2 26
This approach is somewhat unique in the world of international commercial
arbitration, with courts and commentators in most other countries taking the view
222. The decision on where to proceed will likely be driven by tactical concerns such as where the
award-debtor's assets are located and what the case and likelihood of recovery is, given local law and
procedure.
223. Most of the time, award-debtors comply voluntarily with the terms of an award in international
commercial arbitration. See LEW ET AL., supra note 7, 26-1. However, parties resist enforcement
through a variety of means, either through motions to vacate or annul an award or through objections
to enforcement proceedings brought by the prevailing party. One extreme example of parallel proceed-
ings is discussed in Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Day Gas Bumi
Negara, 500 F.3d Ill, 113-16 (2d Cir. 2007) (outlining offensive and defensive actions brought in
Switzerland, Singapore, Hong Kong, Canada and Indonesia as well as both U.S. district and circuit
courts in the Second and Fifth Circuits). The extent of post-award litigation demonstrated by Karaha
Bodas is very unusual. See id
224. For example, it would be extremely disruptive to have multiple proceedings to appoint or chal-
lenge an arbitrator. See infra notes 65-79 and accompanying text.
225. For example, the award-debtor in the Karaha Bodas case improperly asked a court in Indonesia
to vacate an arbitration award rendered in Switzerland. See Karaha Bodas, 500 F.3d at 115 (noting
only the Swiss court could annul the award); see also Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Per-
tambangan Minyak Das Gas Bumi Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 308-10 (5th Cir. 2004).
226. See BORN, supra note 9, at 1286.
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that the purpose of the New York Convention was not to create a hierarchy of
jurisdictional competence, but rather to facilitate the enforcement of arbitral
awards. 227 According to this latter perspective, any deference to the seat or the
law governing the procedure is both unwarranted under the Convention and coun-
128
terproductive to the fast and easy enforcement of arbitral awards. Indeed, shift-
ing the focus to the award and away from the judicial process surrounding the
award in the country where it was rendered is one of the greatest achievements of
the New York Convention.229
1. Primary and Secondary Jurisdiction as a Choice ofForum Issue
The U.S. concept of primary and secondary jurisdiction developed as a result
of particular language in the New York Convention indicating that a court may
refuse to enforce an award rendered in another state if the award "has been set
aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the
law of which, that award was made."2 30 This language has been read as giving
some courts (i.e., those with primary jurisdiction) preferential status over other
courts (i.e., those with secondary jurisdiction).231
Primary jurisdiction is vested either in the place where the award was made
(i.e., the arbitral seat) or in the place under whose law the award was made. (As
discussed below, this usually turns out to be the same place.) 232 "Secondary juris-
diction" exists in all other courts, regardless of whether there is any preexisting
connection with the parties, the arbitration or the dispute.233 Quite simply, in U.S.
jurisprudence, every court in the world has secondary jurisdiction over an arbitra-
tion agreement or award with the sole exception of the court that has primary ju-
risdiction.
Notably, courts with primary jurisdiction only receive preferential treatment
with respect to certain well-defined issues. Two of the most important involve the
right to set aside an award234 and the right to address certain procedural matters
relating to the internal workings of the arbitration. These might include appoint-
ment of or challenge to arbitrators or assistance in the taking of evidence, among
others.235
In theory, there could be two courts with primary jurisdiction, since the refer-
ence to "the law of which...that award was made" means the procedural law gov-
erning the arbitration that led to the award.236 However, in the vast majority of




230. New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(1)(c).
231. BORN, supra note 9, at 1286; see also Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan
Minyak Das Gas Bumi Negara, 500 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 2007); Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perus-
ahaan Pertambangan Minyak Das Gas Bumi Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 308-10 (5th Cir. 2004).
232. See infra notes 236-47 and accompanying text.
233. Karaha Bodas, 364 F.3d at 287.
234. See infra notes 470-97 and accompanying text.
235. See infra notes 317-30, 352-421 and accompanying text.
236. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(1)(c); Steel Corp. of Philippines v. Int'l Steel
Serv., Inc., 354 Fed. Appx. 689, 692-94 (3d Cir. 2009); Int'l Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad
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cases, the procedural law of the arbitration is that of the arbitral seat. Indeed, it is
both unusual and unwise for the parties to attempt to choose the law of a state
other than the seat as the procedural law of the arbitration, although there are
times when a party will attempt to do so. In these cases, the arbitral seat retains
competence over what has been called "external" matters (i.e., the relationship
between the courts and the arbitration) while the law that has been chosen to con-
trol procedural issues governs any "internal" matters.237
Numerous difficulties arise when the procedural law is not that of the arbitral
seat, both with regard to the choice of the court to hear the motion and the choice
of applicable law. 238 This has led U.S. courts and commentators to adopt a strong
presumption that parties intended the procedural law of the arbitration to be that of
the arbitral seat. Indeed, as the Fifth Circuit has noted:
[u]nder the New York Convention, an agreement specifying the place of
the arbitration creates a presumption that the procedural law of that place
applies to the arbitration. Authorities on international arbitration de-
scribe an agreement providing that one country will be the site of the ar-
bitration but the proceedings will be held under the arbitration law of an-
other country by terms such as "exceptional"; "almost unknown"; a
"purely academic invention"; "almost never used in practice"; a possibil-
ity "more theoretical than real"; and a "once-in-a-blue-moon set of cir-
cumstances." Commentators note that such an agreement would be com-
plex, inconvenient, and inconsistent with the selection of a neutral forum
as the arbitral forum. 239
Any derogation from this principle must be both clear and explicit as a matter of
U.S. law. Thus, for example, any general choice of law provisions contained
within a contract are usually not considered to include matters of procedure but
are instead interpreted as referring only to matters of substance.240
However, U.S. courts not only need to establish that they have jurisdiction as
a matter of international law and practice, they also must confirm that they have
jurisdiction as a matter of domestic law. This requirement gives rise to a few
interesting issues.
Issues relating to federal subject matter jurisdiction are relatively straightfor-
ward, since the FAA clearly states that "[a]n action or proceeding falling under the
Convention shall be deemed to arise under the laws and treaties of the United
States," with district courts having "original jurisdiction . . . regardless of the
amount in controversy." 241 Venue is found in "the place designated in the agree-
ment as the place of arbitration if such place is within the United States" or "any
Anonima Petrolera, 745 F.Supp. 172, 176-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting this phrase does not refer to the
law governing the substance of the dispute); BORN, supra note 9, at 2410-11.
237. See Union of India v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 48, 50-51; BoRN, supra
note 9, at 1330-31.
238. See supra notes 222-29 and accompanying text.
239. See Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pcrtambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bum, Negara, 364
F.3d 274, 291 (5th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
240. See BORN, supra note 9, at 1330; see also infra notes 535-52 and accompanying text.
241. 9 U.S.C. §§203, 302 (2011); see also New York Convention, supra note 22; Panama Conven-
tion, supra note 25.
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court in which save for the arbitration agreement an action or proceeding with
respect to the controversy between the parties could be brought."2 42
Questions regarding personal jurisdiction are slightly more complicated. On
the one hand, private parties - whether foreign or domestic - are entitled to the
due process protections found in the U.S. Constitution.243 This means that all of
the necessary constitutional tests regarding personal jurisdiction must be met with
respect to private parties.244
However, the situation is not quite so clear with respect to foreign states and
state agencies or instrumentalities. Recent decisions have held that foreign states
are not "persons" under the U.S. Constitution and are therefore not entitled to the
protection of the Due Process Clause.245 However, it is unclear whether and to
what extent this principle extends to other state-affiliated entities, such as a state-
owned foreign corporation. 246 Issues relating to foreign states and state agencies
are discussed below. 247
2. Primary and Secondary Jurisdiction as a Choice ofLaw Issue
The preceding subsection focused on the question of which court is compe-
tent to hear a particular motion or action in international commercial arbitration
and indicated that the phrase "law . .. under which that award was made" typical-
ly refers to the arbitral seat in U.S. practice.248 However, the concept of primary
and secondary jurisdiction has a second application in the United States. As a
matter of U.S. practice, the national arbitration law of the country with primary
jurisdiction applies to various procedural matters if the parties have not decided
otherwise. 249 This means that courts sometimes have to apply the national arbitra-
tion law of the place of arbitration on matters relating to arbitral procedure, even
when that particular issue is not heard at the arbitral seat.
This approach can be justified on both legal and practical grounds. Legally,
the parties are considered to have implicitly chosen the procedural law of the
place of arbitration when they choose the seat.250 Practically, the application of
the law of the seat to procedural matters, wherever heard, eliminates forum shop-
ping (since the court at the seat and the court at a distant location will both apply
the same procedural law), and increases the predictability of the arbitral process,
since the procedural law will be known and settled at the time the seat is chosen
242. 9 U.S.C. §§204, 302.
243. See U.S. CONST., amends. V, XIV.
244. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, SA v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
414-15 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980); Oppenheimer
Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 n.13 (1978); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945).
245. See U.S. CONST., amend. V; Frontera Res. Azerbaijan Corp. v. State Oil Co. of Azerbaijan
Republic, 582 F.3d 393, 400 (2d Cir. 2009); TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Property Fund of Ukraine, 411
F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
246. See Frontera, 582 F.3d at401.
247. See infra notes 698-713 and accompanying text.
248. New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(l)(c).
249. See BORN, supra note 9, at 1286.
250. See Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364
F.3d 274, 288-92 (5th Cir. 2004).
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(i.e., when the agreement is made) and will not depend on the parties' later choic-
es on where to bring a particular motion.
However, this approach has not been universally adopted. In contrast to U.S.
practice, some members of the international community take the view that "the
seat of the arbitration, often chosen for reasons of convenience or because of the
neutrality of the country in question, does not necessarily cause the procedure to
be governed by the law of that jurisdiction." 251 This approach is evidenced by the
national legislation in a number of jurisdictions, such as France, Switzerland, The
Netherlands, Portugal, Egypt and Italy, as well as arbitral rules from prominent
arbitral institutions, international conventions and arbitral case law.252
Courts and commentators adopting this approach take the view that deferring
to the seat for rules of procedure would be neither warranted nor in accordance
with the parties' expectations. 253 Instead, arbitral procedure should be determined
through reference to private rules prepared by arbitral institutions, transnational
rules derived from comparative law or arbitral case law, or any combination of
these and other laws. This approach emphasizes the ability of arbitrators to decide
on any procedural issue if and when it arises, subject to the agreement of the par-
ties.254
Notably, the U.S. concept of primary and secondary jurisdiction as a choice
of law device does not extend to the substantive law that applies to the merits of
the dispute. These default mechanisms involving the choice of the national arbi-
tration law of the arbitral seat only apply to certain matters of arbitral procedure.
Having described the necessary background concepts, it is time to consider
the role of U.S. courts in specific situations relating to international commercial
arbitration. The following section breaks the discussion down into three different
time periods: prior to or at the initiation of arbitral proceedings; during arbitral
proceedings; and after arbitral proceedings have concluded.255
IV. ROLE OF U.S. FEDERAL COURTS IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
A. Role of the Court Prior to or at the Initiation ofArbitral Proceedings
U.S. courts may be asked to resolve a number of issues prior to or at the initi-
ation of an international commercial arbitration. Several of the more common
types of motions are discussed below, although other alternatives are possible.
1. Motions to Compel Arbitration
The first and perhaps most common motion that might be made during the
early stages of a dispute involves a request to compel an international commercial
arbitration. Under Chapters 2 and 3 of the FAA, a motion to compel can be made
251. FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN, supra note 138, 1178.
252. See id. 1178 et seq.
253. See BORN, supra note 9, 1299-1301.
254. FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN, supra note 138, T 1171 et seq.
255. See LEW ET AL., supra note 7, T$ 15-21 to 15-57.
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in a U.S. court regardless of where in the world the arbitration is supposed to take
place.256 The technical requirements regarding the making of a motion to compel
arbitration appear in section 4 of the FAA, which applies to international proceed-
ings by virtue of the residual application provisions of Chapter 2 and 3.2
When considering motions to compel in the international context, U.S. federal
courts are required to take into account the strong federal policy in favor of inter-
national commercial arbitration.25 8 This pro-arbitration policy is based on two
different statutory provisions. First, the FAA states that if an arbitration agree-
ment exists and "there is a default in proceeding thereunder, the court shall make
an order summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accord-
ance with the terms thereof."259 Second, the New York Convention indicates, in
similarly mandatory terms, that:
[t]he court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in
respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning
of this Article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties
to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, in-
operative or incapable of being performed.260
Notably, the pro-arbitration stance exhibited by both the FAA and the New
York Convention is predicated on the existence of a valid arbitration agreement
between the parties.2 61 Therefore, courts facing a motion to compel arbitration
may be asked to determine whether a valid arbitration agreement actually exists.
This leads to the question of who should determine questions regarding the validi-
ty or existence of an arbitration agreement: the court or the arbitral tribunal. The
FAA does not speak directly to this issue, which means that judges must look to
other sources of authority for guidance.262
Analysis of the question of "who decides?" involves two separate but related
concepts: the notion of separability and the idea of competence-competence
(Kompetenz-Kompetenz), known in the U.S. as the arbitrators' ability to determine
their own jurisdiction.263 Although judges are familiar with these principles in the
domestic context, international disputes give rise to some unusual quirks.
In the United States, the notion of separability refers to the idea that the exist-
ence, validity, and legality of the underlying contract does not necessarily affect
the existence, validity, or legality of the arbitration agreement. 264 Therefore, "un-
less the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract's va-
256. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 206, 303 (2011) (stating "[a] court having jurisdiction under this chapter may
direct that arbitration be held in accordance with the agreement at any place therein provided for,
whether that place is within or without the United States").
257. See id. §§ 4, 208, 307.
258. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985) (noting
arbitration agreements should be enforced in the international realm, "even assuming that a contrary
result would be forthcoming in a domestic context").
259. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
260. New York Convention, supra note 22, art. 11(3).
261. See id.; 9 U.S.C. §§ 2,4.
262. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307.
263. See BORN, supra note 9, at 851-52.
264. See Buckeye Check Cashing Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-46 (2006); Prima Paint Corp.
v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,400,402-04 (1967).
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lidity is considered by the arbitrator in the first instance." 265 This analysis can get
quite complicated and will not be discussed in detail here.266
In the U.S., questions about the validity of the arbitration agreement itself (as
opposed to the contract in which the arbitration agreement is found) evoke the
concept of "gateway" issues. Gateway determinations distinguish between those
matters that are properly within the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and those that are
properly within the jurisdiction of the court.267 A considerable amount of juris-
prudence regarding gateway issues has developed in the context of domestic arbi-
tration, which appears to be equally applicable in the international realm.268
Domestic case law regarding gateway issues can give rise to some confusion
when transferred to the international realm. Fortunately, this is primarily a lin-
guistic issue rather than a conceptual one.
Gateway issues often involve discussion of the concept of "arbitrability,"
which is used in the United States to refer to "[t]he question whether the parties
have submitted a particular dispute to arbitration."269 According to this definition,
arbitrability is a private concern that goes to the scope of the parties' agreement
and, thus, lies at the heart of gateway issues as a matter of U.S. jurisprudence.
"Arbitrability" is not defined the same way elsewhere. Outside the United
States, the notion of "arbitrability" refers to a public law concern going to whether
a country will permit a particular subject matter to be resolved through arbitra-
tion.270 This type of arbitrability is not considered very often in U.S. courts be-
cause the United States takes a very liberal approach to arbitration and has few
restrictions on the types of issues that can be heard in the arbitral setting.271' Thus,
for example, antitrust concerns were once considered non-arbitrable as a matter of
U.S. law, although that has now changed.272
While there is a general international trend to increase the number and types
of issues that are arbitrable, some types of claims remain off-limits in some juris-
dictions.273 There is nothing wrong with a country designating a particular type of
subject matter as non-arbitrable, and in fact the practice is specifically contem-
plated in the New York Convention. 274  However, the restriction on non-
arbitrability must be narrowly construed, and references in the New York Conven-
tion to "a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration" should not be inter-
preted by reference to the national law of single state but instead "must be made
265. Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at 44546.
266 See BORN, supra note 9, at 322-43, 359-91.
267. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83-84 (2002); First Options of Chica-
go, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).
268. See General Elec. Co. v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 155 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying First Options in
an international dispute); BORN, supra note 9, at 911-48.
269. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83 (citations omitted).
270. See FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN, supra note 138, f 532-33 (referring to "objective arbi-
trability" or "arbitrability ratione materiae").
271. See BORN, supra note 9, at 781-85.
272. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636-37 (1985)..
273. See European Council Regulation 44/2001 of 22 Dec. 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition
of Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1, art. 22(4) (giving
courts exclusive jurisdiction over "proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents,
trademarks, designs, or similar rights required to be deposited or registered").
274. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. 11(1) (noting applicability of the Convention only
to arbitration agreements "concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration").
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on an international scale, with reference to the laws of the countries party to the
Convention." 275
Both types of arbitrability can be raised in U.S. courts. The domestic under-
standing of arbitrability is seen most frequently in discussions relating to gateway
issues. However, the international understanding of arbitrability can also be in-
troduced in some instances. For example, even though the United States has
adopted a broad view of arbitrability in the international sense (i.e., of various
subject matters) as a matter of domestic law, courts can occasionally be asked to
determine an issue of arbitrability (again in the international sense) under the law
of a different country.276 Therefore, parties need to be prepared to distinguish
between the two types of arbitrability, depending on the question at hand.
However, returning to the jurisdictional question of "who decides," parties
need to consider more than just separability and arbitrability (in the U.S. sense).
Counsel briefing these issues also need to take into account the concept of compe-
tence-competence, or the arbitral tribunal's ability to decide its own jurisdiction. 277
The international community has recognized that when the validity or existence of
the arbitration agreement is challenged, the principle of competence-competence
allows an arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction without invalidating the
result of that determination should it find there is no valid arbitration agree-
ment.278 Competence-competence prevents parties from challenging the validity
or existence of arbitral agreements as a delaying or obstructionist tactic, and con-
solidates resolution of disputes about the existence and validity of arbitral agree-
ments with disputes about the existence and validity of the underlying contract to
prevent wasted costs and time through parallel and duplicative proceedings. 279
Although the FAA is silent on the subject, the U.S. Supreme Court has indi-
cated that arbitral tribunals are generally competent to decide matters relating to
their own jurisdiction.280 However, just because arbitrators are competent to de-
termine their own jurisdiction does not mean that they are allowed to do so in all
circumstances. This gives rise to the "gateway issue" debate in U.S. case law,
which focuses on whether the parties agreed to submit the question of jurisdiction
to arbitration (in which case the matter will be determined through arbitration) or
whether the parties reserved that issue for judicial determination (in which case
the matter will be determined through litigation).2 8'
Some controversy exists regarding the extent to which U.S. practice on gate-
way issues conforms to international norms. Some commentators take the view
that "the First Options approach bears important resemblances to those [taken] in
other jurisdictions."282 Other experts believe that the U.S. stance is difficult to
275. Meadows Indem. Co. Ltd. v. Baccala & Shoop Ins. Services, Inc., 760 F.Supp. 1036, 1042
(E.D.N.Y. 1991); see also New York Convention, supra note 22, art. 11(1).
276. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(I)(a).
277. See William W. Park, Determining an Arbitrator's Jurisdiction: Timing and Finality in Ameri-
can Law, 8 NEV. L.J. 135, 139-42 (2007) (noting this question involves several constituent issues).
278. See BORN, supra note 9, at 328-32.
279. See FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN, supra note 138, % 680-82.
280. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2011); Rent-a-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 2777-79
(2010); Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U S. 79, 83-84 (2002); First Options of Chicago,
Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).
281. See First Options, 514 U.S. at 943.
282. BORN, supra note 9, at 911.
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implement and conceptually problematic when compared to that used in other
nations. 283 Applied in its fullest sense, competence-competence allows arbitrators
to be the first (though not the sole) judges of their jurisdiction.
Although case law regarding jurisdictional concerns will doubtless continue
to develop over time, as a practical matter, a U.S. court faced with a motion to
compel arbitration has several possible responses:
* the court can immediately compel arbitration, even if questions exist
about the validity or existence of the arbitration agreement, on the
grounds that the arbitral tribunal is competent to determine its own juris-
diction, in accordance with the principle of competence-competence;
* the court can hear argument about the validity or existence of the ar-
bitration agreement on the grounds that the parties did not want to give
this issue to the arbitral tribunal and then, if the arbitration agreement is
upheld, send the substantive dispute to arbitration; or
* the court can hear argument about the validity or existence of the ar-
bitration agreement on the grounds that the parties did not want to give
this issue to the arbitral tribunal and then, if the arbitration agreement is
not upheld, retain jurisdiction over the substantive dispute.
It is also possible to split parties and issues, sending some to arbitration while
others remain in litigation.2 84
Should the court decide to compel arbitration under one of the first two op-
tions, the proper and, indeed, necessary next step is to issue an order compelling
arbitration.285 This is a mandatory duty that exists in cases where the arbitration is
to be seated in the United States as well as in situations where the proceedings are
to be seated abroad. Indeed, the First Circuit has noted that:
[s]o long as the parties are bound to arbitrate and the district court has
personal jurisdiction over them, the court is under an unflagging, nondis-
cretionary duty to grant a timely motion to compel arbitration and there-
by enforce the New York Convention as provided in Chapter 2 of the
FAA, even though the agreement requires arbitration in a distant fo-
rum.286
However, any order directing the parties to arbitration must not attempt to specify
the procedures that are to be used in the arbitration, since doing so could run afoul
of governing laws, as well as important principles regarding party autonomy, arbi-
283. See William W. Park, The Arbitrability Dicta in First Options v. Kaplan- What Sort of Kompe-
tenz-Kompetenz Has Crossed the Atlantic? 12 ARB. INT'L 137, 148-50 (1996) (comparing the U.S.
approach to English, French, Swiss and German techniques of determining jurisdiction).
284. See infra notes 289-97 and accompanying text.
285. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 4, 206, 303 (2011).
286. InterGen NV v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 142 (1st Cir. 2003); see also 9 U.S.C. §§201-08; BORN,
supra note 9, at 1015-16 (citing numerous decisions).
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trator discretion, and the supervisory competence of courts at the arbitral seat (i.e.,
the primary jurisdiction).287
Notably, the United States appears to be unique in the way that it issues a
mandatory order compelling the parties to proceed to arbitration. Other nations
typically give effect to the pro-arbitration mandate of the New York Convention
by merely referring the parties to arbitration.288
2. Motions to Stay Litigation
Another type of proceeding that parties may bring in a U.S. court at the early
stages of an international commercial arbitration is a motion to stay litigation.
Notably, this type of motion may only be brought in the same court where a law-
suit has been filed.289 If an action is proceeding in another venue, then the proper
tactic is to seek an anti-suit injunction, which is discussed below.290
A motion to stay litigation arises out of an agreement to arbitrate to the same
extent as a motion to compel arbitration, with the latter simply reflecting a posi-
tive obligation and the former reflecting a negative obligation. Because the two
motions are mirror images of one another, they merit the same level of respect
under the New York Convention, even though the Convention only speaks of the
court's duty to refer parties to arbitration. 291
The FAA is more explicit, stating expressly that:
[i]f any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United
States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writ-
ing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon be-
ing satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable
to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the
parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in
accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for
the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration. 292
This provision is made applicable to international disputes through the residual
application clauses of Chapters 2 and 3.293
Sometimes a party files an action that involves both arbitrable and non-
arbitrable claims. In those situations, a court may compel the arbitration of some
disputes and stay litigation of the remaining issues pending the outcome of the
arbitration.294 A similar outcome results when a plaintiff attempts to bring claims
287. See Rhone Mediterrance Compagnia Francese Di Assicurazioni E Riassicurazoni v. Achillc
Lauro, 712 F.2d 50, 54-55 (3d Cir. 1983); BORN, supra note 9, at 1018.
288. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. 11(3); BORN, supra note 9, at 1014-15.
289 See 9 U.S C. §§ 3, 208.
290. See infra notes 289-309 and accompanying text.
291 See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. 11(3); BORN, supra note 9, at 1020-28.
292. 9 U.S.C. § 3.
293. See id. §§ 208, 307; Energy Transport, Ltd. v. M.V. San Sebastian, 348 F.Supp.2d 186, 201
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
294. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217, 221 (1985) (recognizing the possi-
bility of "'piecemeal' litigation" and "the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in
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against multiple parties but only some of the defendants are subject to an arbitra-
tion agreement. In those situations, a court may compel the arbitration of some
disputes while staying the remaining claims until the arbitral proceedings have
concluded.295 In some rare cases, a court may decide that the FAA does not
preempt a state law that allows for a stay of arbitration pending the outcome of
litigation.296
In general, the U.S. approach to staying litigation is the same in international
disputes as in domestic disputes. Interestingly, this is one of the areas where civil
law and common law jurisdictions differ, at least as a technical matter, in that
common law courts typically stay a litigation that has been initiated in violation of
a valid arbitration agreement, while civil law courts dismiss the case altogether. 297
However, the difference between the two systems is lessened to the extent that
U.S. and other common law courts consider the stay of litigation mandatory rather
than discretionary.
3. Motions Seeking an Anti-suit Injunction
Parties wishing to protect the arbitration process may come to a U.S. court
seeking a third type of assistance: an anti-suit injunction. Unlike motions to stay
litigation, which involve proceedings in one particular court, anti-suit injunctions
prohibit parties from seeking or pursuing judicial relief in any court anywhere in
the world. 298 Recently, the international arbitral community has also begun to see
a related form of relief, the anti-anti-suit injunction.299 Although anti-suit injunc-
tions are discussed here in the context of preliminary proceedings, they may be
sought during an arbitration as well.
Because anti-suit and anti-anti-suit injunctions have their roots in common
law jurisdictions, U.S. and other common law courts are often prime candidates
for receiving motions of this type.3o Interestingly, the U.S. has become an even
more attractive jurisdiction for anti-suit injunctions ever since the Court of Justice
of the European Communities curtailed English courts' ability to issue such in-
different forums"); Kwasney Co. v. AcryliCon Int'l Ltd., No. 09-13357, 2010 WL 2474788, at *3
(E.D. Mich. June 11, 2010); BORN, supra note 9, at 1032.
295. See Moses H. Cone Mcm'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1983) (stating that
"federal law requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement"
and noting that the agreement must be enforced "notwithstanding the presence of other persons who
are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement") (emphasis in original);
AgGrow Oils, LLC v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 242 F.3d 777, 783 (8th Cir. 2001); Marubeni Corp. v.
Mobile Bay Blue Chip Center, No. 02-0914-PL, 2003 WL 22466215, at *17-18 (S.D. Ala. June 16,
2003); BORN, supra note 9, at 1032.
296. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307; Volt Info. Sciences v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 471, 479 (1989).
297. See BORN, supra note 9, at 1026-27.
298. See id at 1036.
299. See Teck Metals, Ltd. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, No. 05-411, 2010 WL
252804, at *1 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 19, 2010).
300. See infra notes 452-55 and accompanying text.
301. See BORN, supra note 9, at 1041. However, civil law systems have also become increasingly
willing to enjoin parties from initiating or continuing actions in other jurisdictions. See Emmanuel
Gaillard, Reflections on the Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Arbitration, in PERVASIVE
PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 203 at 10-1 (Loukas A. Mistclis & Julian D.M. Lew eds.,
2008) [hereinafter Gaillard, Reflections].
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junctions in cases involving proceedings brought in other Member States of the
European Union.302
To obtain an anti-suit injunction in a U.S. court, a movant must typically
demonstrate that:
* the parties in the foreign litigation are the same as those who are
bound by the agreement to arbitrate;
* the foreign litigation involves the same issues as would be resolved
under the arbitration agreement;
* irreparable injury or grave hardship would occur absent the injunc-
tion; and
* the public policy of the U.S. forum warrants a grant of injunctive re-
lief.303
In the cross-border context, it is also necessary to weigh matters of interna-
tional comity against "the need to 'prevent vexatious or oppressive litigation' and
to 'protect the court's jurisdiction.'" 3 0 Although "'it is well settled that American
courts have the power' to issue foreign antisuit injunctions, '[c]omity dictates that
[these injunctions] be issued sparingly and only in the rarest of cases.' 30 s Thus,
"no mere disagreement with a party's approach to enforcing or attacking a foreign
arbitral award under the Convention should suffice to support an anti-foreign-suit
injunction."0
While cases have held that the New York Convention does not divest U.S.
federal courts of their authority to issue an anti-suit injunction, one factor that may
be relevant to the anti-suit analysis is whether the U.S. court has primary or sec-
ondary jurisdiction over the arbitration. 307 Although anti-suit injunctions are sel-
dom granted and are highly suspect in some jurisdictions, one international com-
mentator has taken the position that anti-suit injunctions "are not inconsistent with
the New York Convention (because they enforce, rather than breach, international
arbitration agreements)." 308 Others have argued that "anti-suit injunctions negate
the very basis of arbitration, that is, the parties' consent to submit their disputes to
302. See Case C-185/07, West Tankers Inc. v. Allianz SpA (formerly RAS Riunione Adriatica diSci-
urtA SpA), [2009] 1 A.C. 1138, 1153 174 (Court of Justice of the European Communitics).
303. See BORN, supra note 9, at 1039-40.
304. Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 335
F.3d 357, 366 (5th Cir. 2003).
305. Answers in Genesis of Ky., Inc. v. Creation Ministries Int'l, Ltd., 556 F.3d 459, 471 (6th Cir.
2009).
306. Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 500
F.3d 111, 125 n. 17 (2d Cir. 2007).
307. See New York Convention, supra note 22; Karaha Bodas, 335 F.3d at 365, 368-70 (leaving open
the question of whether a court of secondary jurisdiction could enjoin a litigation in the primary juris-
diction). But see General Elec. Co. v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 161-62 (3d Cir. 2001) (failing to con-
sider issues regarding primary and secondary jurisdiction per se, instead focusing on comity analysis).
308. BORN, supra note 9, at 1044; see also New York Convention, supra note 22.
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arbitration," even when anti-suit injunctions are issued with the intent to support
international arbitration. 309
4. Motions Seeking an Anti-arbitration Injunction
The actions discussed in the preceding three subsections involve a moving
party who wants to proceed in arbitration rather than litigation. Sometimes, how-
ever, the reverse exists: a demand for arbitration has been made, but the respond-
ent believes that the dispute should be heard in court. Although it is possible for
the respondent to lodge an objection with the arbitral tribunal and for the dispute
to be returned to court, many parties are skeptical about arbitrators' willingness to
deny their own jurisdiction over a dispute. Nevertheless, evidence suggests this
result does indeed happen on occasion.310 Procedurally, this can be tricky, since
parties must be careful that the method by which they object to the jurisdiction of
the arbitral tribunal does not waive their right to have the issue heard in front of a
judge.311
In order to avoid these problems, some parties go directly to court to request
an anti-arbitration injunction, which is a type of anti-suit injunction meant to stop
the initiation or continuation of an arbitration.312 Anti-arbitration orders can be
directed to a party to the arbitration or to the members of the arbitral tribunal.
Such actions to challenge the validity or existence of an arbitration agreement
must be considered in light of the principle of competence-competence, or the
arbitral tribunal's power to rule on its own jurisdiction.313
Anti-arbitration orders are justified on the grounds that allowing an arbitral
proceeding to go forward when no valid arbitration agreement exists injures the
innocent party. 314 However, as with anti-suit injunctions, resort to litigation and
intervention of national courts can be seen as encroaching on the proper jurisdic-
tion of the arbitral tribunal and interfering with the parties' consent to arbitrate
their disputes. 3t5 Ultimately, there is not a great deal of authority available on this
issue, and questions arise as to whether U.S. courts can issue such an injunction in
cases where the arbitration is seated outside the United States. 316
309. See Gaillard, Reflections, supra note 301, at 10-19.
310. See M&C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., KG, 87 F.3d 844, 847 (6th Cir. 1996); New Elliott
Corp. v. MAN Gutchoffnungshutte AG, 969 F.Supp. 13, 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
311. See Orion Pictures Corp. v. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc., 946 F.2d 722, 725 (9th Cir.
1991).
312. See Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 51 F.Supp.2d 756, 758 (E.D.
Tex. 1999).
313. See BORN, supra note 9, at 852-83.
314. See id. at 1049.
315. See Gaillard, Reflections, supra note 301, at 10-19 to 10-21.
316. See Farrell v. Subway Int'l, B.V., No. II Civ. 08 (JFK), 2011 WL 1085017, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 23, 2011); URS Corp. v. Lebanese Co. for the Dcv. and Reconstr. of Beirut Central District SAL,
512 F.Supp.2d 199, 208 (D. Del. 2007); Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, 51 F.Supp.2d at 761; BORN,
supra note 9, at 1049-50.
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5. Motions for Assistance in the Naming of an Arbitrator
Not all motions made at the preliminary stage of an international commercial
arbitration relate to the desire to compel or stay a particular type of proceeding.
Sometimes the parties agree that the dispute should be heard in arbitration, but
experience difficulties in getting the procedure started.
The most common of these early logistical problems involves the selection of
the arbitral tribunal. Several types of difficulty can arise: the parties may not
have agreed to a particular method of appointing the arbitrator or arbitrators, one
party may be unable or unwilling to exercise its power to appoint an arbitrator, or
an appointing agency may fail to act in an expeditious manner.
Quite often, the solution to these problems can be found in the express
agreement of the parties (i.e., in the arbitration agreement itself) or in the arbitral
rules that the parties have selected to apply to their proceedings, since those rules
reflect the parties' implicit agreement regarding procedural matters. In both cases,
the FAA empowers U.S. courts to "appoint arbitrators in accordance with the
provisions of the agreement."3 18
Sometimes, however, the agreement is silent with respect to the selection of
the arbitral tribunal. In these cases, the parties must look to Chapter I of the FAA
for guidance, since Chapters 2 and 3 of the FAA only address situations where the
parties have made provision for the appointment of arbitrations.3 19  Section 5,
made applicable to international disputes through the residual application provi-
sions of Chapters 2 and 3, states that if the arbitration agreement makes no provi-
sion for the naming of the arbitrators, then:
the court shall designate and appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators or um-
pire, as the case may require, who shall act under the said agreement with
the same force and effect as if he or they had been specifically named
therein; and unless otherwise provided in the agreement the arbitration
shall be by a single arbitrator. 320
The FAA's approach to the appointment of arbitrators is consistent with that
taken by numerous other national statutes, so there is no danger of the U.S. being
out of step with other jurisdictions with respect to U.S. courts' ability to select
arbitrators. 321 Nevertheless, parties must take care with motions of this type, be-
cause this is one of those areas where confusion can arise regarding the proper
place to bring a motion for judicial assistance. For example, parties could attempt
to seek aid from courts at their places of residence, the place of performance of the
contract and/or the place of arbitration. Successful motions in all these locations
could result in a superfluity of arbitrators.322
The international arbitral community has addressed this issue by taking the
view that motions to appoint an arbitrator should only be made in the court with
317. See BORN, supra note 9, at 1424-30.
318. 9 U.S.C. §§ 206, 303(a) (2011).
319. See id. §§ 1-307.
320. Id. § 5; see also id. §§ 208, 307.
321. See id. §§ 5, 208, 307.
322. See BORN, supra note 9, at 1432.
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primary jurisdiction. This position is based on treaty language indicating that a
party may object to the enforcement of the arbitral award if "[t]he composition of
the arbitral authority . .. was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties,
or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country
where the arbitration took place." 323 Because the default law with respect to the
selection of arbitrators is that of the seat of arbitration, it is logical to give jurisdic-
tion over those matters to those courts. Indeed, "[i]t is only in the rarest cases that
national arbitration legislation should be interpreted as permitting appointment of
arbitrators in an arbitration that does not have its seat in the appointing court's
state."324
U.S. courts have recognized their power to appoint arbitrators in international
arbitrations seated in the United States when the parties have not agreed to a par-
ticular procedure. 325 This is true even if the agreement between the parties indi-
cates that the arbitration may be seated either in the U.S. or elsewhere, so long as
the U.S. alternative is chosen.326
Sometimes the arbitration agreement indicates how arbitrators are to be
named. Federal courts will enforce the terms of these types of agreements in a
U.S.-seated arbitration.327 Furthermore, U.S. courts have held that they have the
ability to name arbitrators in cases where the parties have not agreed to the place
of arbitration, but "only where the second party has expressly consented to a Unit-
ed States forum or has contacts with that forum sufficient to meet the require-
ments of personal jurisdiction." 328
The more difficult question arises when the seat of the arbitration is outside
the United States, since the FAA's appointment mechanisms do not differentiate
between arbitrations seated in the United States and those seated elsewhere.329
Very few U.S. courts appear to have addressed this issue, although one older deci-
sion suggests in dicta that it might have had the ability to name arbitrators in a
proceeding seated in Switzerland. 330 However, parties should not attempt to bring
an action in U.S. federal court to name an arbitrator in a non-U.S. arbitration,
since such requests appear contrary to international law and practice, and could
conflict with orders made by the court at the arbitral seat regarding the appoint-
ment of arbitrators.
323. New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(I)(d); see also Panama Convention, supra note 25,
art. 5(l)(d).
324. BORN, supra note 9, at 1433.
325 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 5, 208, 307; Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Argonaut, Inc., 500 F.3d
571, 578-79 (7th Cir. 2007), affg 444 F.Supp.2d 909, 921-22 (N.D. 111. 2006).
326. See Cargill Rice, Inc. v. Empresa Nicaraguense Dealimentos Basicos, 25 F.3d 223, 224-25 (4th
Cir. 1994).
327. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 206, 303(a); Farrell v. Subway Int'l, B.V., No. 11 Civ. 08 (JFK), 2011 WL
1085017, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2011).
328. See Jam v. de Mere, 51 F.3d 686, 692 (7th Cir. 1995).
329. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 5, 206, 303.
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6. Motions for Provisional Aid ofArbitration
Appointment of arbitrators is only one way that a court can provide early as-
sistance to an international commercial arbitration. Parties may also come to a
U.S. judge seeking help with the freezing of assets, protection of property or other
forms of preliminary injunctive relief. The international arbitral community con-
siders courts and arbitral tribunals to share concurrent jurisdiction over the grant-
ing of provisional relief pursuant to numerous national laws and arbitral rules,
which means that these sorts of motions are entirely proper.33' Furthermore, such
requests may be made at any time during the arbitral proceedings, although parties
are most likely to refer these sorts of requests to a judge in the early stages of a
dispute, before the arbitral tribunal has been fully constituted.332
While the practice of seeking provisional relief from a court has been accept-
ed as necessary in cases where the tribunal is not yet in place, 333 the international
arbitral community views the need to require the parties to go to court for assis-
tance as conceptually unsatisfactory, given that the parties have clearly contracted
for their disputes to be heard in arbitration. 334 Several arbitral institutions have
attempted to cure this deficiency by creating various means of providing urgent
preliminary relief in arbitration. For example, the ICC has promulgated a separate
set of Rules for a Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure that gives an interim referee the
power:
a) to order any conservatory measures or any measures of restoration that
are urgently necessary to prevent either immediate damage or irreparable
loss and so to safeguard any of the rights or property of one of the par-
ties;
b) to order a party to make to any other party or to another person any
payment which ought to be made;
c) to order a party to take any step which ought to be taken according to
the contract between the parties, including the signing or delivery of any
document or the procuring by a party of the signature or delivery of a
document;
d) to order any measures necessary to preserve or establish evidence. 335
The LCIA has provided a similar solution by offering an expedited appoint-
ment procedure for constituting a tribunal to deal with urgent preliminary mat-
331. See BORN, supra note 9, at 1972-73, 2050.
332. See id. at 1973, 2050.
333. LEW ET AL., supra note 7, 1 23-100.
334. Id. T 23-122, 23-128.
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ters.336 Other international institutions have also created their own means of re-
solving initial requests for preliminary relief.3 37
Although the international approach to the availability of provisional relief is
relatively clear, U.S. practice is slightly more complicated, due, in part, to the fact
that the FAA is silent on the question of provisional measures in arbitration other
than in a narrow range of maritime disputes.338 However, some guidance can be
found in case law. For example, courts agree that, absent an agreement between
the parties to grant exclusive jurisdiction on this issue to one body or another, both
the arbitral tribunal and the court are empowered to provide such relief in domes-
tic arbitration. 339 Furthermore, it is clear that the arbitral tribunal may provide
such relief in international arbitration. 34 However, courts are split as to whether a
U.S. judge can order provisional relief in an international arbitration given manda-
tory language in the New York Convention indicating that a court "shall . . . refer
the parties to arbitration."3 41
On the one hand, the Second Circuit has held that "entertaining an application
for a preliminary injunction in aid of arbitration is consistent with the court's
powers" under section 206 of the FAA and thus the New York Convention. 34 2
This is true even if the arbitration is seated outside the United States.343 This ana-
lytical approach has been applied both to preliminary relief and prejudgment rem-
edies.
On the other hand, the Third and Ninth Circuits do not permit courts to pro-
vide provisional relief in international commercial arbitration, either because the
relief requested is available from the arbitral tribunal (a factor that may be particu-
larly important in disputes arising after the tribunal has been constituted or where
an arbitral mechanism for urgent preliminary relief exists) or because the New
York Convention forbids such actions by requiring courts to refer parties to arbi-
tration as a mandatory matter.345
Of the two approaches, the first seems to be the more prevalent as well as the
most consistent with international standards. Indeed, the weight of U.S. authority
"rejects the view that Article 11(3) of the [New York] Convention precludes court-
ordered provisional measures in aid of arbitration," consistent with "almost all
non-U.S. decisions and academic commentary."346 As a practical matter, this
336. See LCIA Arbitration Rules, supra note 32, art. 9.
337. See ICDR International Arbitration Rules, art. 37, supra note 32; Netherlands Arbitration Institu-
tion Rules, art. 42, effective July 15, 2001, available at http://www.nai-nl.org/cn/info.asp?id=398;
BORN, supra note 9, at 1971-72.
338. See 9 U.S.C. § 8 (2011).
339. See Am. Express Fin. Advisors v. Thorley, 147 F.3d 229, 231 (2d Cir. 1998).
340. See Banco de Seguros del Estado v. Mutual Marine Office, Inc., 344 F.3d 255, 262-63 (2d Cir.
2003), aff'd 344 F.3d 255 (2d Cir. 2003); BORN, supra note 9, at 1955-56, 2045-46.
341. New York Convention, supra note 22, art. 11(3); see also BORN, supra note 9, at 2030-31.
342. See Borden, Inc. v. Meiji Milk Prods. Co., 919 F.2d 822, 826 (2d Cir. 1990); see also New York
Convention, supra note 22; 9 U.S.C. §206.
343. See Bahrain Telecommc'n Co. v. Discoverytel, Inc. 476 F.Supp.2d 176, 180-81 (D. Conn. 2007).
344. See id. at 182.
345. See Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 725 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting preliminary relief
was available under arbitral rules); McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT, 501 F.2d 1032, 1038 (3d
Cir. 1974) (citing Article 11(3) of the New York Convention); New York Convention, supra note 22,
art. 11(3).
346. BORN, supra note 9, at 2031, 2039; see also New York Convention, supra note 22, art. 11(3).
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makes sense, particularly in the early stages of a dispute, when the tribunal has not
yet been constituted.
Although this is an issue that can arise at any stage of the arbitration, 347 U.S.
courts follow the same basic method of analysis regardless of when the applica-
tion for assistance is made. First, judges consider whether and to what extent the
parties have agreed, implicitly or explicitly, to a particular mode of provisional
relief (i.e., whether they have required recourse to a court or a tribunal or permit-
ted access to both).
Second, the court considers other relevant factors. For example, courts in the
past have looked at whether the party seeking the assistance has previously
demonstrated support of the arbitral proceeding (such as by moving to compel
arbitration) and whether the moving party is seeking any relief other than provi-
sional measures. 348
Some older authorities suggest that, as a procedural matter, a motion for pro-
visional relief must be accompanied by a motion to compel arbitration or stay
litigation.349 Other cases have held that such a narrow reading of the court's pow-
ers is inconsistent with the New York Convention's goal of facilitating speedy and
effective arbitration.3 50
B. Role of the Court During Arbitral Proceedings
The preceding subsection addressed motions that are made prior to or at the
initiation of arbitration. However, procedural disputes and difficulties also arise
while the arbitration is ongoing. Although most of these issues should and will be
heard within the confines of the arbitration itself, there are times when a party
may seek judicial assistance. Nevertheless, courts in the U.S. and elsewhere agree
that restraint is necessary so as to give effect to the principle of judicial non-
interference in an on-going arbitral proceeding.3 5 '
1. Motions for Disclosure or Discovery in Aid of an
International Arbitral Proceeding
Perhaps the most controversial type of motion that can be brought during an
international commercial arbitration involves a request for judicial aid in the dis-
closure or discovery process. This is a particularly complicated and contentious
area of law, given the vast conceptual differences between discovery in U.S. liti-
gation and the production of evidence in other forms of public and private dispute
resolution. Before discussing the various issues that can arise in connection with
international commercial arbitration, it is necessary to describe certain fundamen-
tal principles regarding the exchange of information outside U.S. courts.
347 See infra notes 452-55 and accompanying text.
348. See Bahrain Telecommc'n, 476 F. Supp. 2d at 181-82; BORN, supra note 9, at 2040-42.
349. See International Shipping Co., S.A. v. Hydra Offshore, Inc., 875 F.2d 388, 391 n.5 (2d Cir.
1988).
350. See Bahrain Telecommc 'n, 476 F. Supp. 2d at 180; New York Convention, supra note 22.
351. See Gary Born, The Principle of Judicial Non-Interference n International Arbitral Proceed-
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a. Discovery Versus Disclosure
Procedures relating to the discovery or disclosure of information vary greatly,
depending on the forum in which the parties find themselves. Each country has
adopted its own individual approach to the exchange and presentation of evidence,
although certain broad generalizations can be made depending on whether the
legal system falls into the common law or civil law tradition. 352  International
commercial arbitration reflects a third, unique method of taking and presenting
evidence, blending elements of both common law and civil law in a process
known as "disclosure" rather than "discovery."353
The purposes and procedures associated with discovery in U.S. litigation are
well known and therefore require little discussion. Because courts are entitled to
hear all the facts relevant to a dispute, parties are permitted to make wide-ranging
requests for documents and testimony from both litigants and third parties.354
Failure to comply with a discovery request results in judicial sanctions. 3ss Al-
though efforts have been made to limit the scope of the discovery process, the
universe of discoverable information in U.S. litigation remains by far the broadest
in the world, even among common law nations that share the same fundamental
approach to civil procedure.ss
The situation is very different in other jurisdictions, particularly those that
follow the civil law tradition. For example, plaintiffs in a civil law litigation often
must attach all their relevant documentation to their moving papers, with defend-
ants having a concordant obligation to attach their own documents to their respon-
sive pleadings. Although these submissions provide the primary framework for
analysis of the dispute, the parties have several other opportunities to supplement
their evidentiary positions, either through formal rebuttal papers or in response to
particular matters that arise during a series of interim hearings. Requests to com-
pel the production of documents or other information from another party are virtu-
ally unknown. This, of course, differs significantly from the common law method
of presenting documents at a single time and in a single hearing at the end of a
period of discovery of the other party's documents. However, the civil law's
more controlled, iterative process allows judges and parties to focus on precise
issues that are actually raised rather than trying to anticipate, in the abstract, all
possible arguments.
One of the ways in which the civil law influences international commercial
arbitration is through the early submission of materials to the tribunal. As a mat-
ter of practice, parties in international arbitration frequently attach key documents
to their initial pleadings in a manner similar to that found in civil law litigation.
However, common law practices are reflected in a limited form of document pro-
352. See ZWEIGERT & KOTz, supra note 9, at 256-75.
353. See William W. Park, Arbitrators andAccuracy, 849 PLI/LiT 279, 290-300 (2011).
354. See S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in US. Federal Courts, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 489,
522-23, 541-53 (2010) (including text of actual U.S. discovery requests) [hereinafter Strong, Jurisdic-
tional Discovery].
355. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
356. See id. R. 26(b); see also Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery, supra note 354 at 489, 501-03, 509-
12 (comparing discovery practices in U.S. and England).
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duction 3 5 7 and the production of a final "bundle" of documents358 that is presented
to the tribunal prior to or at the final hearing. This process is much more limited
in its scope than U.S.-style discovery, although it nevertheless provides parties
with some access to the documents on which their opponents are relying prior to
the hearing.359
Although disclosure in international commercial arbitration bears some re-
semblance to U.S.-style discovery, there are some key differences. For example,
parties cannot be formally compelled to produce documents as part of the disclo-
sure process. Although this may appear to allow unscrupulous parties to conceal
relevant but damaging documents, any potential benefit associated with self-
serving behavior is offset by the fact that an arbitral tribunal may make an adverse
inference about facts that are likely to be contained in documents that are believed
to exist but that are not produced during the hearing. 360
Disclosure differs from discovery in other ways as well. For instance, pre-
hearing depositions are virtually unheard-of in international commercial arbitra-
tion, as are orders to compel the production of documents from non-parties prior
to the hearing.361 However, the international arbitral regime has again created
mechanisms to make sure the lack of these devices does not work a hardship to
the parties. First, witnesses, including non-parties, may be compelled to attend a
hearing and bring documents with them.362 Second, an increasing number of wit-
nesses - both fact and expert - produce and exchange extensive written statements
in advance of the hearing.3 63  These witness statements typically stand as the
speaker's affirmative testimony, which allows counsel sufficient time to prepare
for cross-examination at the hearing. Through live cross-examination (another
common law contribution to international arbitral proceedings), counsel can iden-
tify any inconsistencies or ambiguities in the written statements and establish the
credibility of the witnesses.
Procedures relating to disclosure are addressed in various institutional rules
on arbitration, but the provisions are often sparse. Traditionally, arbitral tribunals
have used their discretionary powers to expand on this basic language and create
suitable means for the taking and presentation of evidence in individual dis-
357. Typically parties do not have a right to document production (often referred to as an "exchange
of documents"), though such procedures are within the arbitral tribunal's case management powers.
See ICC Arbitration Rules, supra note 32, app. IV(d); ICDR Arbitration Rules, supra note 32, art. 16;
LCIA Arbitration Rules, supra note 32, arts. 20.2, 22.1(0.
358. The term "bundle" comes from English litigation practice, where it refers to the documents given
to a barrister at the time he or she is engaged ("bamster's bundle") or to the court at the time of trial
("litigation bundle"). The term has been making its way across the Atlantic in recent years and can be
seen in some U.S. states.
359. In many ways, the scope and method of disclosure in international commercial arbitration re-
sembles English litigation practice. See Civil Procedure Rules (England), Rule 31, available at
http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/courts-and-tribunals/courts/procedure-
rules/civil/contents/parts/part31.htm; Practice Direction 31A, Disclosure and Inspection, available at
http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/courts-and-tribunals/courts/procedure-
rules/civil/contents/practice directions/pdpart3 I a.htm.
360. BORN, supra note 9, at 1919-21.
361. Both of these procedures are essentially unique to U.S. litigation practice.
362. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 7, 208 (2011).
363. LEW ET AL., supra note 7, 1121-48.
No. 1] 173
55
Strong: Strong: Navigating the Borders
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
putes. 364 Although this approach to disclosure appears impossible to predict be-
cause issues are resolved privately on a case-by-case basis, a great deal of infor-
mation on the disclosure process can be found in treatises and published arbitral
awards.365 In the last ten years, parties and arbitrator have also come to rely
heavily on the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence, since these provisions pro-
vide detailed guidance on numerous issues and reflect the international arbitral
366community's consensus on how disclosure should optimally progress.
Having described the basic parameters of disclosure in international arbitra-
tion, it is time to move on to the various issues that arise in U.S. federal court.
This discussion is broken into three separate segments: (1) arbitrators' powers to
order disclosure and the extent to which courts can or must support arbitral orders;
(2) courts' powers to order disclosure in U.S.-seated international arbitrations; and
(3) courts' powers to order discovery (not disclosure) in international arbitrations
seated outside the United States. Each will be discussed in turn.
b. Arbitrators' Powers to Order Disclosure
"Most disclosure or discovery in international arbitration occurs entirely with-
in the context of the arbitration, under the control of the arbitral tribunal, and only
involving the parties to the arbitration (and not third parties)." 6 Nevertheless,
"international arbitral tribunals are often reluctant to order disclosure as readily, or
to the same extent, as in many common law litigations. This is reflected in arbi-
tral awards, where tribunals typically refuse to grant expansive, fishing-expedition
discovery requests." 368
Although most arbitral rules provide arbitrators with the ability to order dis-
closure, similar grants of power can also be located in most national statutes on
arbitration. In the United States, this issue is addressed in section 7 of the FAA,
which applies to international arbitrations through the residual application provi-
sions of Chapters 2 and 3.369 Notably, the arbitrators' power is discretionary, in
that the arbitrators simply "may," rather than must, "summon in writing any per-
son to attend before them or any of them as a witness and in a proper case to bring
with him or them any book, record, document, or paper which may be deemed
material as evidence in the case." 370
Although arbitrators are empowered to summon the attendance of witnesses
at a hearing, sometimes a person so summoned does not appear. In those instan-
ces, the court at the seat of arbitration "may compel the attendance" of the sum-
moned person or persons "or punish said person or persons for contempt in the
same manner provided by law for securing the attendance of witnesses or their
punishment for neglect or refusal to attend in the courts of the United States."m37
364. See ICC Arbitration Rules, supra note 32, app. IV(d); ICDR Arbitration Rules, supra note 32,
art. 16; LCIA Arbitration Rules, supra note 32, arts. 20.2, 22.1(f).
365. See BORN, supra note 9, at 1739-1939; LEW ET AL., supra note 7, IN 21-1 to 22-106.
366. See IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence, supra note 119
367. BORN, supra note 9, at 1877.
368. Id. at 1907 (citations omitted).
369. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 7, 208, 307 (2011).
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Federal courts can also become involved in disputes regarding the outer
boundaries of arbitrator-ordered disclosure. One issue involves the extent to
which international arbitral tribunals can order depositions or disclosure from
third parties in advance of the arbitral hearing.
Precedents in this area are split.372 This approach is based on the clear lan-
guage of Section 7 of the FAA as well as the view that arbitrators who feel the
need to see certain documents in advance of the final hearing "'have the power to
compel a third-party witness to appear with documents before a single arbitrator,
who can then adjourn the proceedings.' Section 7's presence requirement, how-
ever, forces the party seeking the non-party discovery - and the arbitrators author-
izing it - to consider whether production is truly necessary." 373 This technique
appears consistent with party expectations regarding both the limited scope of
disclosure in international commercial arbitration and the blending of civil law
and common law procedures.
A second issue that courts must occasionally address involves the territorial
scope of an arbitrator-issued summons. According to the FAA, arbitrator-issued
summons "shall be served in the same manner as subpoenas to appear and testify
before the court."3 74 Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure impose geo-
graphic limitations on the service of summons, problems can arise if arbitrators
attempt to issue summons to witnesses residing beyond those territorial bounda-
ries.375 In particular, questions arise as to whether it is possible for arbitrators to
extend their jurisdictional reach through reliance on the Hague Convention on the
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague Evidence
Convention).376
On its face, this argument is difficult to make, given language restricting use
of the Hague Evidence Convention to situations where evidence is sought "for use
in judicial proceedings."37 7  However, one commentator has suggested that it is
"plausible that a tribunal could apply to a national court in the arbitral seat and
request that it issue a letter of request, which could be executed pursuant to the
Hague Evidence Convention." 378 The Hague Conference on Private International
Law has also suggested that recourse may possibly be had to the Hague Evidence
Convention in arbitration, in proper circumstances. 379  However, the question
372. See Life Receivables Trust v. Syndicate 102 at Lloyd's of London, 549 F.3d 210, 215-17 (2d
Cir. 2008) (discussing positions held by various circuits). However, the "emerging rule" among federal
courts is that the arbitral tnbunal does not have the power to compel pre-hearing disclosures from a
non-party. See id. at 216-17; National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., 165 F.3d
184, 188 (2d Cir. 1999).
373. Life Receivables Trust, 549 F.3d at 218 (citations omitted); see also 9 U.S.C. § 7.
374. 9 U.S.C. § 7.
375. See FED. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(2)-(3); Dynergy Midstream Service, LP v. Trammochem, 451 F.3d 89,
96 (2d Cir. 2006); BORN, supra note 9, at 1929.
376. See Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
opened for signature, Mar 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444 [hereinafter Hague Evidence
Convention].
377. Id. art. I.
378. BORN, supra note 9 at 1939.
379. See Hague Conference on Private International Law: Special Commission Report on the Opera-
tion of the Hague Service Convention and the Hague Evidence Convention, 28 1.L.M. 1556, 1566-67
(1989); see also Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 376.
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remains open, since no U.S. court appears to have considered the interplay be-
tween arbitration and the Hague Evidence Convention.
c. Courts'Powers to Order Disclosure in a U.S.-seated Arbitration
Although parties might ask a U.S. federal court to oversee and assist with var-
ious actions taken by an arbitral tribunal with respect to disclosure, it is also pos-
sible for a party to ask a court to undertake certain direct actions of its own. This
is not uncommon as a matter of international law and practice, and numerous
states allow arbitral tribunals, or parties with the approval of an arbitral tribunal,
to seek the assistance of a court in the taking of evidence in an international com-
380
mercial arbitration.
The United States follows international norms regarding the ability of courts
to order disclosure upon the request of an arbitral tribunal or with the tribunal's
approval. However, the U.S. is very much of an outlier in another respect. Unu-
sually, some cases have held that parties themselves can seek disclosure orders
from courts even when the arbitral tribunal has not expressly consented to such
381
actions.
This is not to say that U.S. courts grant these motions routinely. Instead, or-
ders of this type, which are considered to be implicitly authorized by section 7 of
the FAA and made applicable to international disputes through the residual appli-
cation provisions of Chapters 2 and 3, are only available in exceptional circum-
stances. 382 Most judges who have considered this issue have required parties to
demonstrate a fairly high need for the requested material (such as when the evi-
dence may become unavailable), as well as a showing that the arbitral tribunal is
unable to take or safeguard the evidence itself (as might occur if the tribunal has
not yet been constituted). Courts take particular care in cases where a party
claims the discovery is necessary for a litigation that has been stayed pending an
ongoing arbitration, since such tactics could be used to circumvent the arbitra-
tion.384
Allowing courts to grant disclosure at the parties' direct request is conceptual-
ly problematic, since it appears to "run counter to the parties' agreement to resolve
their disputes exclusively by arbitration. "385  The only time such relief is truly
justifiable as being consistent with the parties' agreement is when the disclosure is
necessary to prevent imminent, irreparable harm, which would mean that such
relief should usually only be granted prior to the constitution of the arbitral tribu-
nal.
380. See UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law, supra note 87, art. 27; BORN, supra note 9, at 1923.
381. See BORN, supra note 9, at 1930.
382. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 7, 208, 307 (2011); BORN, supra note 9, at 1930.
383. See Levin v. Ripple Twist Mills, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 876, 880 (E D. Pa. 1976), dismissed by 549
F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1977); Vespe Contracting Co. v. Anvan Corp., 399 F. Supp. 516, 522 (E.D. Pa.
1976) (involving evidence that was disappearing due to construction work).
384. See Harry F. Ortlip Co. v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 126 F.R.D. 494,497 (E D. Pa. 1989).
385. BORN, supra note 9, at 1931.
386. See id. at 1932.
176 [Vol. 2012
58
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2012, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2012/iss1/8
Navigating the Borders
Numerous U.S. circuit courts have approved this highly cautious approach to
granting discovery in international arbitrations. 387  Indeed, as one circuit court
judge has noted, judicial intervention in the arbitral disclosure process:
would create practical difficulties. . . . Since the judge will not be in-
volved in the development of the issues as the case proceeds through the
arbitration process, he will lack a basis upon which to make informed rul-
ings on discovery matters. His only options would be to have the parties
brief the development of the issues in arbitration or to discuss the current
state of the dispute with the arbitrator. Such a litigation model is obvi-
ously both inefficient and a waste ofjudicial resources.388
d Courts'Powers to Order Discovery in a Foreign-seated Arbitration
Because disclosure is a procedural matter, questions relating to its availability
are typically governed by the parties' agreement, the governing arbitral rules (if
any), and the arbitration law at the arbitral seat. Under this analysis, it would
appear that U.S. laws would have no bearing on an international commercial arbi-
tration seated outside the United States.
Furthermore, the principle of primary and secondary jurisdiction states that
jurisdiction over procedural matters lies only with the court at the arbitral seat. 389
Courts in other countries only have secondary jurisdiction and therefore should, as
a matter of international law and practice, decline any invitation to become in-
volved in disputes over procedural concerns.
This approach was uncontroverted for many years, leaving U.S. courts with
little or no role to play in disclosure disputes arising out of foreign-seated arbitra-
tions. However, the situation may have changed recently due to a new reading of
a federal statute regarding assistance that may be provided by U.S. courts to for-
eign and international tribunals and to litigants before such tribunals.390
The aim of the statute, which is found in chapter 28 of the U.S. Code at sec-
tion 1782, is relatively clear.391 The text states that:
[t]he district court of the district in which a person resides or is found
may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a docu-
ment or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international
tribunal.392
The language is equally straightforward with respect to the procedure to be
followed, indicating that:
387. See National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Bear Steams & Co., Inc., 165 F.3d 184, 187 (2d Cir.
1999); Suarez-Valdez v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc., 858 F.2d 648, 649 (1lth Cir.
1988); BORN, supra note 9, at 1932.
388. Suarez-Valdez, 858 F.2d at 650 (Tjoflat, C.J., concurring).
389. See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
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[t]he order may be made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request
made, by a foreign or international tribunal or upon the application of any
interested person and may direct that the testimony or statement be given,
or the document or other thing be produced, before a person appointed by
the court.... The order may prescribe the practice and procedure, which
may be in whole or part the practice and procedure of the foreign country
or the international tribunal, for taking the testimony or statement or pro-
ducing the document or other thing. To the extent that the order does not
prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be taken, and the
document or other thing produced, in accordance with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
A person may not be compelled to give his testimony or statement or to
produce a document or other thing in violation of any legally applicable
privilege.393
For years, this provision was used only in cases involving litigation located
abroad. Recently, however, parties have begun to make applications for assis-
tance relating to international commercial arbitrations seated outside the United
States. Results have been mixed, with courts taking opposing views on two key
issues.
i. Arbitration as Involving "Foreign or International Tribunals"
First, U.S. courts are divided as to whether the statutory reference to "foreign
or international tribunals" includes international commercial arbitrations. Initially
courts opposed such a reading, stating that "the fact that the term 'foreign or inter-
national tribunals' is broad enough to include both state-sponsored and private
tribunals fails to mandate a conclusion that the term, as used in § 1782, does in-
clude both."394
However, a 2004 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court opened the door to the
use of Section 1782 in arbitration by suggesting a more expansive interpretation of
the term "foreign or international tribunals" than had been used up until that
date. 95 Notably, this case, Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., did not
involve international commercial arbitration.3 9 6  Instead, the request for infor-
mation in Intel was made in the context of certain competition law investigations
that were being made by the European Commission.397 Although the Commission
is not normally considered a tribunal, it was acting in this instance as the taker of
proof for two judicial bodies (i.e., the Court of First Instance and the European
Court of Justice).398 Since those courts did not themselves accept new evidence in
matters of this type, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the Commission was
393. Id.
394. National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Bear Steams & Co., Inc., 165 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 1999).
395. 28 U.S.C. § 1782; see also Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258
(2004).
396. See Intel, 542 U.S. at 241.
397. See id.
398. See id. at 242-243.
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acting as a "foreign or international tribunal" within the meaning of Section 1782
in these circumstances. 399
One of Intel's key holdings was its explicit recognition that Section 1782 is a
discretionary device that does not require a court to order discovery in response to
a party's request. 400 The Supreme Court identified several issues that are relevant
to the decision whether to grant the request for disclosure. For example:
when the person from whom discovery is sought is a participant in the
foreign proceeding .. ., the need for § 1782(a) aid generally is not as ap-
parent as it ordinarily is when evidence is sought from a nonparticipant in
the matter arising abroad. A foreign tribunal has jurisdiction over those
appearing before it, and can itself order them to produce evidence. . . . In
contrast, nonparticipants in the foreign proceeding may be outside the
foreign tribunal's jurisdictional reach; hence, their evidence, available in
the United States, may be unobtainable absent § 1782(a) aid.401
Other criteria must also be considered. For example, "a court presented with
a § 1782(a) request may take into account the nature of the foreign tribunal, the
character of the proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign
government or the court or agency abroad to U.S. federal-court judicial assis-
tance.4 0 2 Furthermore, a court "could consider whether the § 1782(a) request
conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other
policies of a foreign country or the United States." 403 Notably, many of these
factors refer to public law-oriented concerns, which could be interpreted as mean-
ing that Section 1782 was not intended to apply to arbitration. However, other
criteria could be seen as applying by analogy to private forms of dispute resolu-
tion, which could weigh in favor of a more expansive reading of Section 1782.40
Intel has created a considerable amount of confusion as to whether Section
1782 applies to international arbitral proceedings.405 One court, having analyzed
the purpose and history of Section 1782 as well as the decision in Intel, concluded
that:
after applying a functional analysis of the ICC Panel, the Court finds that
it is not a foreign or international tribunal under § 1782. The decisions of
the ICC Panel are not judicially reviewable under the criteria established
by Intel. The ICC Court is itself a creature of contract and may only
modify the form of the ICC Panel's award, not its substance. In addition,
the ICC Panel is the product of the parties' contractual agreement and its
authority to issue binding decisions arises from that contract. The Court
399. 28 U.S.C. § 1782; see also Intel, 542 U.S. at 257-58.
400. See Intel, 542 U.S. at 264; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1782.
401. Intel, 542 U.S. at 264 (citations omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1782.
402. Intel, 542 U.S. at 264.
403. Id at 264-65.
404. See Kenncth Bcalc ct al., Solving the § 1782 Puzzle. Bringing Certainty to the Debate Over 28
U.S. C. § 1782's Application to International Arbitration, 47 STAN. J. INT'L L. 51, 96-108 (2011).
405. See In rcl Application of Winning (HK) Int'l Shipping Co. Ltd., No. 09-22659-MC, 2010 WL
1796579, at *6-7 (S.D. Fla., April 30, 2010) (noting split of opinion); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1782; Intel,
542 U.S. at 241.
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finds that § 1782 does not authorize discovery relief in a proceeding such
as the ICC Panel, which functions as a contractual alternative to state-
sponsored courts, administrative agencies, arbitral tribunals, and quasi-
judicial bodies. Thus, the Court is without authority to provide discovery
assistance under § 1782.40
One of the few appellate opinions to discuss the matter comes out of the Fifth
Circuit. The decision here is particularly useful because it describes the effects
that a broad interpretation of Section 1782 would have, noting:
that § 1782 authorizes broader discovery than what is authorized for do-
mestic arbitrations by Federal Arbitration Act § 7. If § 1782 were to ap-
ply to private international arbitrations, "the differences in available dis-
covery could 'create an entirely new category of disputes concerning the
appointment of arbitrators and the characterization of arbitration disputes
as domestic, foreign, or international."' We also note[ ] that empowering
parties in international arbitrations to seek ancillary discovery through
federal courts could destroy arbitration's principal advantage as "a
speedy, economical, and effective means of dispute resolution" if the par-
ties "succumb to fighting over burdensome discovery requests far from
the place of arbitration." Neither private arbitration nor these questions
were at issue in Intel.407
409
This is an important issue that will no doubt develop over time.48 Going
forward, courts will need to consider a variety of factors when determining
whether and to what extent Section 1782 applies to international commercial arbi-
tration.409 For example, courts not only need to analyze the language of the stat-
ute, they also must take into account the effect the various interpretations will
have on the international arbitral regime. In particular, it is appropriate to consid-
er whether an expansive interpretation of Section 1782 would contravene U.S.
treaty obligations under the New York and Panama Conventions, and whether
broad applicability of Section 1782 to international commercial arbitration would
promote the kind of "respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribu-
406. In re Opcradora DB Mexica, S.A. de C.V., No. 6:09-cv-383-Orl-22GJK, 2009 WL 2423138, at
*12 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2009); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1782; Intel, 542 U.S. at 241.
407. El Paso Corp. v. La Comision Ejccutiva Hidroelectrica dcl Rio Lempa, 341 Fcd. Appx. 31, 34
(5th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1782; Intel, 542 U.S. at 241; In re Application
of Caratube Int'l Oil Co., LLP, 730 F. Supp. 2d 101, 107 (D.D.C. 2010) (concluding that reliance on
Section 1782 constitutes "an attempt to circumvent the Tribunal's control over the arbitration's proce-
dures, and this factor thus weighs against granting the petition").
408. See Beale ct al., supra note 404, at 109. Indeed, a large number of federal decisions have been
rendered concerning the use of Section 1782 in the context of a complex series of disputes involving
Chevron and the Republic of Ecuador. However, those cases are not discussed here because the Sec-
tion 1782 requests were made in support of several ongoing matters, including those proceeding in
both arbitration and litigation, and therefore do not address the specific issues relating to use of Section
1782 in international commercial arbitration. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1782; In re Chevron Corp., 650
F.3d 276, 278-95 (3d Cir. 2011); Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297, 300-11 (2d Cir. 2011);
Ecuadorian Plaintiffs v. Chevron Corp., 619 F.3d 373, 375-80 (5th Cir. 2010); Republic of Ecuador v.
Bjorkman, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1121(D. Colo. 2011).
409 See 28 U.S.C. § 1782.
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nals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for pre-
dictability in the resolution of disputes" that is required by the U.S. Supreme
Court.4'0 Furthermore, courts evaluating the applicability of Section 1782 may
find it useful to recall the differences between international litigation and interna-
tional arbitration, particularly with respect to the distinction between discovery
and disclosure, both as a matter of party expectation and international practice.411
Parties must be sensitive to all these issues when considering whether to pursue or
defend an action involving Section 1782.412
ii. "Interested Persons" in Arbitration
Although most of the scholarly and judicial attention focuses on whether in-
ternational commercial arbitration involves "foreign or international tribunals"
under Section 1782, difficulties can also arise with respect to who constitutes an
"interested person" under the statute.4 13 On one level, the analysis is very straight-
forward, given the express language of the statute indicating that applications may
be made by tribunals or "any interested person."4 14 However, allowing parties to
submit discovery applications directly to the court in a Section 1782 proceeding
without the approval of the arbitral tribunal runs afoul of the same problems that
arise in the context of U.S.-seated arbitration. 4 15 Although courts have in some
cases granted discovery under Section 1782 on the application of a party, there is
very little judicial discussion of this particular issue.416
As this area of law develops, courts will need to investigate more thoroughly
the various factors identified by the Supreme Court in Intel concerning the exer-
cise of judicial discretion in an action under Section 1782.417 The most relevant of
these may be "whether the § 1782(a) request conceals an attempt to circumvent
foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign country or the
United States."418 Certainly it has been suggested that party-initiated requests for
judicial assistance in U.S.-seated arbitrations may be an illegitimate means of
avoiding the arbitral process.41 9  This concern would likely hold equal, if not
greater, weight in arbitrations seated outside the United States.420 Judges may also
410. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1782.
411. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782; see also supra notes 352-66 and accompanying text.
412. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782.
413. Id.
414. Id.; see also Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 257 (2004) (discussing
scope of term); In re Application of Caratubc Int'l Oil Co., LLP, 730 F. Supp. 2d 101, 104 (D.D.C.
2010) (concluding, without analysis, that a party to an international arbitration was an "interested
person").
415. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782; see also supra notes 380-88 and accompanying text.
416. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782; In re Roz Trading Ltd., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1223 (N.D. Ga. 2006);
Ukmafta v. Carpatsky Petroleum Corp., No. 3:09 MC 265(JBA), 2009 WL 2877156, at *2 (D. Conn.
Aug. 27, 2009).
417. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782; Intel, 542 U.S. at 264-65.
418. Intel, 542 U.S. at 264-65; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1782.
419. See In re Application of Caratube, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 107.
420. See BORN, supra note 9, at 1935-36.
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wish to consider the effect that broad use of Section 1782 would have on interna-
tional commercial arbitration generally. 421
2. Challenges to Arbitrators During Proceedings
As important as discovery and disclosure are, they are not the only matters
that can be brought to a court's attention while an arbitration is ongoing. Another
relatively common issue involves challenges to sitting arbitrators.
Challenges can be trigged by a variety of circumstances, both inside and out-
side the arbitral proceedings.422 For example, a comment made by a panelist dur-
ing a hearing may suggest a lack of impartiality. An arbitrator's recent purchase
of stock in one of the parties to the proceeding may call that arbitrator's independ-
ence into question. Late discovery of disclosable facts can create concerns about
impartiality or independence late in the proceeding, long after the initial disclosure
was made.
Because challenges to arbitrators are procedural matters, motions to remove a
sitting panelist should only be brought in the arbitral seat. This arrangement re-
spects the principle of primary and secondary jurisdiction and mirrors the ap-
proach taken to the selection of arbitrators.423
Parties contemplating a challenge to an arbitrator must consider two separate
issues: (1) the standards that govern the substance of the dispute about the propri-
ety of the arbitrator's continuing to serve and (2) the procedure by which that
challenge shall be heard. When addressing these matters, courts look to the par-
ties' agreement, the governing arbitral rules (if any), and the arbitration law of the
arbitral seat for guidance.424 The one exception is in situations where the parties
specifically address challenges to arbitrators in their contract. In those cases, the
national law governing the arbitration agreement controls the interpretation of that
issue.425 Notably, the law governing the arbitration agreement is not necessarily
the same as the law governing the substance of the dispute; therefore, courts can-
not determine the law controlling the construction of the arbitration agreement
simply by referring to a general choice of law provision.426
The first issue to consider involves the appropriate procedure. Most arbitral
rule sets describe the means by which a party can mount a challenge to one or
more arbitrators, and it is clear that the parties must adhere to those procedures
whenever they apply.4 27 Similarly, parties will be held to any challenge procedure
they have adopted, even outside the context of one of the institutional rule sets.428
These types of challenges may be brought at any time it is appropriate to do so
under the rules or agreed procedures.
421. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782; El Paso Corp. v. La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroclectrica dcl Rio Lempa,
341 Fed. Appx. 31, 34 (5th Cir. 2009).
422. See LEW ET AL., supra note 7,11 13-1 to 13-4.
423. See supra notes 317-30 and accompanying text.
424. See LEW ET AL., supra note 7, 113-25.
425. See BORN, supra note 9, at 1460 (discussing choice of law issues).
426. See supra notes 535-52 and accompanying text.
427. See BORN, supra note 9, at 1567-68.
428. See LEW ET AL., supra note 7, 13-32.
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However, there are times when the parties have not agreed to a particular
mechanism for challenging arbitrators. In these cases, recourse must be had to the
national arbitration statute in place at the arbitral seat.429 Most arbitration statutes
contain default provisions describing the means by which a party can challenge
and remove an arbitrator on an interlocutory basis.430 The United States is unusu-
al in that it strictly limits the courts' ability to hear an interim challenge to an arbi-
trator.431 Indeed, "it is well established that a district court cannot entertain an
attack upon the qualifications or partiality of arbitrators until after the conclusion
of the arbitration and the rendition of the award."432 This position is based on the
fact that the FAA is silent on the issue of interim challenges, instead providing
only for vacatur of an award for partiality after the arbitration has concluded.433
Nevertheless, there are a few exceptions to this general rule where a court has
allowed removal of an arbitrator prior to the rendering of the final award.434
Therefore, a party proceeding under U.S. law may have fewer opportunities to
challenge an arbitrator than a party proceeding under an arbitral rules set.435
The second question to consider involves the substantive standards to be ap-
plied to the question of removal. Although U.S. courts are unlikely to reach this
issue at the interlocutory stage, given the U.S. position on interim challenges, the
substantive standards are more or less the same regardless of whether the chal-
lenge is brought after the arbitration has ended or partway through the proceed-
ings. 436 Matters relating to the substantive standard to be used in a challenge pro-
cedure will therefore be considered here for ease of discussion, even though U.S.
courts are more likely to consider these issues as part of a motion to vacate an
award or an objection to enforcement of a foreign award.437
For years, the international arbitral regime has taken the view that arbitrators
must be impartial, independent and neutral.438 However, the United States initial-
ly embraced a very different approach, based on domestic principles of law indi-
cating that party-appointed arbitrators did not have to be neutral unless the parties
agreed otherwise.439
Tensions began to arise in the 1990s, as international commercial arbitration
became more popular and the rising need for predictable and consistent standards
across the globe made the United States's distinctive approach to arbitrator neu-
trality increasingly troublesome.440 This led to several actions being taken in an
429. Id. 13-29 to 13-35.
430. See UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law, supra note 87, art. 13.
431. See BORN, supra note 9, at 1567-69 (noting a few exceptional circumstances).
432. Aviall, Inc. v. Ryder Sys., 110 F.3d 892, 895 (2d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
433. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2011); BORN, supra note 9, at 1568.
434. See Fleming Co., Inc. v. FS Kids, L.L.C., No. 02-CV-0059E(F), 2003 WL 21382895, at *4, 6
(W.D.N.Y. May 14, 2003) (relying on section 2 of the FAA).
435. In this context, the arbitral rules "trump" the default provisions of U.S. law. See supra notes 33-
63 and accompanying text; see also LEW ET AL., supra note 7, NJ 21-6 to 21-11.
436. See LEW ET AL., supra note 7, %J 13-36 to 13-42 (noting some jurisdictions, such as Germany,
impose a higher standard after the award has been rendered). Once the proceedings have concluded,
the challenge is to the enforcement of the award, not to the arbitrator, who is functus officio at this
point. See id.
437 See supra notes 470-97, 510-630 and accompanying text.
438. See LEW ET AL, supra note 7, 1 13-8 to 13-18.
439. See BORN, supra note 9, at 1492-98.
440. Id. at 1496-97.
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attempt to resolve the situation. For example, international organizations like the
IBA made the expectation of arbitrator neutrality clear, as a matter of international
practice." 1 Furthermore, several U.S.-based arbitral institutions amended their
rules and codes of conduct to make their default positions reflect international
expectations.4 2 Parties to international disputes also became increasingly vocal
about their expectations regarding arbitrator conduct, not only including explicit
provisions regarding neutrality in their arbitration agreements, but also demanding
acknowledgement of the neutrality of the arbitrators at the appointment stage.43
As a result of these actions, U.S. courts have demonstrated a growing recog-
nition that party-appointed arbitrators in international disputes are expected to
adhere to international standards regarding independence, impartiality, and neu-
trality.4 However, this approach has not yet been universally adopted.
Although it is easy to describe the relevant standard of behavior in the ab-
stract, it is much harder to establish precisely how the concepts of independence,
impartiality, and neutrality are to be applied in practice. Fortunately, this task has
become much easier since the publication of the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of
Interest in International Arbitration.446 Although the Guidelines tend to be con-
sidered persuasive rather than binding, the provisions are widely relied upon by
arbitrators and practitioners in the field." 7 The Guidelines have also been judi-
cially considered in the United States.4" Two older documents - the IBA Rules
of Ethics for International Arbitrators and the AAA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators
in Commercial Disputes - also discuss relevant standards of behavior, although
these instruments' influence has waned in the wake of the IBA Guidelines, which
are much more detailed and practically oriented." 9
Although U.S. courts do not usually remove arbitrators midway through pro-
ceedings, a vacancy on a tribunal may nevertheless arise, either because a panelist
has been removed by an arbitral institution or because someone has stepped down
voluntarily or become unable to continue.450 Should this occur, a U.S. court may
be asked to help select a new arbitrator. In those instances, the appointment pro-
cedure often is the same as it is during the pre-arbitration phrase, although some
441. See IBA Guidelines, supra note 120, Gen. Std. 1.
442. See ICDR International Arbitration Rules, supra note 32, art. 7; AAA Commercial Arbitration
Rules, effective June 1, 2009, R-12, R-17, available at http://www.adr.org/sp.aspid=22440; AAA
Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, effective Mar. 1, 2004, Canons IX-X, available
at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=32124; BORN, supra note 9, at 1496-99.
443. See Employers Ins. Co. of Wausau v. Certain Underwnters at Lloyd's of London, No. 09-cv-
201-bbc, 2009 WL 3245562, at *3-5 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 29, 2009).
444. See Scandinavian Reins. Co. Ltd. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 732 F Supp. 2d 293, 309
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (concluding that a party-appointed arbitrator acted with "evident partiality").
445. See Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 617, 620, 623 (7th Cir. 2002).
446. See IBA Guidelines, supra note 120.
447. See id.
448. Id.; New Regency Prod. Inc. v. Nippon Herald Films, Inc., 501 F.3d 1101, 1110 (9th Cir. 2007);
Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makinc Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d 132, 136 (2d Cir.
2007).
449. See IBA Guidelines, supra note 120; see also AAA Code of Ethics, supra note 442; IBA Rules
of Ethics for International Arbitrations, available at http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications
IBAguides and free materials.aspx#ethics.
450. See LEW ET AL., supra note 7, 11 13-1 to 13-4.
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institutional rules allow for a truncated appointment process to avoid delay or
obstructionist tactics.45
3. Motions in Aid ofArbitration
Previous sections discussed a number of motions that are commonly made
452prior to or at the initiation of an international commercial arbitration. Several
of these motions - for example, those requesting an anti-suit injunction or seeking
prejudgment attachment - can also be brought while the arbitration is ongoing.
For the most part, courts consider these motions using the same criteria that are
used during the pre-arbitration phase.453
However, there is one major difference between early- and late-arising mo-
tions, and that is the availability of relief in arbitration. Courts and tribunals often
have concurrent jurisdiction over the granting of provisional relief by virtue of the
applicable national law or arbitral rules, but once an arbitration has begun, there is
often less need for the parties to seek judicial relief.454 Therefore, parties should
be aware that courts often prefer not to interfere with an ongoing arbitration, par-
ticularly if the type of relief requested is within the arbitrators' power to grant.
Exceptions to this general rule do, of course, exist, and different courts take dif-
ferent views on the availability of judicial forms of provisional relief, as discussed
previously. 455
4. Motions to Enforce Interim Awards and Provisional Measures
The fimal type of interlocutory judicial proceeding to consider involves re-
quests for immediate enforcement of an interim award or provisional measure
ordered by the arbitral tribunal. These types of actions are somewhat problematic,
for although the law regarding the enforcement of final arbitral awards is well-
developed,456 it is less clear whether and to what extent interim awards and provi-
sional measures are immediately enforceable. 457
The difficulty arises because the New York Convention and many national
statutes on arbitration have traditionally been interpreted as relating only to the
enforcement of final awards, meaning an "award that disposes of either all the
parties' claims or all the parties' remaining claims in the arbitration.' 458 However,
the enforceability of other types of arbitral awards and procedural orders (includ-
ing arbitral decisions regarding stays, disclosure, and provisional measures) is
much less clear under the relevant statutory provisions.459
451. See id. 13-53 to 13-66; see also supra notes 317-30 and accompanying text.
452. See supra notes 256-350 and accompanying text.
453. See supra notes 331-50 and accompanying text.
454. See BORN, supra note 9, at 1972-2019.
455. See supra notes 331-50 and accompanying text.
456. See infra notes 510-630 and accompanying text.
457. See LEW ET AL., supra note 7, %f 24-14 to 24-34; James M. Gatis, The Federal Arbitration Act:
Risks and Incongruities Relating to the Issues of Interim and Partial Awards in Domestic and Interna-
tionalArbitrations, 16 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 1, 45-63 (2005).
458. BORN, supra note 9, at 2429-30; see also New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V (referring
only to "the award").
459. See BORN, supra note 9, at 2428, 2354, 2356.
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Most of the debate focuses on the distinction between "partial final awards"
(sometimes called "partial awards"), which finally dispose of some portion of the
parties' claims in arbitration, and interim awards (sometimes called "interlocutory
awards"), which decide a particular issue that is relevant to the final disposition of
a claim (such as a determination involving the choice of law) but do not finally
dispose of the claim or any part of the claim.460 Partial final awards are usually
immediately enforceable as a matter of national and international law.46 Interim
awards are less likely to be considered immediately enforceable, even when they
provide for provisional relief that appears to finally dispose of the request for such
relief.462
The FAA provides little guidance on this issue, since it, like the New York
Convention, fails to distinguish between the various types of awards when dis-
cussing enforcement and confirmation. 463 Thus, Chapter 2 only refers to "an
award falling under the Convention" while Chapter 3 discusses "[a]rbitral deci-
sions or awards made in the territory of a foreign state."4M Chapter 1, which is
applicable to international disputes by virtue of the provisions on residual applica-
tion, is slightly broader, to the extent that it states that an appeal may be immedi-
ately taken from an order "confirming or denying confirmation of an award or
partial award."465
Case law provides some guidance, with U.S. courts adopting a position, con-
sistent with that of courts from other jurisdictions, that provisional or interim
measures ordered by an arbitral tribunal can be judicially enforced to the extent
that the measure in question constitutes a final disposition of the matter request-
ed.466 Furthermore, "although the Federal Arbitration Act uses the word award in
conjunction with finality, courts go beyond a document's heading and delve into
its substance and impact to determine whether the decision is final."467
Courts asked to enforce a partial or interim award must also consider the
proper procedure to be used. That issue is discussed below, 468 since the approach
used at an interim stage is the same as that used after the arbitration has been
completed.
C. Role of the Court After Arbitral Proceedings Have Concluded
Once the arbitrators have issued their final award, including any award as to
costs, the tribunal isfunctus officio, which means that it has finished its tasks and
has no further jurisdiction over the dispute. However, the conclusion of the arbi-
tration does not necessarily put all issues between the parties to rest, and courts
may be asked to address several different types of matters even after the final
460. See id. at 2430.
461. See id. at 2433.
462. See id. at 2434-35.
463. See New York Convention, supra note 22; 9 U.S.C. §§ 207, 304 (2011).
464. 9 U.S.C. §§ 207, 304.
465. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(D); see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 208, 307.
466. See Arrowhead Global Solutions, Inc. v. Datapath, Inc., 166 Fed. Appx. 39, 41 (4th Cir. 2006)
(confirming interim award).
467. Publicis Comm. v. True North Comm., Inc., 206 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2000).
468. See infra notes 510-630 and accompanying text.
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arbitral award has been rendered. Notably, this is a time period where judicial
assistance may be sought in several jurisdictions simultaneously.469
1. Motions to Vacate an Arbitral Award
One type of judicial proceeding that may arise after the conclusion of an in-
ternational commercial arbitration involves a motion to vacate an arbitral award.
Although U.S. courts often address these sorts of motions in the domestic context,
international disputes give rise to several unique issues.
The first matter to be addressed is whether and to what extent a U.S. court is
the proper venue in which to bring a motion to vacate an arbitral award. As a
matter of U.S. law and practice, an award may only be set aside (i.e., vacated) in
the place of arbitration or the country under whose laws the award was made
(which will in most cases be the arbitral seat).470
Courts that only have secondary jurisdiction over the arbitration may not set
aside an award arising out of that proceeding. Instead, these courts are limited to
denying recognition or enforcement of the award, as discussed below.471 The
distinction between setting aside an award, on the one hand, and recognizing and
enforcing an award, on the other, is critical because different standards and proce-
dures may apply to the two actions. The two procedures also yield different ef-
fects.
Therefore, the only time that a U.S. court may hear a motion to vacate an ar-
bitral award is when the underlying arbitration is seated in the United States. If
the arbitration is seated elsewhere, the U.S. court only has jurisdiction to consider
whether to recognize or enforce the award.
Just because the arbitration is seated in the United States does not mean all
parties reside there. As a result, it may be necessary to serve notice of a motion to
vacate an award on a foreign party. Some question has arisen as to whether the
Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Extra-Judicial and Judicial Docu-
ments (Hague Service Convention) is applicable in these circumstances. 472
This issue has not yet been fully resolved, although the time periods associat-
ed with the service of process under the Hague Service Convention would make
application of the Convention to arbitration extremely problematic, since the
three-month deadline for service of process under the FAA is the minimum
amount of time recommended for service of process under the Hague Service
Convention. 473 However, concerns about timing may not exist in all cases, such
469. See Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bum Negara, 335
F.3d 357, 369 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting "multiple judicial proceedings on the same legal issues are char-
acteristic of the confirmation and enforcement of international arbitral awards under the Convention")
470. See New York Convention, art. V(1)(e); BORN, supra note 9, at 2337. This is a classic example
of the U.S. principle of primary jurisdiction at work. See FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN, supra note
138, 1 1178. See also supra notes 222-55 and accompanying text. However, the concept of primary
and secondary jurisdiction is a U.S. creation.
471. See BORN, supra note 9, at 2338; see also infra notes 510-630 and accompanying text.
472. See Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Extra-Judicial and Judicial Documents, opened
for signature, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638 [hereinafter Hague Service Conven-
tion]; Argentine Republic v. National Grid PLC, 637 F.3d 365, 366-67 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
473. See Hague Service Convention, supra note 472; 9 U.S.C. §§ 12, 208, 307 (2011); Republic of
Argentina v. BG Group PLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 108, 120 n. 10 (D D.C. 2010)
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as when service by mail is permitted under the Hague Service Convention.474
This is a developing area of law that will bear further attention in the future.
The second major matter to consider involves the standards to be used to va-
cate an arbitral award in an international arbitration. There is a growing interna-
tional trend toward having the grounds for setting aside an arbitral award in the
place where it was rendered mirror the grounds for non-enforcement of a foreign
award under the New York Convention.475 Nevertheless, some countries still
allow vacatur on grounds additional to or different than those relating to non-
enforcement of an award under the New York Convention.476 Although the num-
ber of states that have adopted this approach is diminishing, the practice remains
relatively common, even though it "produces anomalous results which are very
difficult to justify in light of the Convention's overall structure and purposes."A77
Interestingly, this is a subject on which U.S. courts are split. For example, the
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have ruled that parties may only rely on the
grounds relating to non-enforcement under Article V of the New York Conven-
tion, even in actions to vacate an award arising out of an arbitration seated in the
United States. 478 The rationale in these cases is that the New York Convention
applies to both "foreign" awards (i.e., those seated outside the United States) and
"non-domestic" awards (i.e., those seated within the United States but falling
within the scope of the Convention by virtue of Section 202 of the FAA) by virtue
of the express language of Article 1(1) of the Convention. 479 This appears to be
the approach taken in the draft Restatement on the U.S. Law of International
Commercial Arbitration as of January 2012, although the Reporters have cau-
tioned that all drafts are to be considered tentative until the entire project has been
completed, since revisions, some significant, are entirely likely during the drafting
process.480
An alternative position is enunciated by the Second Circuit, which takes the
view that the New York Convention does not impose any limits on the grounds
upon which vacatur is allowed.48 1 Courts adopting this approach allow parties
seeking to set aside an arbitral award rendered in the United States to rely on do-
mestic principles of law. In this analysis, courts would look to Section 10 of the
FAA for the appropriate criteria for vacatur, which is said by advocates of this
474. See Hague Service Convention, supra note 472; Int'l Transactions, Ltd. v. Embotelladora Agral
Regionmontana SA de CV, 277 F. Supp. 2d 654, 662 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
475. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V; UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law, supra
note 87, art. 34; BORN, supra note 9, at 2553.
476. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V; BORN, supra note 9, at 2553.
477. BORN, supra note 9, at 2555-56.
478. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V; Industrial Risk Ins. v. MAN
Guetchoffnungshuitte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434, 1440-41, 1445 (11th Cir. 1998); Lander Co., Inc. v.
MMP Inv., Inc., 107 F.3d 476, 481-82 (7th Cir. 1997).
479. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. 1(1); 9 U.S.C. § 202 (2011); Industrial Risk Ins.,
141 F.3d at 144041, 1445; Lander, 107 F.3d at 481-82; see also supra notes 143-201 and accompany-
ing text.
480. See American Law Institute, supra note 8.
481. See New York Convention, supra note 22; Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys "R"
Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 22-23 (2d Cir. 1997). But see Westerbcke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., Ltd.,
304 F.3d 200, 221-22 (2d Cir. 2002) (calling Toys "R " Us into question regarding reliance on Section
10 of the FAA).
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position to be applicable to international arbitrations by virtue of the residual ap-
plication provisions of Chapters 2 and 3.482 Section 10(a) states:
In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the dis-
trict wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award
upon the application of any party to the arbitration -
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitra-
tors, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been preju-
diced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the sub-
ject matter submitted was not made.483
Notably, these provisions are broadly similar to the standards for non-
enforcement described in the New York Convention.484 Consequently, there at
first appears to be little conflict between the international arbitral regime and the
United States's statutory scheme. However, some people take the view that do-
mestic U.S. law also recognizes certain common law bases for the setting aside of
an arbitral award, and that is where the real debate exists, both with respect to
whether these additional grounds of vacatur still exist and whether they apply to
international disputes.
Two of these non-statutory grounds for vacatur - public policy and non-
arbitrability - are also found in the New York Convention and are, therefore, not
problematic as a conceptual matter, although the standards applicable to interna-
tional disputes may differ slightly from those applicable to domestic cases.48s
Instead, it is the third non-statutory ground for vacatur - manifest disregard of law
- that causes difficulties in international circles.486
It is extremely rare for a party to establish a manifest disregard of law, and
"examples of manifest disregard . . . tend to be extreme, such as 'explicitly re-
ject[ing] controlling precedent' or otherwise reaching a decision that 'strains cre-
482. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 208, 307.
483. Id. § 10(a).
484. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V; 9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
485. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(2); BORN, supra note 9, at 2622 (noting the
content of international public policy), 2637.
486. See BORN, supra note 9, at 2639-46.
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dulity' or lacks even a 'barely colorable' justification."4 87 The status of manifest
disregard as a matter of domestic U.S. law is less than clear, despite several recent
U.S. Supreme Court pronouncements on the subject. 488 However, even if manifest
disregard survives as a viable ground for vacatur, the doctrine only applies in a
very narrow range of cases where the arbitrators were cognizant of controlling
legal authority and deliberately disregarded it.489 As a practical matter, claims of
manifest disregard of law very seldom result in the setting aside of an award.490
However, the doctrine of manifest disregard encompasses a substantive re-
view of the merits of an award, and, as such, is contrary to the modem expectation
in international arbitration that arbitral awards are not judicially reviewable on
matters of substance.491 Use of manifest disregard of law is particularly problem-
atic in international disputes that are governed by something other than U.S. law,
since U.S. judges are not well-placed to determine whether, in those instances,
there is a "clearly defined governing legal principle" that has been ignored.492
Although much could be said about each of the various grounds for vacatur,
that discussion will be set to one side, given the lack of consensus on whether
Section 10 even applies to disputes arising under Chapter 2 and 3 of the FAA.493
Notably, even if Section 10 is determined to apply to international disputes, the
various provisions should be read in an international light.494 Thus, for example,
debates concerning the "evident partiality" of a particular panelist would need to
consider international standards regarding independence, impartiality, and neutral-
ity of arbitrators.4 95
The final issue to consider involves the effect of a decision to vacate an arbi-
tral award arising out of an international dispute seated in the United States. Al-
though there are some parallels to what occurs in the domestic context, interna-
tional arbitrations give rise to some additional considerations.
In a domestic dispute, the decision to vacate an arbitral award forecloses all
future opportunities to recover on the award. This is not the case in an interna-
tional dispute. In international commercial arbitration, a decision to vacate an
award bars recovery on the award in the jurisdiction where the court is seated, but
does not necessarily preclude enforcement of the award in other (i.e., secondary)
jurisdictions. Indeed, the New York Convention explicitly states that a court sit-
ting in a secondary jurisdiction may still enforce an award even if that award has
been set aside in the primary jurisdiction. 496 However, a court in a secondary
487. Tclcnor Mobile Commc'n AS v. Storm LLC, 584 F.3d 396, 407 (2d Cir. 2009) (citations omit-
ted).
488. See Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1768 n. 3 (2010); Hall St.
Ass'n, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584-85 (2008).
489. See BORN, supra note 9, at 2641.
490. See Telenor Mobile, 584 F.3d at 407.
491 See UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law, supra note 87, art. 34; BORN, supra note 9, at 2638,
2649; Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration and the Lessons of ADR, 40 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 449, 509 (2005).
492. Duferco Int'l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 383, 389 (2d Cir. 2003); see
also BORN, supra note 9, at 2644.
493. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 208, 307 (2011).
494. See id. § 10.
495. Id. § 10(a)(2); see also supra notes 422-51 and accompanying text.
496. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(I)(c).
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jurisdiction can take the fact that the award has been set aside into account during
an enforcement proceeding.497
2. Motions to Confirm an Arbitral Award
Another action that can be brought after the conclusion of an arbitration is a
motion to confirm an arbitral award. There is no need to bring an action of this
nature as a matter of international law, since one purpose of the New York Con-
vention was to abolish the practice of double exequatur, which at one time re-
quired parties to confirm the award at the place where it was rendered before tak-
ing it to another location for enforcement.498 Furthermore, there is no need to
confirm an award to trigger the obligation of the non-prevailing party to comply
with the terms of the award, since an arbitral award has legal effect immediately
upon being rendered.499
Nevertheless, a prevailing party might wish to bring a confirmation proceed-
ing so as to transform the award into a civil judgment and facilitate enforcement
of the award domestically.500 (Since enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is
usually easier than enforcement of foreign judgments, parties would seldom want
to confirm an award so as to obtain international enforcement of the resulting
judgment.)50 Even if a party does not intend to enforce the award in the arbitral
seat immediately, it may be wise to confirm the award as soon as possible after the
conclusion of the arbitration so as to protect the award for future use. This is par-
ticularly true in jurisdictions that only allow confirmation within a certain time
period.502
Confirmation of arbitral awards in the United States is a relatively straight-
forward process.50 3 A party may only object to confirmation of the award on
grounds used for non-enforcement of a foreign arbitral award under the New York
or Panama Convention.504 Parties to an award that falls under the New York or
Panama Convention have three years in which to bring a motion to confirm the
award, which is considerably longer than the one-year period for confirming a
domestic award.505
There is one aspect of U.S. practice relating to the confirmation of arbitral
awards that can lead to confusion in international disputes. Some authorities sug-
gest that the parties' underlying arbitration agreement must include language to
the effect that "judgment upon the award may be entered by Court having jurisdic-
tion hereof' for the award to be confirmable.50 6 Adherence to this requirement,
497. See id.; see also infra notes 577-605 and accompanying text.
498. See New York Convention, supra note 22; BORN, supra note 9, at 2338 (noting neither the New
York nor the Panama Convention requires double exequatur).
499. See BORN, supra note 9, at 2343; see also infra notes 631-45 and accompanying text.
500. See supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
501. See BORN,supra note 9, at 91-101.
502. See id. at 2329.
503. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 207, 302 (2011); BORN, supra note 9, at 2712-25, 2727-28.
504. See id.
505. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 207, 302.
506. See id. § 9; Oklahoma City Assoc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 923 F.2d 791, 794-95 (10th Cir.
1991) (concerning domestic arbitration); Splosna Plovba of Piran v. Agrelak SS Corp., 381 F. Supp.
1368, 1371 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (concerning international arbitration).
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which has been characterized as "archaic," is problematic in international dis-
putes, however, since it imposes a form requirement that is not reflected elsewhere
in the New York Convention.5 0 7 Because Chapter 1 of the FAA does not apply to
international disputes to the extent that the relevant provisions are inconsistent
with the New York Convention, the better practice would be to consider language
ostensibly required under Section 9 regarding the entry of judgment to be unnec-
essary or inapplicable.os Another alternative is to allow the requirement of Sec-
tion 9 to be met by implication, as numerous U.S. cases, including those in the
international realm, have already done. 509
3. Motions to Enforce a Foreign Arbitral Award
Perhaps the most common action to be brought in U.S. court after the conclu-
sion of an international commercial arbitration is a motion to enforce a foreign
arbitral award. Motions to enforce foreign awards can be brought in any second-
ary jurisdiction in the world, although parties tend to choose places where the non-
prevailing party has assets that can be used to satisfy the award.
The vast geographic scope of the New York and Panama Conventions means
that virtually all enforcement proceedings brought in a U.S. court will fall under
one of these two instruments. 5t0  Although parties may enforce arbitral awards
outside the treaty framework, this happens only rarely in the United States.51'
Therefore, for reasons of space, this discussion focuses exclusively on treaty
mechanisms.
Before beginning, it is useful to clear up the differences between the "recog-
nition" and "enforcement" of a foreign arbitral award under the New York and
Panama Conventions. 512 "Recognition" of an award gives the award the status of
a national court judgment in that state.5 13 However, most parties want more than
just a simple judgment; they want the court to use its coercive power to give effect
to the terms of the award. In those cases, parties seek to have the award "en-
forced."5 14 Because the procedures for recognition and enforcement are the same,
the following discussion will simply use the term "enforcement" to refer to both
types of action.
The New York Convention reflects a strong presumption in favor of the en-
forcement of foreign arbitral awards as a result of mandatory language indicating
that "[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and en-
507. BORN, supra note 9, at 2788-89; see also 9 U.S.C. § 207 (noting the only grounds for non-
confirmation arc those contained in the New York Convention).
508. See New York Convention, supra note 22; 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 208, 307.
509. See 9 U.S.C. § 9; Daihatsu Motor Co., Ltd. v. Terrain Vehicles, Inc., 13 F.3d 196, 199-203 (7th
Cir. 1993); BORN, supra note 9, at 2788.
510. See New York Convention, supra note 22; Panama Convention, supra note 25; New York Con-
vention Status, supra note 23; SICE, supra note 29.
511. See Weizmann Inst. of Sci. v. Neschis, 421 F. Supp. 2d 654, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (concerning
an award rendered in Liechtenstein prior to Liechtenstein's adherence to the New York Convention).
512. See New York Convention, supra note 22; Panama Convention, supra note 25.
513. See LEW ET AL., supra note 7, IT 26-9 to 26-12. Technically, an award may also be "recognized"
at the arbitral seat, although that process is usually referred to in the United States as "confirmation."
See BORN, supra note 9, at 2398.
514. See LEW ET AL., supra note 7, %f 26-9 to 26-12.
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force them."5t5 A party may object to the enforcement of a particular award, but
only on the grounds listed in Article V of the Convention, which are to be con-
strued narrowly.5 16 Other possible reasons for non-enforcement, such as ration-
ales based on Section 10 of the FAA or developed through the common law, are
inapplicable in an action to enforce a foreign arbitral award. "
Procedures for enforcing foreign arbitral awards are meant to be relatively
straightforward, and the New York Convention itself imposes few requirements
other than the production of an original or duly certified copy of both the award
and the underlying arbitration agreement as well as certified translations, if neces-
sary.1 Other than that, contracting states are free to adopt their own procedural
mechanisms for enforcing arbitral awards, although "[t]here shall not be imposed
substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on the recognition
or enforcement of arbitral awards to which this Convention applies." 519  The
FAA's enforcement provisions are relatively straightforward and have led to few
controversies.520
Although the party that prevailed in the arbitration brings the motion to en-
force an award, the non-prevailing party can enter one or more objections to en-
forcement. The various grounds for objection are listed in the seven subsections
of Article V of the New York Convention.52 ' Each subsection is introduced brief-
ly below along with a discussion of some of the more contentious issues that can
arise under each heading. Notably, the nature of this Article permits only a curso-
ry discussion of each of the various objections. Numerous other issues can and
will arise, although some of these matters can be addressed through three prelimi-
nary observations.
First, the New York Convention specifically states that non-enforcement is
discretionary rather than mandatory. 522 Therefore, U.S. courts are not obliged to
refuse enforcement just because the criteria contained in one of the provisions of
Article V have technically been met.523 Instead, judges are free to give effect to
the general pro-enforcement policy underlying the New York Convention as a
whole and enforce the award as a matter of discretion.524
Second, Article V is broken into two major subsections. 525 Objections under
Article V(1) may only be made by a party, whereas objections under Article V(2)
may be raised sua sponte by the enforcing court. 526 This distinction arises because
Article (V)(2) addresses two questions that are of particular significance to states:
515. New York Convention, supra note 22, art. Ill; see also Czarina, L.L.C. v. W.F. Poe Syndicate,
358 F.3d 1286, 1292 n. 3 (11 th Cir. 2004).
516. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V; Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. So-
cicte Gencrale De L'Industne Du Papier (RATKA), 508 F.2d 969, 973-74 (2d Cir. 1974).
517. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2011); Encyclopaedia Universalis SA v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 403
F.3d 85, 90, 92 (2d Cir. 2005).
518. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. IV.
519. Id. art. Ill.
520. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 204 (regarding venue); see also id. § 207 (regarding enforcement procedures).
521. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V.
522. See id (noting enforcement "may be refused").
523. See Rhone Mediterrance Compagnia Francesc Di Assicurazioni E Riassicurazoni v. Lauro, 712
F.2d 50, 54 (3d Cir. 1983).
524. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974).
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whether the subject matter of the dispute is capable of settlement by arbitration
under the national law of the enforcing country (i.e., arbitrability in the interna-
tional sense) and whether enforcement of the award is contrary to the public poli-
cy of the enforcing country.527 By allowing courts to raise these concerns on their
own initiative, the drafters of the New York Convention avoided the possibility of
parties colluding to evade mandatory provisions of law applicable in the enforcing
state.528
Third, Article V contains several provisions regarding the law that is to apply
to any particular issue.529 For example, objections arising under Article V(l) are
largely considered pursuant to the law that has been chosen by the parties, either
explicitly in their agreement or implicitly through the choice of the arbitral seat.530
This means that the law relevant to inquiries under Article V(1) may be different
than that of the enforcing court.5 3' However, objections under Article V(2) are
explicitly made subject to the law of the enforcing court.5 32 Parties must keep
these distinctions in mind when making their various objections.
Before discussing each of the individual objections to enforcement under the
New York Convention, it is useful to present Article V in its entirety.13 1 It reads
as follows:
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the re-
quest of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes
to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is
sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in Article II were, under
the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said
agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have sub-
jected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the coun-
try where the award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given
proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not
falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it con-
tains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to ar-
bitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbi-
tration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the
award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration
may be recognized and enforced; or
527. See id. art. V(2).
528. See id.
529. See id. art. V.
530. See id. art. V(1).
531. See id
532. See id. art. V(2).
533. See id. art. V.
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(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral proce-
dure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or,
failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the
country where the arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has
been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country
in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be re-
fused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and en-
forcement is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement
by arbitration under the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary
to the public policy of that country.534
Now it is time to discuss each of the individual subsections in turn.
a. Article V(1) (a) - Incapacity of the Parties or Invalidity of the Agreement
The first means of objecting to enforcement of a foreign arbitral award under
the New York Convention involves the incapacity of the parties or the invalidity
of the agreement.535 Notably, either or both of these issues may have been raised
earlier in the proceeding. The matter may have been determined in a U.S. or other
court, or it may have been considered by the arbitral tribunal, depending on how
questions regarding competence-competence and gateway issues played out.536
Although the parties are free to raise this issue again at the time of enforce-
ment, a U.S. judge may conclude that an earlier judicial determination on this
issue, by a U.S. or other court, precludes a similar objection in an enforcement
proceeding.5 37 The enforcing court may also choose to defer to the arbitral tribu-
nal on this issue, although the amount of deference given to the arbitrators' deci-
sion may depend on whether the parties agreed to have matters such as these de-
termined by the arbitrators.538
The most difficult issue arising under Article V(1)(a) involves the determina-
tion of the applicable law. Parties very seldom designate the law under which
534. Id.
535. See id. art. V(1)(a).
536. See supra notes 256-88 and accompanying text.
537. See Four Seasons Hotel & Resorts, B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 377 F.3d 1164, 1171-72 (11th
Cir. 2004); BORN, supra note 9, at 2794-95, 2919-29.
538. See Sarhank Group v. Oracle Corp., 404 F.3d 657, 661-62 (2d Cir. 2005 Czarina, L.L.C. v. W.F.
Poe Syndicate, 358 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11 th Cir. 2004); Telenor Mobile Comm. AS v. Storm LLC, 524
F. Supp. 2d 332, 350-51 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff'd, 584 F.3d 396 (2d Cir. 2009); BORN, supra note 9, at
2790-91.
539. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(1)(a).
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the arbitration agreement is to be construed, although they often include a general
choice of law provision elsewhere in the contract. 540 The question, therefore,
becomes whether a general choice of law provision should be construed to govern
issues relating to incapacity or invalidity in an Article V(1)(a) analysis.54'
U.S. courts have responded to this question in a variety of ways. Some judg-
es apply the law designated in the general choice of law provision to questions
arising under Article V(1)(a) while others apply federal common law in an attempt
to ensure uniformity of treatment across the nation.542
Both approaches are problematic. First, using the law designated in the gen-
eral choice of law provision fails to take heed of the principle of separability.543
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated in a similar context that "the choice-of-
law provision covers the rights and duties of the parties, while the arbitration
clause covers arbitration; neither sentence intrudes upon the other."544 Therefore,
general choice of law provisions should be construed to apply only to substantive
issues, absent the parties' agreement to the contrary.
Second, it is difficult to justify the application of federal common law to the
question of validity and incapacity simply because the motion to enforce the arbi-
tral award is before a U.S. court.545 Indeed, to do so ignores the express language
of Article V(1)(a), which states that issues of invalidity or incapacity should be
determined by the law of the arbitral seat when the parties have not agreed on an
applicable law to address that issue.546 Since the arbitral seat is different than the
place of enforcement, U.S. law cannot apply to these issues.
Of these various options, the best approach is to follow the express language
of Article V(1)(a) and apply the law of the arbitral seat to questions involving
incapacity and invalidity, unless the parties have very clearly designated another
law to address that specific issue.547 Furthermore, the court has the discretion to
enforce the award, even if the objecting party has met the technical requirements
of Article V(1)(a).54 8
540 See BORN, supra note 9, at 443-46; FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN, supra note 138,1 425.
541. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(1)(a).
542. See id.; Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 500 F.3d 571, 577-78 (7th
Cir. 2007) (addressing contract with no choice of law provision); Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 388
F.3d 39, 50-51 (2d Cir. 2004) (applying law named in general choice of law provision); Westbrook
Int'l, LLC v. Westbrook Tech., Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 681, 683-85 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (not applying law
named in general choice of law provision); BORN, supra note 9, at 449-50.-
543. See supra notes 256-88 and accompanying text.
544. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63-64 (1995).
545. See Rhone Mediterrance Compagnia Francese Di Assicurazioni E Riassicurazoni v. Achille
Lauro, 712 F.2d 50, 52-54 (3d Cir. 1983) (discussing interplay of choice of law issues under Articles 11
and V of the Convention).
546. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(1)(a) (referring to "the law to which the parties
have subjected [the issue] or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the
award was made"); BORN, supra note 9, at 453.
547. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(1)(a); AO Techsnabexport v. Globe Nuclear
Scrv. & Supply, Ltd., 656 F. Supp. 2d 550, 558 (D. Md. 2009), af'd, 404 Fed. Appx. 793 (4th Cir.
2010) (applying Swedish law to validity questions relating to arbitration seated in Sweden); Spier v.
Calzaturificio Tecnica, SPA, 71 F. Supp. 2d 279, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (applying Italian law to validity
questions relating to arbitration seated in Italy).
548. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(1)(a); Four Seasons Hotel & Resorts, B.V. v.
Consorcio Barr, S.A., 533 F.3d 1349, 1352 n. 5 (11th Cir. 2008).
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Some debate exists regarding the burden of demonstrating the existence of a
valid arbitration agreement in disputes arising under Article V(1)(a).5 49 In particu-
lar, questions arise as to whether the award-debtor or the award-creditor has the
burden of meeting the form requirements reflected in Article II of the New York
Convention.5 o However, the language of Article V(1) clearly puts the burden of
proving the grounds for objection on the award-debtor, stating "[r]ecognition ...
may be refused, at the request of the party against whom [the award] is invoked,
only if that party furnishes ... proof' that one of the various bases for objection is
met.55 ' Thus, most national courts and commentators take the view that award-
debtor has the burden of proof regarding the form requirements of Article II of the
Convention, with the award-creditor simply being required to provide a document
purporting to be the agreement in writing referred to in Article IV. 552
b. Article V(1) (b) - Notice and Presentation of One Party's Case
The second ground for objection under article V of the New York Convention
involves violations of core due process rights concerning notice and the ability to
present one's case.553 Unlike Article V(1)(a), Article V(1)(b) does not indicate the
country whose law is to control this issue. 554 Thus, commentators have taken the
position that "Article V(1)(b) is best viewed as providing the basis for uniform
international standards of procedural faimess," which is to be "applied in light of
the Convention's general pro-enforcement objectives."555
This is not to say that some U.S. courts have not looked to domestic notions
of due process when considering objections made under Article V(1)(b), for they
have.55 However, the character of the arbitration as an international proceeding
must be considered, even when domestic legal principles are taken into account.55 7
Therefore, it is enough if the broad principles of due process and procedural fair-
ness are met, even if the precise means by which these objectives are fulfilled
differ from procedures used in U.S. courts. 5 Indeed, the fact that "[t]he Conven-
tion is a global, international instrument, to which states with widely-divergent
domestic litigation systems are party . . . leaves no room for individual Contract-
ing States to impose their domestic litigation procedures as requirements of pro-
cedural fairness under Article V(1)(b)." 559  Therefore, this objection is to be
viewed from more of an international perspective, rather than a national one.
549. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(1)(a).
550. See id. art. 11; BORN, supra note 9, at 2705-06.
551, New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(1).
552. See id. arts. 11, IV; BORN, supra note 9, at 2706.
553. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(1)(b).
554. See id. art. V(1)(a)-(b).
555. BORN, supra note 9, at 2738; see also New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(I)(b).
556. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(1)(b); Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Pcrusahaan
Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 298 (5th Cir. 2004).
557. See Emp'rs. Ins. of Wausau v. Banco de Seguros dcl Estado, 199 F.3d 937, 943-44 (7th Cir.
1999).
558. See id.; BORN, supra note 9, at 2744.
559. BORN, supra note 9, at 2744; see also New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(1)(b).
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c. Article V(1)(c) - Difference Not Contemplated By or Within the Terms
of the Submission ofArbitration or Beyond the Scope of the Submission to
Arbitration
The third ground for objection to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards
under the New York Convention focuses on whether the tribunal has in some way
exceeded or abused its jurisdiction, either by going beyond the matters that were
submitted to arbitration (an act considered to be extra petita or ultra petita in the
international realm) or by failing to address the matters that were submitted to
arbitration (an act considered to be infra petita).5 6 0 Although the authorities are
split as to whether the New York Convention addresses acts that are infra petita,
Article V(l)(c) is a relatively straightforward provision leading to few conceptual
difficulties. 561
Most U.S. courts construe the language narrowly, since arbitral tribunals are
presumed to have acted within the scope of their duties.562 This is consistent with
party expectation and international practice, since "most arbitration agreements
and institutional rules leave the arbitral tribunal substantial discretion in imple-
menting their terms." 563
One source of potential confusion involves challenges to awards "based on
objections to the arbitrators' substantive contract interpretations or legal conclu-
sions, or to the arbitrators' procedural rulings."56 Neither allegation can properly
be made under Article V(l)(c), since substantive objections to the award cannot
be made anywhere under Article V and arguments about the fairness of the arbi-
tral procedure should more properly be made under Articles V(1)(b) or V(1)(d).
d. Article V(1)(d) - Composition of the Tribunal or Arbitral Procedure
The fourth ground for objection to enforcement of a foreign arbitral award
under the New York Convention is one of the most important.56 6 This provision
deals with the composition of the tribunal and the arbitral procedure, both issues
that are considered fundamental to the concept of international commercial arbi-
tration.5
Application of Article V(1)(d) is relatively straightforward in cases where the
parties have agreed to have their arbitration governed by a set of institutional
rules.568 In those instances, the relevant standards regarding arbitral procedure
and the composition of the arbitral tribunal are typically stated in the relevant
560. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(1)(c); BORN, supra note 9, at 2798-99.
561. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(1)(c).
562. See Mgmt. & Tech. Consultants S.A. v. Parsons-Jurden Int'l Corp., 820 F.2d 1531, 1534 (9th
Cir. 1987); Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale De L'Industric Du Papier
(RATKA), 508 F.2d 969, 976 (2d Cir. 1974).
563. BORN, supra note 9, at 2800.
564. Id.
565. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V.
566. See id art. V(1)(d); see BORN, supra note 9, at 2764-74; LEW ET AL., supra note 7, if 26-94 to
26-97.
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rules.s69 When considering whether and to what extent the underlying arbitration
complied with the various provisions, courts can look not only to the language of
the rules themselves, but also to previously published arbitral awards (particularly
those construing the rules in question, although analogies can be drawn from simi-
lar provisions from other arbitral institutions).570 It is also possible for courts to
consider scholarly commentary, since these sources provide important insights
into how arbitral tribunals and institutions - who are the entities entrusted by the
parties to make these procedural decisions and who know the rules best - view the
issues at stake. 571
The situation is slightly more complicated when the parties have neither
agreed to abide by any particular set of arbitral rules nor explicitly addressed the
disputed issue in their arbitration agreement.572 In these instances, questions re-
garding the arbitral procedure and composition of the arbitral tribunal are gov-
emed by the law of the arbitral seat.573 Notably, this means enforcing courts
should look to the arbitration law in place at the seat of arbitration, not its national
rules of civil procedure, which are not applicable in arbitration absent very clear
party agreement. 574 Thus, the law of the enforcing court is irrelevant to the deter-
mination of these issues.
To be actionable, a procedural irregularity must be relatively egregious. In-
deed, some U.S. courts faced with objections to enforcement of an arbitral award
under Article V(1)(d) have stated that "because of the clear 'pro-enforcement
bias' of the New York Convention, it is appropriate to set aside an award based on
a procedural violation only if such violation worked substantial prejudice to the
complaining party."' 575 Furthermore, U.S. courts give a high degree of deference
to the decisions of the arbitrators.57 6
569. See BORN, supra note 9, at 2765.
570. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 85 (2002) (noting arbitrators are
"comparatively better able to interpret and to apply" the rules of their arbitral institution than are
courts); China Minmetals Materials Import & Export Co., Ltd. v. Chi Mci Corp., 334 F.3d 274, 288-89
n. 14 (2d Cir. 2003) (considering similarities between different rule sets); see also STRONG, supra note
7, at 83-84; Strong, Research, supra note 1, at 142-45.
571. See Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85; see also STRONG, supra note 7, at 71-137; Strong, Research, supra
note 1, at 142-45.
572. See Encyclopacdia Universalis SA v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 403 F.3d 85, 90, 91 (2d
Cir. 2005) (upholding parties' agreement in case where no institutional rules applied); BORN, supra
note 9, at 2770-74.
573. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art V(1)(d); Pactrans Air & Sea, Inc. v. China Nat'1
Chartering Corp., No. 3:06-cv-369/RS-EMT, 2010 WL 1332085, at *1-2 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 29, 2010).
574 See Matter of Arbitration Between InterCarbon Bermuda, Ltd. and Caltex Trading & Transport
Corp., 146 F.R.D. 64,72 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
575. Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 190 F.
Supp. 2d 936, 945 (S.D. Tex. 2001); see also New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(1)(d).
576 See Lagstein v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 607 F.3d 634, 643-44 (9th Cir. 2010)
cert. denied 131 S.Ct. 832 (2010); Compagnic des Bauxites de Guince v. Hammermills, Inc., No. 90-
0169, 1992 WL 122712, at *5 (D.D.C. May 29, 1992) (stating that "[t]he Court does not believe that
section 1(d) of Article V was intended, as CBG argues, to permit reviewing courts to police every
procedural ruling made by the Arbitrator and to set aside the award if any violation of ICC procedures
is found"); BORN, supra note 9, at 2768.
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e. Article V(1)(e) - Award Not Yet Binding or Set Aside by a
Competent Authority
The final ground for objection under Article V(1) of the New York Conven-
tion involves an award that is not yet binding or that has been set aside by a com-
petent authority.577 In general, an award is generally considered "'binding' for the
purposes of the Convention if no further recourse may be had to another arbitral
tribunal (that is, an appeals tribunal). The fact that recourse may be had to a court
of law does not prevent the award from being 'binding.' 578
Concerns about awards being "not yet binding" can arise in the context of
motions to enforce partial or interim awards.5 7 9 The analysis in these cases focuses
on whether immediate enforcement is necessary to protect the final award or
whether the parties have expressed an interest in immediate resolution of this par-
ticular issue.so In determining whether an award should be considered final,
courts typically look past the nomenclature of "partial" or "interim" awards and
focus on the substance of the award.
The second element of Article V(1)(e) addresses whether the award "has been
set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under
the law of which, that award was made." 582 This language is familiar as the gene-
sis for the U.S. distinction between courts with primary and secondary jurisdic-
tion, and for the conclusion that only courts of primary jurisdiction are considered
capable of setting aside an arbitral award.5 8 3 This means that decisions rendered
by courts with secondary jurisdiction have no effect elsewhere in the world, and
enforcing courts should give those decisions no regard in the enforcement analy-
sis. 584
As with all other grounds for non-enforcement, Article V(1)(e) is framed in
discretionary terms. 85 Questions therefore arise as to the criteria that should be
used to determine whether an award that has been set aside in the primary jurisdic-
tion should nevertheless be enforced in the United States. These factors may also
play into whether a U.S. court considers it proper to stay enforcement proceedings
pending a decision by a court with primary jurisdiction on a motion to vacate. 586
The New York Convention provides no guidance on the issues that should be
considered in an Article V(1)(e) determination. Furthermore, no consensus
577. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(1)(c).
578. Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948, 958 (S.D. Ohio 1981)
(citation omitted); see BORN, supra note 9, at 2818-19.
579. See Hall Steel Co. v. Metalloyd Ltd., 492 F. Supp. 2d 715, 717-18 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
580. See id. at 719-20.
581. See Publicis Comm. v. True North Comm., Inc., 206 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2000).
582. New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(1)(c).
583. See supra notes 222-5 5 and accompanying text.
584. See Nicor Int'l Corp. v. El Paso Corp., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1375 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
585. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(1)(c) (noting recognition and enforcement
"may be refused").
586. See id. art. VI (stating an enforcing court "may, if it considers it proper, adjourn the decision on
the enforcement of the award" pending a decision on a motion made to a competent authonty to set
aside or suspend an award).
587. See id art. V(1)(c).
200 [Vol. 2012
82
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2012, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2012/iss1/8
Navigating the Borders
exists internationally as to how enforcing courts should treat an award that has
been set aside by a competent court.
U.S. courts demonstrate some consistency in this area, although a few outly-
ing opinions exist. The first U.S. case to deal with this issue was Chromalloy Gas
Turbine Corp. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, which ultimately enforced an Egyptian
arbitral award notwithstanding the fact that an Egyptian court had nullified the
award on the grounds that the arbitral tribunal had misapplied Egyptian law.58 9
The U.S. judge pointed to several aspects of the Egyptian judicial process that
raised concerns about the legitimacy of the order nullifying the award. For exam-
ple, the Egyptian decision appeared to espouse a "suspicious view of arbitration"
that reflected "precisely the type of technical argument that U.S. courts are not to
entertain when reviewing an arbitral award."590 Furthermore, the Egyptian court's
decision was made in spite of a contractual provision stating that Egypt would not
seek review of the award.59' This suggested that non-enforcement of the award by
the U.S. court "would not only allow the respondent to repudiate its solemn prom-
ise but would, as well, reflect a parochial concept that all disputes must be re-
solved under" the laws and courts of the arbitral seat.592
Because the Egyptian court acted in manner contrary to both a fundamental
U.S. public policy prohibiting substantive judicial review of arbitral awards as
well as the parties' express agreement waiving any such review, the court in
Chromalloy held that the decision to set aside the award at the place where it was
rendered was not a sufficient reason to block enforcement of the award in the
United States.593 Instead, the U.S. court exercised its discretionary power and
allowed enforcement of the award, despite the fact that the objection technically
met the criteria for non-enforcement outlined in Article V(1)(e).594
One important aspect of Chromalloy was its emphasis on the fact that a court
faced with an objection under Article V(1)(e) of the Convention has the discretion
to enforce or not to enforce the award. 9 s Other U.S. courts have also recognized
this discretionary power, which is explicitly reflected in Article V(1)(e).
One U.S. court took the unusual view that there is a mandatory duty to deny
enforcement of an award that has been set aside at the arbitral seat. 9 Not only
does this case contravene the express provisions of the New York Convention and
the weight of U.S. authority, but its central holding that an award that has been set
aside no longer "exists" to be enforced elsewhere has been expressly denied by
588. See BORN, supra note 9, at 2677.
589. 939 F. Supp. 907, 911 (D.D.C. 1996); BORN, supra note 9, at 2683-84.




594 See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(1)(c); Chromalloy, 939 F. Supp. at 912.
595. See id.
596. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(1)(e) (stating enforcement "may be refused");
Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pcrtambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 335 F.3d 357,
367 (5th Cir. 2003); Baker Marine Ltd. v. Chevron Ltd., 191 F.3d 194, 197 n.3 (2d Cir. 1999); BORN,
supra note 9, at 2684-85.
597. See Termorio S.A. E.S.P. v. Eltranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 936 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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other judicial authorities. 9 Notably, the rationale enunciated by the court in
Termorio has not been adopted elsewhere in the United States. 99
Thus, the question remains as to the criteria that should be used to determine
whether an award that has been set aside at the arbitral seat should be enforced in
the United States. Chromalloy suggests that judges considering this issue may
find it useful to consider the grounds upon which the set-aside was founded.600 If
the reason for the set-aside is reflected in Article V of the New York Convention,
then it may be appropriate to deny enforcement in the United States as well.6 o' On
the other hand, annulments that appear to be based on "parochial" or self-
protective rationales might not be considered sufficient grounds for non-
enforcement elsewhere.602 Highly technical readings of national law that do not
involve "substantial prejudice to the complaining party" might also be deemed
insufficient grounds for non-enforcement in the United States.603
Only allowing non-enforcement in cases where the set-aside is based on an
Article V rationale is particularly useful because it does not allow one state to hold
the entire international arbitral regime hostage.60 It also supports the notion that
international enforcement may take place immediately upon the award's being
rendered, without the need for confirmation or exequatur from the court at the
arbitral seat, a concept that is central to the regime created by the New York Con-
* 605vention.
f Article V(2) (a) - Subject Matter Not Capable of Settlement
by Arbitration
The preceding five subsections focused on objections to enforcement arising
under Article V(1) of the New York Convention, all of which may be raised by
"the party against whom [the award] is invoked."60 6 Parties may also make objec-
tions under Article V(2), although enforcing courts may also raise these issues sua
sponte.607 The court's power to deny enforcement of a foreign arbitral award
under Article V(2) is again discretionary, rather than mandatory.608
598. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(1)(e); Judgment of 14 January 1997, 1997 REv.
ARB. 395 (Paris Cour d'appel), Note, Fouchard, as quoted in BORN, supra note 9, at 2679.
599. See Teriorio, 487 F.3d at 936. Furthermore, the Colombian court that nullified the original
award is no longer be able to take this sort of action, based on changes to the Colombian law of inter-
national arbitration. See Strong, Colombia, supra note 78, at 103.
600. See Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907, 911-12
(D.D.C. 1996).
601. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V; Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica, SPA, 71 F.
Supp. 2d 279, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (denying enforcement where the underlying award was determined
to be in excess ofjurisdiction); BORN, supra note 9, at 2685.
602. See Chromalloy, 939 F. Supp. at 911-12.
603. See Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 190
F. Supp. 2d 936, 945 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (concerning Article V(1)(d)).
604. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V.
605. See id; see also BORN, supra note 9, at 2826; supra notes 498-509 and accompanying text.
606. New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(1).
607. See id. art. V(2).
608. See id. (stating enforcement "may. . . be refused").
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The first of the two grounds for non-enforcement found in Article V(2) deals
with arbitrability in the international sense.i As discussed above, the interna-
tional definition of arbitrability focuses on whether a particular country permits
certain types of disputes to be resolved in arbitration. 610 Article V(2)(a) therefore
protects the national interests of both the enforcing state and the non-prevailing
party by allowing non-enforcement of an award in cases where "the subject matter
of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration" under the law of the
enforcing state.611
The language of Article V(2)(a) bears a striking resemblance to that found in
Article 11(1), which contains contracting states' affirmative obligation to recognize
arbitration agreements "concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbi-
tration." 612 The two provisions' linguistic similarities have led authorities to con-
clude that questions of arbitrability should be addressed in a parallel manner.6 13 In
other words, if the subject matter of an arbitration agreement cannot support a
motion to compel arbitration, it cannot support a motion to enforce an award aris-
ing out of an arbitration based on that agreement, and vice versa.
Article V(2)(a) recognizes a concern voiced by critics of international com-
mercial arbitration that the procedure allows parties to circumvent mandatory
provisions of law simply by seating their arbitrations in other countries.614 By
allowing judges to consider foreign arbitral awards in light of the enforcing state's
own national laws regarding arbitrability, Article V(2)(a) provides courts with an
important protective mechanism.615
Nevertheless, the New York Convention reflects a strong bias towards en-
forcement of arbitral awards, which means that this provision is to be construed
narrowly, as are other grounds for objection to enforcement under the New York
Convention. Furthermore, "it is essential . . . to distinguish between matters
which are non-arbitrable in a domestic context and those which are non-arbitrable
in an international context. In many jurisdictions, non-arbitrability rules are
broader in domestic than in international matters."" Indeed, the U.S. Supreme
Court has recognized that there are times when it is "necessary for national courts
to subordinate domestic notions of arbitrability to the international policy favoring
commercial arbitration."618 Restrictions on arbitrability are usually outlined in the
national law on arbitration. However, the FAA is silent on this point, which
means that federal judges must look to case law, policy and substantive statutes to
discern the arbitrability of various matters.
As it turns out, case law demonstrates a clear and consistent approach to arbi-
trability, with all claims being deemed arbitrable unless Congress "expressly di-
609. See id. art. V(2)(a); see supra notes 256-88 and accompanying text.
610. See supra notes 256-88 and accompanying text.
611. New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(2)(a).
612. Id. arts. 11(1), V(2)(a).
613. See BORN, supra note 9, at 2863.
614. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(2)(a).
615. See id.
616. See id.; Saudi Iron & Steel Co. v. Stemcor USA Inc., No.97 CIV 5976(DLC), 1997 WL 642566,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 1997); BORN, supra note 9, at 2730.
617. BORN, supra note 9, at 775.
618. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler- Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 639 (1985).
619 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2011); BORN, supra note 9, at 781.
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rected" a contrary result. 620 Furthermore, enforcement of arbitration agreements
and awards may be appropriate in the international realm "even assuming that a
contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context."621 Therefore, to be
non-arbitrable under Article V(2)(a), matters must reflect a "special national inter-
est vested in their resolution."622
Together, these and other precedents indicate that a vast array of types of dis-
putes are considered arbitrable in the United States. Indeed, the United States is
known as reflecting one of the broadest approaches to arbitrability in the world.623
g. Article V(2)(b) -Public Policy
The final ground for non-enforcement of a foreign arbitral award under the
New York Convention is one of the most cited as well as one of the least success-
ful. 624 Article V(2)(b) allows (but does not require) courts to refuse recognition
and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards based on the public policy of the state
where enforcement is sought.625
In the United States, as elsewhere, the public policy exception is given a nar-
row reading.626 Furthermore, even though the Convention refers clearly to the
public policy of the enforcing state:
it has been a consistent theme of recognition decisions under Article
V(2)(b) to interpret national public policies in a manner that is consistent,
insofar as possible, with the objectives of the Convention and the public
policies and interests of other Contracting States. This approach has
manifested itself in two principal ways: (1) the application of "interna-
tional" public policies, rather than domestic public policies, under Article
V(2)(b), and (b) the exercise of a substantial degree of restraint and mod-
eration in the application of public policies under Article V(2)(b). 627
Thus, U.S. courts have noted that:
[t]o read the public policy defense as a parochial device protective of na-
tional political interests would seriously undermine the Convention's
utility. This provision was not meant to enshrine the vagaries of interna-
tional politics under the rubric of "public policy." Rather, a circum-
scribed public policy doctrine was contemplated by the Convention's
620. See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 639-40 n. 21.
621. See id. at 627.
622. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale De L'industric Du Papier (RATKA),
508 F.2d 969, 975 (2d Cir. 1974); see New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(2)(a).
623. See supra notes 256-88 and accompanying text.
624. See New York Convention, supra note 22.
625. See id art. V(2)(b); BORN, supra note 9, at 2827-28.
626. See Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Das Gas Bumi Negara, 364
F.3d 274, 306 (5th Cir. 2004).
627. BORN, supra note 9, at 2833; see also New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(2)(b).
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framers and every indication is that the United States, in acceding to the
Convention, meant to subscribe to this supranational emphasis.628
Other U.S. courts have limited application of Article V(2)(b) to "only those
circumstances 'where enforcement would violate our most basic notions of moral-
ity and justice.' 629 Notably, Article V(2)(b) does not permit non-enforcement
based on "erroneous legal reasoning or misapplication of law."63 o
4. Preclusive Effects of an Arbitral Award
The preceding subsections discuss motions to vacate, confirm, and enforce
arbitral awards, which are perhaps the most common types of judicial proceeding
to arise after the conclusion of an arbitration. However, these are not the only
matters that can be brought to the attention of a U.S. court after an international
arbitral proceeding ends. For example, questions may exist about the preclusive
effects of issues that have been addressed in an international arbitration.
The matter can arise in one of two ways: either under the doctrine of res ju-
dicata (claim preclusion) or under principles relating to issue preclusion. 63 ' The
classic formulation of these concepts operate between the original parties to the
suit, with resjudicata forbidding the relitigation of a particular claim between the
parties and issue preclusion preventing the relitigation of a particular issue of law
or fact. However, issue preclusion may also be asserted, offensively or defensive-
ly, in disputes involving a non-party to an arbitration.
Although principles of preclusion clearly operate in international commercial
arbitration, there is no consensus on the precise rules that apply. The New York
Convention is silent on this issue, although it is certain that an award should be
given some preclusive value, given language indicating that Contracting States are
not only to "enforce" arbitral awards but that such awards are to be recognized as
"binding." 632 The FAA also fails to address this matter, leaving U.S. courts to rely
primarily on case law. 633
Although there is not great deal of authority in this area of law, analogies are
often made to preclusive principles developed in litigation. Thus, for example,
"[u]nder [the doctrine of] issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel,
'once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that
decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of
action involving a party to the first case."'6 34 This proposition applies equally in
628. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale Dc L'Industric Du Papier (RATKA),
508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir 1974) (emphasis added); see also New York Convention, supra note 22,
art. V(2)(b).
629. Telenor Mobile Commc'n AS v. Storm LLC, 584 F.3d 396, 411 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation omit-
ted); see also New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(2)(b).
630. Karaha Bodas Co., 364 F.3d at 306; see also New York Convention, supra note 22, art. V(2)(b).
631. See BORN, supra note 9, at 2883.
632. New York Convention, art. Ill; BORN, supra note 9, at 2891.
633. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2011).
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the arbitral realm, since "an arbitrator generally has the power to determine
whether a prior award is to be given preclusive effect."635
In proper circumstances, an arbitral award may have preclusive effect over a
non-party.636 Furthermore, there is no requirement that the award be confirmed,
nor that the tribunal have resolved every outstanding issue, so long as the award is
sufficiently final for issue preclusion purposes. 637 Even if an award does not have
preclusive power, it may still be persuasive in a later dispute.6 3 8
Issue preclusion is not the only type of preclusion that can arise in the arbitral
realm. Arbitral awards are regularly considered to have res judicata effect as to
all claims heard by the arbitrator. 639 Indeed, such an approach is required if arbi-
tration is to constitute a final and binding dispute resolution mechanism. Howev-
er, granting an award resjudicata status does not mean that a party may not object
to the enforcement of that award under the New York Convention. 64 0
Although courts recognize the res judicata value of an arbitral award, the
principle of claim preclusion does not operate in precisely the same way in arbi-
tration that it does in litigation. This distinction relates to the fact that arbitration,
unlike litigation, is a contractual construct that can limit the claims brought in a
particular proceeding.6' Nevertheless, courts have applied the concept of claim
preclusion in the arbitral context.642
Finally, there is some debate in the international arbitral community as to
whether an arbitral award has preclusive effect immediately upon its being ren-
dered by an arbitral tribunal or whether some judicial action must first take place.
In the United States, an award would certainly have preclusive effect after being
confirmed under the FAA, since the award would then hold the status of a civil
judgment as well as an arbitral award.64 3 At one time, courts appeared hostile to
granting res judicata value to anything other than a confirmed award.' Howev-
er, that approach seems to have changed, such that even an unconfirmed award
can now have preclusive effect in U.S. courts.6 4 5
635. Id. (citation omitted) (noting some exceptions, as in cases where the underlying award is being
used in support of a matter involving public policy).
636 See Universal Am. Barge Corp. v. J-Chem., Inc., 946 F.2d 1131, 1139, 1142 (5th Cir. 1991)
(involving a party who had allegedly been "vouched" into the arbitration); In re Kaiser Group Int'l,
Inc., 375 B.R. 120, 128-29 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (involving alleged privity between a corporate parent
and subsidiary).
637. See Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. v. Toledo Eng'g Co., Inc., 505 F Supp. 2d 423, 430-31 & n. 2 (N.D.
Ohio 2007) (involving an ICC arbitration and discussing both claim and issue preclusion).
638 See Acosta v. Master Maint. & Constr. Inc., 452 F. 3d 373, 377-78 n. 7 (5th Cir. 2006).
639. See FlectBoston Fin. Corp. v. Alt, 638 F.3d 70, 79 (1st Cir. 2011).
640. See New York Convention, supra note 22; Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 145
(2d Cir. 1992).
641. See Wolf v. Gruntal & Co., Inc., 45 F.3d 524, 528 (1st Cir. 1995).
642. See Lewis v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 500 F.3d 1140, 1147-48 (10th Cir. 2007).
643. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 207, 302 (2011).
644. See Jacobson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., Ill F.3d 261, 267 (2d Cir. 1997).
645. See id. at 267-68; Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. v. Toledo Eng'g Co., Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d 423, 430-31
& n. 2 (N.D. Ohio 2007); BORN, supra note 9, at 2897.
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V. SPECIAL ISSUES REGARDING PARTIES TO INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
The preceding section focused on the various types of actions that can be tak-
en before, during, and after an international commercial arbitration. However,
some types of legal issues cannot be tied to specific procedural motions. This is
the case with questions regarding who may be named as a proper party to an in-
ternational commercial arbitration. While these sorts of issues often arise when a
proceeding is being initiated, they are perhaps equally likely to be raised during or
after the conclusion of the arbitration. The following discussion therefore ad-
dresses special problems associated with actions involving non-signatories, multi-
party arbitrations, and state actors.
A. Non-signatories
Many lawyers are already familiar with issues regarding non-signatories in
arbitration as a result of debates arising in domestic disputes. The basic principle
that only those who have signed the arbitration agreement will be bound to its
terms is the same regardless of whether the arbitration is national or international
646in scope. However, putting this principle into practice can be somewhat diffi-
cult,647 and international proceedings give rise to a few unique quirks that need to
be discussed.
Disputes involving non-signatories always begin by asking whether the al-
leged non-signatory has signed the relevant document or documents. Under the
New York Convention, an arbitration agreement is only enforceable if it involves
an "agreement in writing."648 This term is further defined as "includ[ing] an arbi-
tral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or con-
tained in an exchange of letters or telegrams."649
As straightforward as this definition may seem, U.S. circuit courts have split
sharply on issues relating to the writing requirement in international commercial
arbitration.650 For example, circuits take different approaches to the question of
whether the relevant document or documents need to be signed by both parties.651
Additional confusion exists as to whether and to what extent the parties can rely
on the definition of a written agreement that is reflected in Chapter 2 of the FAA
rather than the definition contained in Article 11(2) of the New York Conven-
tion.652
646. See BORN, supra note 9, at 1142.
647. See id.
648. New York Convention, supra note 22, art. 11(1).
649. Id art. 11(2).
650 See Strong, Writing, supra note 168, at 52-70.
651. Compare Kahn Lucas Lancaster, Inc. v. Lark Int'l, Ltd., 186 F.3d 210, 218 (2d Cir. 1999),
partially abrogated on other grounds, Sarhank Grp. v. Oracle Corp., 404 F.3d 657, 660 n.2 (2d Cir.
2005) with Sphere Drake Ins. PLC v. Marine Towing, Inc., 16 F.3d 666, 669 (5th Cir. 1994); see also
Smith/Enron Cogeneration Ltd. P'ship, Inc. v. Smith Cogeneration Int'l, Inc., 198 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir.
1999).
652. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. 11(2); 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 202 (2011); Sourcing Unlim-
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Interestingly, the United States is not the only country to struggle with the
writing requirement under the New York Convention.6 5 3 Inconsistencies abound
across national borders, although the U.S. approach shows perhaps the widest
degree of variation within a single country.654 Given the high need for predictabil-
ity in this area, the international arbitral community has attempted to resolve a
number of issues relating to the writing requirement through a formal recommen-
dation issued by UNCITRAL in 2006 (UNCITRAL Recommendation).65 5 In
drafting this document, UNCITRAL took a variety of factors into account, includ-
ing the increasing prevalence of electronic commerce, communications and signa-
tures, and recognized that the drafters of the New York Convention had taken the
view that "greater uniformity of national laws on arbitration would further the
effectiveness of arbitration in the settlement of private law disputes." 656  The
UNCITRAL Recommendation, therefore, suggests a variety of measures that can
be taken by courts to harmonize the way in which the Convention's writing re-
quirement is interpreted worldwide.6 5 7
In many ways, the UNCITRAL Recommendation is consistent with practices
already advocated by some U.S. courts.65 8  However, explicit reliance on the
UNCITRAL Recommendation in the future would not only comply with interna-
tional legal norms but with U.S. Supreme Court precedent indicating that it is
appropriate, when construing an international treaty that has been incorporated
into domestic U.S. law, to consider "'the postratification understanding' of signa-
tory states."659
Regardless of what analytic approach is ultimately used, it will sometimes be
the case that the party whose participation is under scrutiny will be unable to meet
the necessary requirements regarding an "agreement in writing." 660 However, it is
still possible for such a party to be brought into an arbitration proceeding.
Domestic U.S. law has addressed this issue with some frequency, and U.S.
courts have developed a variety of methods of allowing or requiring entities who
are not formal signatories to an arbitration agreement to rely on the terms of that
agreement. These measures include theories involving "agency (actual and appar-
ent), alter ego, implied consent, 'group of companies,' estoppel, third-party bene-
ficiary, guarantor, subrogation, legal succession and ratification of assumption." 661
653. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. 11(2).
654. See Note by the Secretariat, UNCITRAL, Working Group 11 (Arbitration), Settlement of Com-
mercial Disputes: Preparation of Uniform Provisions on Written Form for Arbitration Agreements,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.139 (14 Dec. 2005) 11 11-2 1; Strong, Writing, supra note 168, at 72-73.
655. See UNCITRAL, Recommendation Regarding the Interpretation of Article 11, Paragraph 2, and
Article VII, Paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, U.N. Doc. A/6/17 (July 7, 2006) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Recommendation].
656. Id.; see also New York Convention, supra note 22.
657. See UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra note 655.
658 Compare id. (suggesting, inter alia, that that "the circumstances described" in Article 11(2)
regarding the definition of an "agreement in writing" not be considered "exhaustive") with Coutinho
Caro & Co. U.S.A., Inc. v. Marcus Trading, Inc., No. 3:95CV2362, 2000 WL 435566, at *11 (D.
Conn. Mar. 14, 2000) (noting Article 11(2) should be read broadly to effectuate the purpose of the
Convention).
659. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 507 (2008) (citation omitted); see also UNCITRAL Recom-
mendation, supra note 655; Strong, Writing, supra note 168, at 85.
660. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. 11(2).
661. Thomson-CSF, SA v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1995); BORN,
supra note 9, at 1137-38, 1142-1211.
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A number of these concepts have been considered in international disputes as
well.662 Although other nations have used these and other methods of binding
non-signatories to arbitration, the United States is one of the most lenient jurisdic-
tions in the world when it comes to joining non-signatories to arbitration.663 As
such, U.S. courts need to be careful not to extend domestic jurisprudence too far
into the international realm, for although other countries agree, as a general propo-
sition, that the benefits and burdens of an arbitration agreement can apply to per-
sons other than those named in the document, problems can arise if the United
States deviates too far from international norms.
Difficulties would typically arise at the time of enforcement. For example, if
a U.S. court compels arbitration with a non-signatory, a court in another country
could take the view that the agreement in question did not constitute an "agree-
ment in writing" vis-a-vis the non-signatory and that the New York Convention,
therefore, does not apply to any award arising out of that agreement. 6 That
could leave the prevailing party without the means of enforcing the award in that
country and possibly other countries as well.
Objections could also be raised under Article V(1)(d) of the New York Con-
vention. For instance, a court in another country could take the view that arbi-
tration with the non-signatory was contrary to the arbitral procedure agreed to by
666the parties. There may be some leeway here if the arbitration took place in the
United States, since objections under Article V(l)(d) of the Convention are con-
sidered "in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took
place" whenever the parties have not agreed otherwise. However, U.S. courts
technically have the ability to compel arbitrations seated both in the United States
and elsewhere, and the law at the arbitral seat may not be as liberal toward non-
signatories as U.S. law is. This could lead to additional problems at the initiation
stage, since the court at the arbitral seat might forbid arbitration of the dispute,
thus opening the parties up to inconsistent judicial orders. Therefore, U.S. courts
should be very cautious about compelling arbitration with non-signatories lest the
award be rendered unenforceable. 668
Although the international arbitral community recognizes that there can never
be any guarantee that an award will be enforceable in every possible jurisdiction,
significant problems arise if an award is not enforceable anywhere. In those cas-
es, the prevailing party is left without any possibility of relief, since the award
cannot be enforced within the existing arbitral regime, nor can the matter be liti-
gated, since principles of preclusion forbid rehearing the same issues in court.6 6 9
While arguments can be made about estopping a party from denying the enforcea-
662. See Invista S.A.R.L. v. Rhodia, Ltd., 625 F.3d 75, 85 (3d Cir. 2010); InterGen NV v. Grina, 344
F.3d 134, 145-50 (1st Cir. 2003).
663. See BORN, supra note 9, at 1142-1205.
664. See New York Convention, supra note 22, art. 11(2).
665. See id art. V(1)(d).
666. See id.
667. Id.
668. See Strong, Writing, supra note 168, at 88.
669. See Dedon GmbH v. Janus et Cic, No. 10 Civ. 04541(CM), 2011 WL 666174, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 8, 2011) (noting that unenforecability under the New York Convention does not mean an agree-
ment to arbitrate does not exist); see also Martin Platte, An Arbitrator's Duty to Render Enforceable
Awards, 20 J. INT'L ARB. 307 (2003); supra notes 631-45 and accompanying text.
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bility of an arbitral award while simultaneously relying on its terms for resjudica-
ta purposes, the end result is excessive and inappropriate litigation.
This is obviously a difficult question that requires great sensitivity to interna-
tional legal norms and practices. Ultimately, however, when considering the
standards that should apply to non-signatories in international commercial arbitra-
tion:
[t]he touchstone should be whether the parties intended that a non-
signatory be bound by and benefit from the arbitration clause. Answer-
ing that question cannot be achieved through abstract generalizations, but
requires focused consideration of the arbitration clause's language and
the relations and dealings among the parties in a specific factual set-
ting.670
B. Multiparty Arbitration
Another issue that is appearing in international arbitration with increasing
frequency involves multiparty proceedings. Indeed, a significant proportion of the
case load of several international arbitral institutions involves multiparty proceed-
ings.67' Multiparty proceedings arise in a variety of contexts, including consolida-
tion of proceedings, joinder and intervention of parties, and class or collective
arbitration.672
Notably, multiparty disputes often include debates about non-signatories,
since the party who is to be brought into an existing bilateral arbitration may not
have signed the same arbitration agreement as the other parties.67 However, mul-
tiparty arbitrations can also arise in situations where all the parties have signed the
same arbitration agreement. 674 Therefore, the multiparty analysis must be con-
ducted separately from the non-signatory analysis, even if both issues arise in a
particular dispute and even if certain legal theories - such as that involving groups
of companies - are used to justify both the inclusion of a non-signatory and the
use of a multiparty procedure.
Neither the New York nor the Panama Convention deals expressly with the
issue of multiparty arbitration. 675 However, these conventions apply equally to
670. BORN, supra note 9, at 1206.
671. See LEW ET AL., supra note 7, 1 16-1 (noting the percentage of multiparty arbitrations adminis-
tered by the ICC rose from 20% to 30% during the period 1995 to 2001); Martin Platte, When Should
an Arbitrator Join Cases? 18 ARB. INT'L 67, 67 (2002) (noting more than 50% of LCIA arbitrations
reportedly involve more than two parties).
672. See BERNARD HANOTIAU, COMPLEX ARBITRATIONS: MULTIPARTY, MULTICONTRACT, MULTI-
ISSUE AND CLASS ACTIONS (2005); LEW ET AL., supra note 7, 16-39 to 16-61; Platte, supra note
671, at 67.
673. See LEW ET AL., supra note 7, % 16-7 to 16-33; S.1. Strong, Does Class Arbitration "Change the
Nature" ofArbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T and a Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REv. (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Strong, First Principles].
674. See LEW ET AL., supra note 7, T 16-34 to 16-38; Strong, First Principles, supra note 673.
675. See New York Convention, supra note 22; Panama Convention, supra note 25.
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multiparty and bilateral arbitration, at least to the extent that multiparty proceed-
ings are seen as arising out of the agreement of the parties.676
Consent to multiparty proceedings may be implied as a matter of international
law and practice. 7 However, U.S. law is in something of a state of flux on this
issue, due to several recent Supreme Court decisions on class arbitration. Al-
though class arbitration is not entirely analogous to other types of multiparty arbi-
tration, there are sufficient similarities that some of the precedents relating to class
arbitration apply equally to other forms of multiparty arbitration and vice versa.678
Because the FAA is silent on the issue of multiparty arbitration, U.S. courts
must look to case law for guidance.679  The first question is who is to decide
whether multiparty treatment is permitted. Ever since the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, U.S. courts have taken the view
that this task falls to the arbitrators, unless the parties have agreed otherwise.680
This approach has been followed both in class disputes and other kinds of multi-
party proceedings, such as consolidation.68'
In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court cast some doubt on this interpretation of
Bazzle, although the Court did not provide an alternate reading of the case. 682 In
the absence of a definitive ruling it is likely that courts will continue to recognize
the ability of arbitrators to decide the proper procedure to be followed in multipar-
ty proceedings. 683
Multiparty arbitration not only gives rise to questions about who is to decide
whether multiparty proceedings are proper, but also about how the decision-maker
is to determine whether multiparty treatment is permitted. The Supreme Court
also addressed this issue recently in the context of class arbitration, stating that the
question of whether a class proceeding is proper must be determined by reference
to the parties' intent, even in cases of contractual silence or ambiguity.684 Some
commentators have suggested that this decision requires parties to demonstrate
express consent to class arbitration, based on language in the opinion indicating
that "we see the question as being whether the parties agreed to authorize class
arbitration" and that "[a]n implicit agreement to authorize class-action arbitration
676. See Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 190
F. Supp. 2d 936, 946 (S.D. Tex. 2001); BORN, supra note 9, at 2073-74 (citing Articles II(1) and 11(3)
of the New York Convention); LEW ET AL., supra note 7, 11 16-94 to 16-99.
677. See Platte, supra note 671, passim.
678. See Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. Arb/07/5, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Dissenting Opinion dated October 28, 2011, IT 150, 152, 172, 237,
available at http://italaw.com/documents/Abaclat DissentingOpinion.pdf; S.I. Strong, The Sounds of
Silence. Are U.S. Arbitrators Creating Internationally Enforceable Awards When Ordering Class
Arbitration in Cases of Contractual Silence or Ambiguity? 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1017, 1038-43 (2009)
[hereinafter Strong, Silence].
679. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2011).
680. 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality opinion); Strong, First Principles, supra note 673, at 451-52.
681. See Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 489 F.3d 580, 586-87
(3d Cir. 2007).
682. See Stolt-Niclsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1770-72 (2010).
683. See Safra Nat'l Bank of New York v. Penfold Inv. Trading, Ltd., No. 10 Civ. 8255(RWS), 2011
WL 1672467, at *3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2011); Strong, First Principles, supra note 673.
684. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1775-76.
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. . . is not a term that the arbitrator may infer solely from the fact of the parties'
agreement to arbitrate."6 8 5
However, the majority opinion does not go as far as those commentators
claim. Instead, the Supreme Court indicates that consent to class procedures can
be demonstrated implicitly, stating that when the parties have not "reached any
agreement on the issue of class arbitration, the arbitrators' proper task [is] to iden-
tify the rule of law that governs in that situation." 686 This statement obviously
negates the proposition that the parties must expressly consent to class arbitration,
since there would be no need to identify the applicable rule of law to determine
that issue if consent had to be express. 6 8 7
The problem is that the Supreme Court failed to give any clear guidance on
what must be shown in the way of implicit consent, stating instead that it had "no
occasion to decide what contractual basis may support a finding that the parties
agreed to authorize class-action arbitration."688 However, the majority did suggest
that recourse might properly have been had to "either to the FAA itself or to one
of the two bodies of law that the parties claimed were governing, i.e., either feder-
al maritime law or New York law." 689
It is unclear as of yet whether Stolt-Nielsen truly signals any real change in
the realm of class arbitration.690 Even more importantly, it is unclear what impact
the decision will have outside class proceedings, given that multiparty analyses
are conceptually and procedurally similar regardless of whether they are in the
class or non-class context. Although it is too soon to make a firm conclusion,
early decisions suggest that Stolt-Nielsen has not altered the analysis regarding
multiparty arbitration much, if at all, particularly outside the realm of class dis-
putes.69
This means that the analytical approach to multiparty arbitration remains very
much what it was prior to Stolt-Nielsen.692 The standard view in the United States
has long been that arbitrators are competent to resolve questions involving the
propriety of multiparty proceedings, even in the case of contractual silence or
ambiguity.693 Because the decision to allow multiparty proceedings is procedural
in nature, this issue falls firmly within the discretion and jurisdiction of the arbitral
tribunal.694 When deciding whether to allow multiparty treatment of whatever
kind, arbitrators consider the language contained in the agreement between the
685. Id. (emphasis in original); see Gary B. Born & Claudio Salas, The U.S. Supreme Court and Class
Arbitration: A Tragedy of Errors, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 21 (2012).
686. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1768.
687. See Strong, First Principles, supra note 673.
688. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1776 n. 10.
689. Id. at 1768.
690. See id. at 1758.
691. See id. at 1758; Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 118-21 (2d Cir. 2011) (discussing
class arbitration), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1742 (2012); Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 728 F.
Supp. 2d 462, 477-78 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (reviewing partial award concerning consolidation of arbitra-
tions involving 38 parties in wake of fraud perpetrated by Bernard Madoff).
692. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1758; Strong, First Principles, supra note 673.
693. See Strong, Sounds of Silence, supra note 678, at 1059-83.
694. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 47 (2003) (plurality opinion).
[Vol. 2012212
94
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2012, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2012/iss1/8
Navigating the Borders
parties as well as the governing law and arbitral rules so as to determine whether
the parties have demonstrated the requisite consent to multiparty arbitration. 9 5
696Notably, this approach is consistent with international practice. Further-
more, this type of purposive interpretive analysis has been said to be preferable to
strict contractual interpretation. This is because strict constructionism is "based
on the idea that an arbitration agreement constitutes an exception to the principle
of the jurisdiction of the courts, and that, as laws of exception are strictly inter-
preted, the same should apply to arbitration agreements. This view is not con-
sistent" with the notion that arbitration is a reputable means of resolving a wide
variety of disputes.697
C. State Parties
The final matter to consider involves international arbitral proceedings
brought by or against states or state-affiliated entities. These are not treaty-based
arbitrations, such as those discussed above,6 9 8 nor are they state-to-state proceed-
ings. Instead, these disputes involve states and state agencies or instrumentalities
that are behaving essentially as private commercial actors.699
These sorts of transactions give rise to several unique issues in the interna-
tional realm. As a practical matter, private commercial actors typically refuse to
conduct business with a public entity unless they can be sure that they have the
right to pursue the same kinds of legal action against the state party as against a
private party. 70o Although increased acceptance of the restricted view of sover-
eign immunity took care of a number of concerns,7 0 ' problems still existed with
respect to the proper forum for resolution of these sorts of disputes. For example,
foreign states were often not comfortable acting as private litigants in the national
courts of another country. 702 However, private actors dealing with a foreign state
often felt that they would not be given a fair hearing in the courts of that nation.703
The solution to this dilemma was international commercial arbitration.
Disputes involving public actors give rise to the same kinds of issues and
problems as arise in purely private disputes. However, there is one clear distinc-
tion, in that foreign states, agencies, and instrumentalities may sometimes try to
object to the jurisdiction of a U.S. court on the grounds of sovereign immunity.705
Claims of foreign sovereign immunity give rise to a wide range of issues that
are beyond the scope of this guide. However, analyses are simplified in matters
695. See Anwar, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 477-78 (noting an agreement to allow multiparty proceedings can
be implied, based on, among other things, contractual provisions and structure); BORN, supra note 9, at
2083-85; LEW ET AL., supra note 7,1 16-8.
696. See Strong, Silence, supra note 678, at 1059-83.
697. FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN, supra note 138, 480.
698. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
699. See LEW ET AL., supra note 7, % 27-1 to 27-83.
700. See id. 1 27-3.
701 See Pauline Whittinghill Klyce Pennoyer, Note, A New Frontera: Foreign Sovereign Immunity,
Arbitral Awards anda Wave Goodbye to Assets, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 115, 148 (2010).
702. See LEW ET AL., supra note 7,1 27-3.
703. See id
704. See id
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involving arbitration because of a specific exception to immunity contained in the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).706 That provision states:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of
the United States or of the States in any case -
(6) in which the action is brought, either to enforce an agreement
made by the foreign state with or for the benefit of a private party to
submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or
which may arise between the parties with respect to a defined legal
relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter
capable of settlement by arbitration under the laws of the United
States, or to confirm an award made pursuant to such an agreement
to arbitrate, if (A) the arbitration takes place or is intended to take
place in the United States, (B) the agreement or award is or may be
governed by a treaty or other international agreement in force for the
United States calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards, (C) the underlying claim, save for the agreement to arbitrate,
could have been brought in a United States court under this section
or section 1607, or (D) paragraph (1) of this subsection is otherwise
applicable.7 o?
Therefore, foreign states that are parties to an arbitration agreement typically may
not successfully invoke their status as sovereigns as means of blocking an en-
forcement action in a U.S. court in an action relating to that arbitration.
Because the statute only mentions motions to compel arbitration and motions
to enforce arbitral awards, some questions exist as to whether a U.S. court has
jurisdiction over a foreign state or state agency in a proceeding involving a motion
for provisional relief. There is very little authority on this issue, although courts
have accepted jurisdiction over a foreign state in cases involving enforcement of
an interim order regarding prejudgment security. 708 Alternatively, it appears that a
motion by a state actor to stay an improperly initiated arbitration will not neces-
sarily result in loss of sovereign immunity.709
706 See 28 U.S.C. § 1603 et seq.
707. Id. § 1605(a)(6); see also id. § 1605(a)(1) (waiving jurisdictional immunities in cases "in which
the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any
withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign state may purport to effect except in accordance with the
terms of the waiver). Prior to the passage of subsection (6), U.S. courts addressed all FSIA cases
involving arbitration under the waiver exception reflected in subsection (1). See id. §1605(a); S.I.
Strong, Enforcement ofArbitral Awards Against Foreign States and State Agencies, 26 Nw. J. INT'L L.
335, 337, 343-45 (2006). It is of course also possible to assert that the foreign entity who has engaged
in business akin to a private commercial actor falls under what is known as the commercial exception
in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, but the arbitration exception tends to be easier to prove. See
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3); LEW ET AL., supra note 7, $ 27-54 to 27-81.
708. See Banco de Seguros del Estado v. Mutual Marine Offices, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d 362, 374
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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For the most part, international commercial arbitration treats state actors ex-
actly the same as non-public parties. Thus, for example, a state entity can be
brought into an arbitration as a non-signatory, despite some courts' reluctance to
do so.710
However, there is one way in which foreign states and state agencies are dis-
tinguishable from private parties. Several recent decisions have held that "foreign
states are not 'persons' entitled to rights under the Due Process Clause" of the
U.S. Constitution.71' This means that parties bringing a motion to compel arbitra-
tion or enforce an arbitral award against a foreign state do not have to demonstrate
that a U.S. court has personal jurisdiction over the foreign state in the constitu-
tional sense (i.e., that the minimum contacts test has been met).712
At this point it is unclear whether and to what extent this principle extends to
other state-affiliated entities, such as state-owned foreign corporations.713 Nota-
bly, these developments do not affect the constitutional requirements for personal
jurisdiction over private parties, which still must be met regardless of the parties'
location and regardless of their status as legal or natural persons.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the preceding discussion has shown, international commercial arbitration
is a complicated area of law requiring detailed knowledge not only of domestic
legal principles but also of international law and practice. International commer-
cial arbitration holds a unique position in the world of dispute resolution, requir-
ing courts to show great deference to international norms in order to ensure the
kind of consistency and predictability that is vital to the effective functioning of
the global economy.714
Parties, arbitrators and counsel entering the realm of international commercial
arbitration must be prepared for a steep learning curve, not only with respect to
the concepts involved but also with respect to the types of legal authorities that are
commonly used in this field. Because so much of what goes on in international
commercial arbitration needs to be placed in comparative context, parties need to
rely on foreign statutes and judicial opinions, arbitral rules and awards, and schol-
arly treaties and commentary in addition to more familiar sources such as treaties,
statutes, and case law.
Although many of the legal principles that apply to domestic arbitration apply
equally to international disputes, parties cannot assume that the two mechanisms
are completely analogous. A significant number of procedures, practices, and
710. See U.S. Titan, Inc. v. Guangzhou Zhen Hua Shipping Co., Ltd., 241 F.3d 135, 146 (2d Cir.
2001); BORN, supra note 9, at 1203.
711. Frontera Res. Azerbaijan Corp. v. State Oil Co. of Azerbaijan Republic, 582 F.3d 393, 400 (2d
Cir. 2009); see also U.S. CONsT. amend. V; TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Property Fund of Ukraine, 411
F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
712. See, eg, Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, SA v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
414-15 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980); Oppenheimer
Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 n.13 (1978); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945)
713. See Frontera Res., 582 F.3d at 401.
714. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985).
No. I] 215
97
Strong: Strong: Navigating the Borders
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
policies are entirely unique to international commercial arbitration. What is more,
all of these procedures, practices or policies are constantly being reviewed by both
courts and members of the international arbitral community so as to ensure the
smooth resolution of international commercial disputes. Although it can be chal-
lenging to keep up with current developments, those who wish to practice in this
field will find it a rewarding and challenging area of specialization. 715
715. Those who wish to familiarize themselves with the resources in this area of law can consult the
bibliography of recent monographs, treatises, specialty journals and arbitral reporters found in
STRONG, supra note 7. Readers may also consult some of the treatises and specialty journals men-
tioned earlier. See supra note 141. Finally, those who aspire to practice in this area of law should
consider joining one of the various international organizations specializing in international commercial
arbitration so as to keep abreast of current events in the field. Some good starting points include the
American Bar Association's Section of International Law, the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators' North
American Branch, the International Bar Association's Arbitration Committee and the London Court of
International Arbitration's (LCIA) North American Branch
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